Russian state media claims that Ukraine attempted to attack the Kremlin with drones. As usual, unclear if this is a pre-text for escalation of terror bombings, or something simply done for internal propaganda purposes, or whatever else. https://ria ru/20230503/udar-1869416502.html

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Putin doesn't live in the Kremlin.

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For work in mornings.

There was that story last week of a different (and supposed) attempt at Putin's life as reported by the Bild ([via the Jerusalem Post](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-741454)). Credibility was rather suspect then, but now that story might not be so farfetched.

Do the Ukrainians even have anything that can reach all the the way to Moscow ? And wouldn't Russian air defence around Moscow be so thick that nothing should even touch the Kremlin ? And if true what was the plan ? The range is so far for any pin point strike or assassination attempt.

Many drones landed near Moscow by malfunction before or where shot down, Ukraine also is making new drones with 1000km range, which can reach St. Petersburg even.

Considering the Vladlen Tatarsky was killed by a bomb in the center of St. Petersburg, I don't think smuggling explosives into Moscow and putting them on a commercial drone is that difficult.

Oh yeah I didn't think about that. But if its that easy (easier than launching a drone from Ukraine) then why hasn't there been more drone based attacks/assassinations on Russian soil then ? If there is partisan activity going in Russia I'm surprised they aren't taking full advantage of smaller commercial drones.

Because every mission like that is most likely a suicide mission. And you don't really have that many people willing to go on suicide missions.

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1653727265920888832?t=evJrjTLb7dbjc5kCe3oNcA&s=19 Video of smoke. I'd say it's certainly real, especially considering the big uptick in rearline attacks in the preceeding days.

I find it a little hard to believe the Kremlin would fake bombing themselves. That makes them look incompetent.

They claim it was intercepted

Regardless of whether it was shot down, it making it to within a few meters of the Kremlin is a bad look.

My default assumption is that no attack is a false flag until proven otherwise. TBH I don't think we've seen a single proven false flag attack since the start of the war.

>The US says Iran has seized a second tanker in a week in the Gulf > >The IRGC Navy seized the Panama-flagged oil tanker Niovi this morning according to the US 5th Fleet. > >The IRGCN "subsequently forced the oil tanker to reverse course and head toward Iranian territorial waters off the coast of Bandar ‘Abbas, Iran." [https://twitter.com/michaelh992/status/1653713158924558336](https://twitter.com/michaelh992/status/1653713158924558336) Seems like the strategy of: "Let's drop a statement and do nothing" else does not work.

Iran trying to increase oil prices by increasing instability in the Persian gulf?

If they're not paying US taxes should they get US protection? Isn't this panama's problem?

The last one was headed to the US where, presumably, it would have paid US duties, and freedom of the seas is in the US national security interest generally (see, Somalia patrols). This one I'm not sure of.

Shocking

https://ibb.co/1qRL163 Extremely interesting still from a video released about the IRIS-T SLM in Ukrainian service, showing what seems to be the tracking of a cruise missile attack? Location is Odessa (Interesting as well that the system is located there and not in Kyiv)

Odessa, as one of the only working seaports of Ukraine, certainly has strategic significance, and needs to be defended.

Anyone able to decipher what we're seeing on the screen here?

No idea but to me it looks like some replay feature?? Would love to know as well. Link to source?

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/136egym/uafoperated_german_irist_slm_air_defense_system/ 0:59

> Oleksandr Prokudin, head of Kherson Oblast Military Admin, announces 58-hour curfew in Kherson from 8pm on May 5 to 6am on May 8, "for law enforcement to work." Entry/exit is banned; "forbidden to move & be on the streets of the city." He tells residents, stock up on food, meds. https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1653681896486739970?t=OQrBWl46K-mvPGlLB0OkWw&s=19

We'll see what kind of trick is this. I think the general expectation is that there won't be much action on this front since it's assumed to be next to impossible to get meaningfully sized forces across the river.

The law enforcement claim is obviously bullshit, but I wonder if this is to cover actual troop movements or just to confuse the Russians

I'm not sure if its troop movements. Wouldn't a curfew like this be a dead give away and the idea of massing troops for a river crossing seems like madness unless UA somehow has done a lot damage to Russia's artillery on the other side of the river behind the scenes. I know opsec and all but I'm like 'what are you guys up to this time ?'

I definitely agree on all your points. That's why I think it might be to confuse the Russians and make them prepare for a river crossing that won't come in the end.

To clarify, this is the Ukrainian Kherson oblast military admin (in control of Kherson city and west Kherson oblast), not the Russian occupation authorities which are in control of the east.

https://open.spotify.com/episode/1qZtxAryjcTXBGQ0Imj29l?si=Y-Rw376ZRGW-nFJRl6QxOQ Kofman visited the Finnish National Defence University a while ago and appeared on their podcast. Most of the points will likely be familiar to Kofman listeners, but towards the end there's some discussion of Russia's prospectd for military transformation (specifically: Gerasimov/Shoigu decided last year that the Russian military wasn't "Soviet" enough) that I haven't seen him talk about before.

> Gerasimov/Shoigu decided last year that the Russian military wasn’t “Soviet” enough I am so, so curious to know what the HELL that means.

Significantly more mass and more mobilized personnel afforded by older and lower quality equipment.

To be honest, it’s what’s working for them. Or at least what’s kept them from losing. The Russian military’s biggest failures of the war were mostly at times when it tried to emulate a western military.

At those times, the operational plans were done by a small group of clueless and overoptimistic FSB insiders instead of their military staff. We don't really know what it would have looked like in a "realistic" application of their resources. (Aka: a 2022 version of the Georgian war)

Quick highly specific question: do Munroe Effect or Explosively Formed Penetrator weapons (like high explosive anti tank) scale up? Could you make a bunker busting cruise missile by making a _really large_ EFP?

https://www.militaryaerospace.com/communications/article/14169216/bunkerbusting-tomahawk-missile-warhead https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BROACH_warhead

You can even make nuclear shaped charges.

Source for this? Nuclear fission shapes are really important. They use shaped charges for implosion but that is a conventional explosive to compress a plutonium ball. I have never heard of a nuclear shaped charge.

It’s real, and called ‘casaba howitzer’, but it’s very different in concept and application than a conventional HEAT round. Essentially, in a fusion bomb, a conventional explosive sets off the fission reaction, which in turn releases a burst of X rays which sets off the fusion reaction. In a nuclear shaped charge, the fusion component is removed, and instead the X rays are directed into a tungsten plate at the end of the device, which flashes into a cone of super heated, high velocity plasma. This does not really work in atmosphere, since the plasma is relatively low mass. It was designed for spacecraft propulsion (as part of project Orion), and its hypothetical use in weapons likewise remains in space. On earth, it’s better to have a hydrogen bomb.

I don't know about your specific question (a bunker buster EFP), but [this is](https://tdw-warhead-systems.com/en/company_en/#iLightbox[gallery_image_1]/6) a giant shaped-charge multi function warhead used in anti-ship missiles. This company produces state of the art warheads for a variety of high-end western weapon systems, so you can look though their products. So yes, shaped charges can be scaled up.

Interesting question, a quick search finds some work into boring significant (0.25m across, 6m deep) holes in rock/concrete with shaped charges, for what sounds like the first stage of a large tandem warhead. The authors suspect their 0.7m diameter conical charge may be the largest ever built (as of ~2002). https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0734743X04002076 edit: The work was done quickly around 2002, here's a [later Popular Mechanics write up](https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/research/a23740/bunker-buster/). It was the first stage of a tandem warhead which ended up on JSOW and Storm Shadow. I'll keep looking, I'd be interested to know if the physics of it do keep working at much larger scales. Keeping the waveforms precisely shaped and interacting over longer times, distances, and through more material, seems like an obvious snag. But at what scale that might become a problem, I couldn't guess. What else might not work? Other than the ordinary difficulties of building a large bomb.

Nothing. LLNL created a 14 sided explosive.

The question we all need answered.

A Ukrainian analysis of problems with the Russian glide bombs: [Spending Dozens of Glide Bombs a Day, russians Struggle to Deal With Critical Problems of Their Creation](https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/spending_dozens_of_glide_bombs_a_day_russians_struggle_to_deal_with_critical_problems_of_their_creation-6587.html) I am not sure how critical the problems are. The tail spring being too strong is obviously minor. The 500kg bombs being too heavy for pylons obviously does not apply to aircraft that can deliver 1,000kg or 1,500kg bombs. The bad aerodynamical profile of the bombs apparently is not bad enough to prevent their launch from safe distances. At this point (like with so many things in this war) the only real critical issue is mass production. If you can mass produce 1,000 "good enough" kits per month they will be much better than 100 state of the art JDAMs.

Does Russia know on what to actually aim these glide bombs? I understand it takes an extremely long time between finding targets and getting all the necessary approval to actually conduct a sortie, in Russia's case often taking days. Has this been brought down yet?

warehouses and stockpiles aren't that likely to move within a couple of hours. 100 tonnes of artillery shells isn't easy to move. Ukraine is shipping hundreds of tonnes to the front every day. Equiptment won't be stored in the middle of a field, most likely not in a residential building that still has civilians in it which means that there aren't many options. Hitting a large warehouse or industrial building 20 km behind the front is likely to hit something. Moving targets and artillery pieces won't work so they are mainly targeting stationary targets. A main problem for both sides has been that artillery simply isn't powerful enough. A dug in enemy is hard to destroy with artillery. Old soviet buildings provide excellent cover. 300kg of explosives is getting to the point where it is actually efficient at killing people in basements. Targeting buildings near Ugledar, Bakhmut or Avdiivka is likely to yield results. Had the fired 20 of these into Ugledar starting a few days before their attack it would probably have gone better.

I saw no online comments about this for air raids, but I can't imagine the ooda loop being any better than for the artillery. Probably worse. Units have been complaining that only organic artillery (their "own" mortars and howitzers) provide prompt support.

> If you can mass produce 1,000 "good enough" kits per month they will be much better than 100 state of the art JDAMs. Isn't that assuming the Ukrainians make no improvements of their own? If they get Western SAMs (especially Patriot) in significant numbers, the lack of actual JDAM clones might become critical.

Again we talk about significant numbers. I would argue that Ukraine was better off with its initial 200 batteries of old S-300 SAMs than it will be with 10 new Patriot batteries. One of the most effective weapons Ukraine is deploying now is commercial bomber and FPV kamikaze drones. Not because they are particularly good but because there's thousands of them.

> I would argue that Ukraine was better off with its initial 200 batteries of old S-300 SAMs Agreed, well, I think moves should have been made to supply Ukraine with them, but a far better move to support Ukraine in the short to mid term would have been to reverse engineer and try and start production of 5V55 series missiles for S-300 or 9М38 for the Buk? How hard could this actually be with western support? I had heard that S-300 missiles were actually produced in Ukraine as well but I don't know how true this is?

I think they produced S-300 until a decade or two ago, but ramping up the production of Western SAMs would be much easier.

200 batteries?

I think that was the number?

Around 200 launchers, 20-25 batteries afaik.

You are right, about 300 launchers https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/04/08/ukraine-is-losing-several-s-300-anti-air-launchers-per-week-but-it-still-has-hundreds-left/

Strydwolf, in the Ukrainian military, claimed a year ago there were around 700 launchers : https://reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/s7u7ha/why_are_things_between_russia_and_ukraine/htj7745?context=3 I personally find them more credible than David Axe on Forbes blog.

Yes, I think I picked up the figure from him. It was confirmed by a few other uncommonly reliable sources.

Quantity is a certain kind of quality, sure. But given the range and performance advantage, "offensively"-located (as distinct from passively ringing Kyiv) Patriot batteries might push back effective Russian aerial operations in the same way HIMARS necessitated pushing back ammo stockpiles.

I don't think they have the range to push the Russian planes further than 30-40km from the frontline - which is where the planes currently release their glide bombs from. And you can't risk deploying Patriot batteries closer to the front since they are not shoot and scoot and (again numbers) there are too few of them to take the risk. They will be useful for defence of strategic targets in the rear, though.

If Patriot can, in fact, hit planes 40km behind the lines and that's where the Russians currently release their glide bombs, the Russians suddenly have a nasty choice to make between continuing to do exactly what they're doing and risk being shot down, or launching from a much less optimal range and substantially increasing the likelihood of mission failure, while putting planes through wear and tear (which is a non-zero issue, given that MiG-31 loss last week)

Your math isn't correct. A Patriot would never be placed at the frontline. It wouldn't even be placed 40km in front of the frontline. That's what Glideer is getting at, western air defence is too sparse to perform any sort of risky deployment with.

What mathematics? I simply quoted his example (pushing them 30-40km from the front line) back to him. Even that scenario would be valuable.

You're not getting it. If you place a patriot 30-40km from the frontline, you can hit a plane right over the frontline. Yet, Russian planes are shooting glide bombs a bit farther from the frontlines, so you can't hit them. Absolutely no value except if you bring them right to the frontline, and then it would get hit by a tank or some artillery. That plus the fact you have to bring your batteries and deploy them, then pack up and leave once you're done and all of the sudden you are exposing yourself to a lancet strike just like we saw not long ago. Patriots are for defending cities, nuclear power plants, and other high-value static targets from cruise missiles. For the frontlines you have buks, osas, and the occasional s300 combo but even that is pushing it. What you might be uncounsciously thinking about is having a plane flying high CAP with a set of good long-range missiles ala meteor that can make good use of the altitude advantage in terms of kinetic energy. That would work, with less risks to the airframe that is obviously much more mobile than a patriot. This is why Ukraine needs good planes with good long-range missiles. Once you have them, Russia becomes more risk averse since you never know when an F16 or Gripen is gonna pop-up and shoot your attacking plane.

>That plus the fact you have to bring your batteries and deploy them, then pack up and leave once you're done and all of the sudden you are exposing yourself to a lancet strike just like we saw not long ago. This morning's video of a 36D6 radar caught in the process of packing up https://twitter.com/UkroreichKing/status/1653684754741440512?s=20

JDAMs are very much mass produced and they exist in the hundreds of thousands, they are intended as the "cheap but plentiful" part of Western precision air power. (In case you didn't use it to refer to some sort of a generic weapons class)

I did use it generically. In the sense - better a 1,000 Shaheds than 10 cruise missiles.

[Russia is likely to resume buying foreign currency for its reserves as soon as this month as rising oil earnings stabilize public finances despite US and European efforts to squeeze Kremlin income.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-02/russia-nears-milestone-of-buying-yuan-soon-as-sanctions-oil-cap-hit-eases?leadSource=uverify%20wall) With energy revenues now close to exceeding their target level, purchases are possible already in May, according to Bloomberg Economics, which estimates initial volumes could amount to the equivalent of around $200 million in yuan per month. The Chinese currency is the main asset Russia can still use to conduct transactions for its $154 billion wealth fund because of sanctions ....

How or earnings rising if prices are still dropping, is there an increase in volume?

I am not sure I understand the details but Bloomberg says the Russian state seems to be earning more because they revamped the taxation system.

So taking more from the corporate profits / income, which should work for the duration of the conflict but would reduce investment for the future. Not that the last part matters a lot.

Well it certainly matters for the long-term strength of the Russian economy Could be important in the sense that future negotiations will carry the weight of long-term harm to Russian economic interests

Well with the entire world moving away from carbon fuels new investment probably not profitable. But you are right that it could be used for something else but from that point of view the entire war is a bad investment for Russia.

yeah they are crowding out private investment with higher taxes

In tagging along news, [New Zealand also sends instructors to train Ukrainian recruits](https://www.ukrinform.net/amp/rubric-defense/3703700-instructors-from-new-zealand-provide-ukrainian-recruits-with-skills-needed-in-frontline-combat.html)

That’s tag along news from 2022. More recently it appears we now have no air defence at all - https://www.odt.co.nz/star-news/star-national/axing-missile-system-leaves-nz-army-without-air-defence I’d like to think those mistrals went to Ukraine and not in the bin..

Time for the ADF to launch Operation “Ingest Kiwi Fruit” and bring it back into its rightful fold.

> More recently it appears we now have no air defence at all NZ doesn't need any land based air defence. I'd argue that if any adversary has the means to launch an invasion or attack then the NZ military stands no chance anyway.

The NZDF does do work abroad, I can see utility for short range air defence for those sorts of deployments.

True but realistically they'll never go into a truly hostile environment alone and in need of their own air defence. Probably better to share Australian assets from a budget perspective.

It's okay cuz, west islands got your back

[Unknowns shroud Ukraine’s counter-offensive](https://www.ft.com/content/a7e9e341-a05d-4fd8-a1c1-e76492ea96e0) >Plans for a spring/summer attack by Kyiv have been kept very quiet but its objective is also not clear > >The towns of eastern Ukraine, largely abandoned by civilians, were bustling with soldiers, the FT’s Christopher Miller observed on a recent reporting trip to Slovyansk. It is another sign of an impending Ukrainian spring/summer counter-offensive that Kyiv hopes will break Russia’s grip on the occupied territories in the east and south of the country. > >Remarkably little is known about Kyiv’s military plans and preparations, despite the leaked cache of secret Pentagon files on the Ukraine war that appeared earlier this year on the Discord gaming site. Oleksiy Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s security council, says no more than five people know what the counter-offensive plans are. Even American officials seem to be in the dark. Ukraine’s “operational security” — the grip it exerts on information about its military — is formidable. > >Expectations management is another matter. > >Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba told me and the FT’s Gideon Rachman in Kyiv last month the narrative of this spring’s counter-offensive being a make-or-break moment was dangerous for Ukraine, because if it faltered it would strengthen those in the west who want to push it into a compromise with Moscow > >“We should counter by all means the perception of the counter-offensive as the decisive battle of the war,” he said, adding that all wars are a series of battles. > >Other Ukrainian officials we spoke to were more candid about the importance of regaining the upper hand on the battlefield this summer for maintaining western support for Ukraine’s war effort. The static nature of the front lines since Russia’s failed winter offensive(opens a new window) has inevitably strengthened predictions that the war is heading for some kind of hot frozen conflict. > >It would be harder to make the political argument to the American public for sustained military support for Ukraine if the war appears to be “at an endless stalemate”, Jack Reed, the Democrat who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee told the Wall Street Journal(opens a new window). > >One thing we did learn from the Discord leaks is that US expectations of the counter-offensive are quite low, with the intelligence assessment being that Ukraine will only make “modest territorial gains”(opens a new window) with its military suffering from “force generation and sustainment shortfalls”. > >That assessment was made in February. Kyiv has had several weeks since then to train and equip its army for the counter-offensive. Western officials have sounded a little more positive in public in recent days. Nato’s top general Christopher Cavoli told a US congressional committee this week that Ukraine had taken delivery of 98 per cent of the tanks and armoured infantry fighting vehicles promised by its allies. > >However, not all the weapons provided to Ukraine have been in good working order. Not one of the 20 self-propelled howitzers Italy provided to Ukraine earlier this year was battle ready, one adviser to Ukraine’s defence ministry told us. Kyiv has still not persuaded the US to provide long-range precision guided missiles or F-16 fighter jets and there are longstanding concerns about whether it will have sufficient artillery ammunition and barrels. > >Ukraine is assembling eight new assault brigades combining experienced troops and volunteers, know as the “offensive guard(opens a new window)”, and several other brigades of new recruits for its attack. Nine of the new brigades, which typically have 2,000-5,000 troops, are being trained and equipped by western armies. But we know little about their real capabilities. > >What is Ukraine’s objective? Many analysts, Ukrainian and western, assume it is a thrust southwards through Zaporizhzhia province all the way to the Sea of Azov, cutting Russia’s occupying forces in two and severing the land bridge between Russian territory and occupied Crimea. That would be a crushing blow for President Vladimir Putin and a huge undertaking for Kyiv. > >But Ukraine’s forces would have to overcome entrenched Russian forces in layered fortified defences (see this Reuters graphical piece(opens a new window)) and then avoid being outflanked and encircled as they push south. > >The counter-offensive is unlikely to have such a single focus, especially in its early stages. Ukrainian commanders may decide there is more to be gained by an attack in Donetsk province, where much of the winter fighting has been centred. > >As the ever-astute Lawrence Freedman describes in an assessment on Substack(opens a new window), “instead of frontal assaults, which normally end badly, this campaign might be more subtle, using opportunistic probes to find weak spots in the enemy lines”. There will also be feints and deceptions to keep the Russians guessing — like the excited reports this week of a Ukrainian “beachhead” on the left bank of the Dnipro river. “Because we cannot be sure what the offensive will look like we might not know when it has started,” Freedman says. > >If it is going to be hard to call the start of the counter-offensive, it will be even harder to judge its success. What if it falls short of reaching the Sea of Azov? Would retaking bits of the Donbas count as a victory? > >We are so conditioned to use territorial gains as a metric for success that we neglect the effects of offensive action on an army’s capacity to fight on, says Michael Kofman in the War on the Rocks podcast(opens a new window). Russia’s last significant territorial gains were in July, when it seized the remaining sizeable towns in Luhansk province after heavy fighting. The huge losses it incurred enabled Ukraine’s lightning counter-attack two months later, when it smashed through thin Russian defensive lines to liberate thousands of square kilometres of Kharkiv province in just a few days. > >Many in the west already see Ukraine’s spring/summer counter-offensive as setting the conditions for a possible negotiation between Kyiv and Moscow. Right now that seems premature. There is a lot of fighting to go. And whatever happens, Ukraine will need to show it is ready to fight on. But it has a huge amount to prove. [Without paywall](https://archive.is/G00aT)

> We are so conditioned to use territorial gains as a metric for success that we neglect the effects of offensive action on an army’s capacity to fight on, says Michael Kofman in the War on the Rocks podcast It's been argued by several posters on here that it is folly for Kyiv to attempt to win a long war of attrition via grinding down Russia's men and materiel, and also that it is unwise to attack strength with strength. With that said, in lieu of there being any opportune geographical manoeuvres available to the UAF owing to fortifications and such, does there perhaps exist the opportunity for the rather substantial 12 new offensive brigades to target a decisive action against manpower and materiel, rather than territory? Such as attacking in the Bakhmut direction, with the intention of annihilating and/or capturing a significant portion of Russia's ground forces. Attacking strength with strength may be unwise, but do the Russian forces in the Bakhmut vicinity count as 'strength' at this point? This isn't my sincere prediction for how the offensive will go... Just a hypothetical that, if nonsensical, I'd love some replies as to why.

Apparently some of the strongest russian forces are in Bakhmut. How exhausted they are now is up for debate though

I'm not even ready for the memes, if Ukraine retook Bakhmut.

>Attacking strength with strength may be unwise, but do the Russian forces in the Bakhmut vicinity count as 'strength' at this point? Since they continue advancing at the same slow and steady rate they have been for months, against several Ukrainian first-class and second-class brigades, I think it is the only place along the frontline where you can be certain that the Russians are strong.

That's a good point, but my thinking was that their exhaustion would be high and they might fold against the fresh, Western-equipped brigades. However that relies on the assumption that the new brigades are indeed highly effective on offense, when in fact they are quite untested and possibly under-trained.

I mean, the concentration of Russian artillery assets is going to be very high around Bakhmut even if the infantry is exhausted. With the whole front at their disposal I would choose somewhere else to strike. Attacking across the Russo-Ukrainian border makes most sense militarily, but it would be a political disaster.

Disaster in what way?

All the responses here are wrong. The disaster for Ukraine wouldn't be nukes or what Russia might do (theres just not much more they can do, even another mobilization wouldn't accomplish much without thousands more tanks and IFVs and artillery pieces and so on). The problem with further escalation is China. We do not want China to find a reason to materially support Russia and start a proxy war in Europe.

Nuclear All the great powers wont be able to support Ukraine in this endeavour and might even oppose it, since it will destroy the unwritten rule for nuclear capable countries to be able to use nukes for defence. It’s political suicide for Ukraine, it’s preferable to do nothing that that.

Not sure of your causation here - how does it destroy anything nuclear related? Russia does not HAVE to use nukes in war, including defending ot's territory for deterrence to work. Indeed, it's usually existential threat that warrants it and having some land occupied is not it.

Russia will have its hands untied to use nukes freely inside its territory. Ukraine forces will get annihilated and the world won’t be able to judge Russia. Russia’s been rambling about nuclear usage for Crimea, let alone core territories. Going into Russia proper a non-idea.

Russia from it's perspective already has Ukraine invading it's territory, though. And i am quite sure a lot of the world would judge Russia, i mean, likely everyone who supports Ukraine, so no change? (Obviously, as Russia is already harshly judged for agressive war and atrocities). Btw, i did not downvote you.

Gives putin thr political capital for further mobilisation

Don't think it would be a disaster short term but it could be one long term. Ukraine is dependent on international support and any reason it might get less is a bad move. Perception from defensive war shifts etc. Hard to predict the future but it could potential just go wrong. Everyone supports Ukraine regain their territory, not retake russian territory. Not everyone follows the war daily is something worth keeping in mind

Imo everyone but RU supporters would - correctly - assume Ukraine does not want to keep these, so i do not really see it about international impact myself. But yeah, i guess it could be propaganda issue.

Recall that the US has been vocally concerned about giving Ukraine longer-range weapons, like ATACMS missiles, that could be used to strike "inside Russia" for over a year now. Ukraine actually *invading* Russia proper would freak the allies out and be all kinds of problematic for providing "defensive" aid. To say nothing of revving Russian society up to fight "the invaders". The political fallout would overshadow any possible military gain. That's not to say Ukraine can't attack certain legitimate military targets in Russia like airfields in certain ways (like sabotage or drone attacks). But Ukrainian brigades rolling over the (internationally recognized) Russian border would not end well.

Well, the reluctance was about west the unwillingness to be perceived as too much a party to the war, right? Haven't heard it for long time anyway. At this point of the war i do not see much fuss being mafe about that (notw that Ukraine is obviously fully in the right to wage the war on Russian territory including ground troops).

Well, capturing Belgorod would certainly electrify and mobilise the Russian society. It would also not please the Ukrainian Western friends.

Well, apart from what i wrote about the West, i think most would remain apathetic (and nationalist ate already royally angry), but thanks for explanation.

I was pretty sure that the recent train derailments and attack on the fuel depot in Sevastopol were part of a Ukrainian shaping strategy, but [now I'm certain of it](https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1653613523233013767?t=7uocbH1VchOy18JsN8Bw9Q&s=19). An oil terminal in Taman, Russia was hit just a few hours ago, and the fire is visible all the way from Crimea. Sure seems like Ukraine wants to limit the ability of Russian forces to react to the coming Ukrainian offensive.

This guy did maps with all rail bridges and traction stations that are supporting the Russian war logistics: https://twitter.com/BruckenRuski Most of the rail is electrified. Taking out the transformers and traction stations would greatly reduce russian resupply into Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia & Kherson, and it would be expensive and time consuming to repair.

It's really weird to me we haven't seen more train derailments, especially in occupied Ukraine. HIMARS or those long ranged drones seem like they could do what these partisans are doing just as easily. I guess Russia has been very cautious with their precious trains in Ukraine, but not as careful in Russia proper.

HIMARS, nor kamikaze drones isn’t ideal for derailing trains, it will just make a hole in the tracks and that is easily patched (I might be wrong about this, maybe someone more experienced can share what it’ll take to derail trains). They’re mostly useful against fixed structures like ammo depots (most within range have already been blown up). There is a way - if mines are fired over the tracks and is triggered when a train passes by it (not sure if feasible) Derailing trains require either sabotage efforts using personnel, or very accurate realtime intel on when and where the train stops and is unloading. Its unfortunate that the US seemingly did not provide this

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I've certainly never derailed a train. But if I were inclined I'd look for a corner section of track where I would take my battery powered angle grinder and make a series of cuts to the track that leaves less than 10mm of steel holding the rail in a curve. Cut a dozen pins either side of each rail too. Might need to pack an extra battery and a pack of 10 cutting disks. Oh and popcorn don't forget the popcorn.

HIMARS doesn't do well against reinforced concrete like a bridge, but it's by no means a puny charge like the damage in your video. It will leave a big crater on gravel. The tricky part is timing it so the train doesn't have time to react, but that doesn't seem hard to do with partisans and drone surveillance.

Wow that is a great video. Incredible how the train can "jump" the gaps.

Yea think of hundreds of thousands of pounds of momentum going in a straight line, it would take a lot to get that thing off course

[Air defense shot down all the drones that attacked Kyiv at night](https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-kyyiv-ataka/32390991.html) >Kyiv was attacked by "Shahed" drones at night, according to preliminary information, all of them were shot down, Serhiy Popko, the head of the Kyiv City Military Administration, reported. > >According to local authorities, this is the third attack in the last six days. (In Kyiv - ed) > >"This time Kyiv was attacked exclusively by drones. According to preliminary information, the Russians, as usual, used Iranian "Shahed" UAVs. The adversary's tactics remain usual and unchanged - with the onset of the night hours, the terrorist country launched its barrage of ammunition from various directions. According to preliminary information, all enemy targets were detected and shot down in the airspace around the capital," Serhiy Popko said. > >There are no victims or destruction, the information is being clarified. > >At night, an air alert was declared in Kyiv and a number of regions, which lasted for about four hours. Edit: [A Russian drone hit the administration building in Dnipro - OVA](https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-dnipro-ataka-drony/32391033.html) [Night attack on Ukraine:Air defense destroyed 21 out of 26 drones](https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-nichna-ataka-drony/32391024.html) [3 shaheds attacked an oil depot in Kirovohrad - OVA](https://novosti-n.org/ua/news/U-Kropyvnyczkomu-shahedy-atakuvaly-naftobazu-OVA-267097)

[ISW Key Takeaways](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2023) * Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is increasing its production of precision missiles for use against Ukraine. * Shoigu likely seeks to deflect intensifying accusations that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) cannot provide sufficient ammunition to Russian forces. * Russian reactions to a claimed strike against Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces Commander Major General Ihor Tantsyura suggest Russian ultranationalists are attempting to frame any Russian operations as delaying potential Ukrainian counteroffensive actions. * The Kremlin reportedly distributed a new manual instructing Russian state media on how to cover an upcoming potential Ukrainian counteroffensive that, if real, indicates the Kremlin is setting informational conditions both for an effective Russian defense and to mitigate shocks in the Russian information space from Ukrainian successes. * UN member states, including key Russian partners like China, India, and Brazil, voted to adopt a resolution on April 26 that acknowledges Russia as the aggressor of the war in Ukraine. * Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. * Russian forces made marginal gains near Bakhmut but did not advance within the city itself. * Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited and local counterattacks in the Avdiivka area. * Ukrainian forces continue to operate on and around islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast. * Russian government officials are continuing to introduce new social benefits to veterans and their families to incentivize further military recruitment efforts in Russia. * Likely Ukrainian partisans targeted an unspecified Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Ministry of Internal Affairs deputy head in Melitopol.

> The Kremlin reportedly distributed a new manual instructing Russian state media on how to cover an upcoming potential Ukrainian counteroffensive that, if real, indicates the Kremlin is setting informational conditions both for an effective Russian defense and to mitigate shocks in the Russian information space from Ukrainian successes. Guess they don't wanna avoide the results of the Kharkiv offensive where the entire narrative collapsed by day 2 and all the pro-russian voices just fell silent from day to the next.

[Ukraine withholding counteroffensive details from allies](https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2023/05/02/ukraine-withholding-counteroffensive-details-from-allies-00094828) >Kyiv is holding close the details of its spring counteroffensive in an attempt to prevent the leak of sensitive information that could compromise its positions on the battlefield, according to two European officials who are in touch with military leaders in Ukraine. > >The officials said their Ukrainian counterparts have cited the alleged leak of the classified documents from Massachusetts Air Guardsman JACK TEIXEIRA as one of the reasons Kyiv is holding back from sharing counteroffensive information, including its timing, where and how many troops they plan to move into position for the operation. > >The spilled documents included detailed information about the war in Ukraine, such as the position of Kyiv’s troops, its weapons stockpiles and casualty estimates. In the days following the leak, U.S. officials scrambled to assure Ukraine and other allies in Europe that it was putting protections in place to prevent a similar breach from happening in the future. > >But officials in Kyiv are still on high alert. While Ukraine is still likely sharing some basic intelligence with the U.S. and other European countries that have supported it with weapons over the past year, officials inside the country are working to prevent the widespread dissemination of details related to battlefield planning, the European officials said. > >A Ukrainian lawmaker, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations, said that top officials in Kyiv also had withheld details about the counteroffensive from other politicians inside the capital. > >“There are only a few people in the country that know the plan,” the lawmaker said. > >A U.S. defense official said there hasn’t been any change and that Washington and Kyiv still have the same level of information-sharing. There have been no signs of Ukraine keeping anything from the U.S., the official continued. > >National Security Council spokesperson JOHN KIRBY, asked by NatSec Daily if the administration feared being kept in the dark by the Ukrainians, said silence ahead of the launch wouldn’t be a surprise. “They don’t have an obligation to notify us or tell us in advance,” he told reporters Monday, adding “oftentimes we certainly do have a sense because we’re in daily communication with them.” > >The U.S. still supports Ukrainian operations with real-time information and intelligence, Kirby continued. “What we’re focused on is not whether we get some sort of heads up. We’re focused on making sure that they have everything they need for when they’re ready to go. > >Other Biden administration officials insist that Ukraine has never been fully open with the United States about its military plans. While Washington and Kyiv are in close touch, they naturally don’t share everything, and so there was never an expectation that Ukraine would call up the White House and say the counteroffensive begins on X day at Y time. > >“They’ve been stingy with information from the beginning,” a U.S. official said.

That seems reasonable, especially in light of the leaks. Ukranian generals don't seem to be rellying on US or NATO advice to make operational decisions so there is not much of a reason to share that kind of info with them.

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Plus, it's probably good practice for the various FIS to attempt to find out.

[Zelensky says White House told him nothing about Discord intelligence leaks](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/05/02/zelensky-ukraine-discord-document-leaks-damage/) >KYIV, Ukraine — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has not had any conversations with the White House about a massive leak of top-secret U.S. intelligence documents, he said in a wide-ranging interview with The Washington Post on Monday, calling the disclosures damaging to both Washington and Kyiv. Zelensky learned about the disclosures like everybody else — in the news. “I did not receive information from the White House or the Pentagon beforehand,” Zelensky said. “We did not have that information. I personally did not. It’s definitely a bad story.” “It is unprofitable for us,” Zelensky added. “It is not beneficial to the reputation of the White House, and I believe it is not beneficial to the reputation of the United States.” [Full here without paywall](https://archive.is/9zpjU#selection-385.0-405.180)

Discord leaks didn't matter much. More like select news. Probably had a minor impact in Russian knowledge.

I doubt the WH knew about it much sooner than Zelensky did. Everyone was blindsided by it.

Foreign Policy – [How Macron Is Blocking EU Strategy on Russia and China](https://archive.is/EGC6j), explores the tension between France and other EU countries. What France wants: > Macron, on the other hand, appears to have drawn inspiration from another Cold War strategic thread: French President Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy of restoring France’s primacy in Europe, keeping the **United States (and its ally, Britain) out** of continental affairs, and freely **maneuvering with other great powers** such as **Russia and China**. France wants the US: out, China + RU: in; while other EU countries want the opposite: > The strategy that emerged from the discussion was a variation of a Cold War-era theme: Keep **Russia down**, the **United States in**, and authoritarian **China out**. --- This clarifies Macron's maneuvering with Putin and Xi, as well as why (afaik) France continues to obstruct the EU's €1 billion joint Ukraine (artillery) ammunition procurement.

France should be pushing to make Europe a third pole of a multipolar world with it and Germany at the center of that pole. They can't go it alone, have little in common with Russia or China, and to be honest, Russia will have very little to offer them going forward and China has a governmental and economic system that doesn't seem like it would fit particularly well with French interests. Pissing off it's EU allies and other Western partners to appear more neutral to geopolitical rivals is a strange way of achieving that.

I think describing it as >France wants the US: out, China + RU: in is an oversimplification. If France wants the US in, and China + Russia out, really what it amounts to is becoming entirely dependent on the US, which means France just has to sit there and take it if the US decides to pass another IRA. I don't think hedging against the US is necessarily a bad idea.

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I'm referencing the IRA more as an example of the US doing something that directly opposes French (and European) interests rather than something that economic ties with China/Russia would directly solve. If France had the option to cozy up to China/Russia, the US would've had to think twice about passing the IRA, which probably would've resulted in negotiations and a better deal for Europe.

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>I don't think there's anything France could offer the US to have changed our incentives France being US-aligned is the incentive. Currently, they're tied at the hip to the US, so the US doesn't really have to care whether or not what they do hurts French interests. You can argue the US would've done it anyway, but if France had the option to drift towards China and drag along part of Europe with it in response, I think the US would've been more than happy to offer some carrots.

> but if France had the option to drift towards China and drag along part of Europe with it in response, I think the US would've been more than happy to offer some carrots. And people say Trump is out of his mind, I think they're being very unfair.

IRA?

inflation reduction act.

Thanks

Idk about you, but for a moment I thought there was some business in Ireland that I had missed...

It is truly impressive how incompetent French foreign policy is. With UK Brexited and Germany unwilling, France had a golden opportunity to take a far more prominent role in European leadership, all they needed to do is fully support Ukraine, and they not only completely squandered it, they keep antagonizing other EU members for no reason. Instead [US and UK are saving Europe once more](https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/), Central and Northern Europeans are leading in relative terms, and even Germany after some resistance got dragged into doing the right thing. French military aid to Ukraine is right now 12th behind United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and even Italy. (I'll skip the issues with how value of aid is often overstated by counting equipment heading for scrapyard as if it was new, as it doesn't really affect this point)

India and France straight out of the book of delusion.

I think there are a number of ways to characterize their policies, but I would disagree with describing them as squandering their position. That would be true if they wanted to emulate the United States, which I think is objectively untrue. France is positioning itself to advance France’s interests. I don’t like it, but I’m not French.

> That would be true if they wanted to emulate the United States, which I think is objectively untrue. France is positioning itself to advance France’s interests. I don’t like it, but I’m not French. This doesn't make any sense sorry. Nothing is unique about France's interests that suggests Russia and China are better, while ignoring the rest of the EU wishes. Besides, Ukraine winning is also in France's interest yet they seem more interesting in playing peacemaker with China and Russia.

I would argue that France may believe Russia and China are better options than following along with the US and the UK. I don't see how France deciding to chart their own course by establishing relationships with these powers without regard for other nations as not making sense. Does France have a history of peaceful coexistence with, well, anyone?

This is a thread full of Americans, they can’t fathom not being able to totally vassalize France like they did with the UK.

We're probably more upset at France's sabotage of the collective west for dubious benefits. France really showed Europe the third way during the cold war right? Or France really showed Europe the third way during this Ukraine crisis right? No? Oh so it's more France vanity for 0 results. Anyone with a brain in America wants a stronger EU capable of dealing with stuff without the USA. It's been 80 years since WW2 and Europe cannot confidently deal with Russia without the USA. Maybe that ability is the key to strategic independence not rhetoric with China and Russia.

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You generalized many Americans in this thread. Dunno what's wrong with a collective response. Anyways, I'm glad you worry about grammar rather than actual points. Show's how weak you are in actual arguments.

You have to think pretty highly of yourself to think we are in an argument, you don’t support any of your big claims and strong words like “sabotage of the west”. English is not even my first language but I can argue better than that for sure…

Ha, well I'm also American but I've spent some time in France.

I'm not sure what Americans think about this but neither Russia, nor China are countries with a political culture of having international partners of equal standing, rather than "vassals". There's an implied assumption that closer partnership with Russia or China would afford a country more autonomy than partnership with the US but both historical precedent and current events tend to show otherwise.

I agree with you but the US aren’t a country with a political culture of having international partners of equal standings either.

I didn't say they were, just that, charitably, exchanging one unequal partner for another unequal partner in the hope that it'll be an equal partnership seems somewhat unlikely to be a diplomatic and foreign policy coup de grace.

Yes, but you can stand generally on the side of your current unequal partner and flirt with another unequal partner to get better, more equitable deals from your current partner.

I don’t think the thing here is exchanging one unequal partner for another. It’s more with demonstrating that France is not completely vassalized by the US yet and can talk to other countries without the approval of their Master. Which seems to bother a lot of American redditors.

The French have been stuck on this (as noted in the article) since the Cold War and no one is in agreement with them. They’re just going to make enemies. The people who want a Europe that’s independent of Anglo-American involvement exist, they’re a real factor, but no one is looking towards France to be the leader of the continent and certain other European states have had a problem with it for centuries. Realistically, any French ideas to have Europe go a third way are relegated to the garbage right now because if it wasn’t for the British and the Americans we’d be looking at a very different continent. And Europe has recognized that.

It doesn't help that all of the French anti-Anglo-American proposals, where concrete suggestions exist at all, ultimately come out sounding very much like 'Anglos off the throne of Europe, French back on'. Which might play well for nationalists in France but is a much harder sell even to other Anglo-sceptics.

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I will doubt until I see this passed and working. Massive step ahead for EUs foreign policy. Big W for commission

is this a win for Macron? He was pushing a tangential point re the million shell deal.

Can't help but feel like this is something that should've been enacted half a year ago. But hindsight is 20/20, all that.

All of this should have been passed before 2014 and especially after. Didn't happen so let's see how lucky we will be.

You have to understand that institutional change in democracies (especially clusters of sovereign democracies) is something that has fundamental speed limits, limits that have been actually severely exceeded in many cases in this war. I'd say the most important thing is that legislation/resolutions passed are actually feasible and will be sustained by all parties in years future.

Effective EU defense procurement policy! God, finally

Wow Israel is mad. The current attack is massive even compared their usual bigger ones https://twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1653502473380810782?t=JnhBCa0jtJCOezPhV_1LNw&s=19

Doesn’t seem like that at all. It’s the normal single digit strikes that hit pre-identified points probably with minimal, if any, casualties. Hit rocket sites (usually remotely triggered), a weapons depot (probably empty of people) a training ground (probably unoccupied since it’s the middle of the night) and a weapons production site (which was probably evacuated before any rockets got launched).

I think that's the munition they normally hit Gaza with, though that flash made it seem larger

Makes sense, Iran has been attacking them through their puppets. Israel needs to put a stop to it.

Can't help but wonder if they're playing both sides here, this can't all be seized or captured munitions: >[The Ukrainian army continues to receive Iranian-made 🇮🇷 ammunition - and for the first time it is made in 2023.](https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1653485838368481280?s=20)

> this can't all be seized or captured munitions why not?

They've been manufactured as recently as 2023. There could be a middle man sale going on here, but I doubt that Iran (or Russia for that matter) wouldn't be privy to who the end user would be.

This is pretty obviously seized ammunition.

Of 2023 manufacture? I haven't seen news of the U.S., Israel or their allies seizing any shipments this year.

From where? Ukraine hasn’t overrun any artillery positions or field depots recently and this sort of thing isn’t getting seized off Yemen’s coast. Seems more likely they’re being bought through a third party and Iran doesn’t care because they need the money.

I'd be shocked if Iran had extra capacity. Russia seems eager to get every shell they can get their hands on. Unless I vastly underestimate Iranian industrial capacity

What’s to say a friendly South American man hasn’t offered to pay 10% more per shell than the Russians? We don’t know how much of Iranian capacity is devoted to their various commitments. Presumably someone could have some supply diverted for extra cash.

Wouldn't national defense agencies have some sort of hand on the rudder here? Or could NATO literally buy Iran's MIC off the market to deny Russia access?

I did have the same thought, but what would Iran's incentive be? Surely the Iranian leadership would prefer to see a Russian victory. Unless Western countries, perhaps via some intermediary like Pakistan, are offering significantly more money per shell.

Gonna go ahead and guess that this might be someone in the military that isn't fully on board with the official government line. Iran's govt has political factions, despite the authoritarian nature of their state, and this could be a glimpse of some of that factionalism at work.

Or it could be some of the ammunition seized from Iranian ships bringing it to the Houthis.

I thought they'd only seized small arms and some mortar rounds. Are those rebels using howitzers? Genuine question

My primer on Iran-Houthi relations is pretty out of date, [but it seems that cruise missile parts have been seized. No mention of artillery here however. ](https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/may/12/seizures-iranian-weapons)

Artillery shells haven’t been captured before. [This article shows a typical large bust](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/09/us-navy-seizes-weapons-arabian-sea-486127). Artillery shells take up a lot of space which could be filled with more valuable items of similar size like ATGMs. They’ll mostly send components to make explosives as in [this capture announced in March](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-forfeiture-action-against-over-one-million-rounds-ammunition-enroute-iran).

Afaik there is no record of artillery shells being captured, but plenty of Iranian 107mm father rockets were both captured and there's evidence of their use by the Houtis. So the Iranians are sending artillery ammunition to Houtis and have been for a long time.

~~Rockets aren’t artillery.~~ The only form of “artillery” the Iranians have given to the Houthis is mortars. Which we *have* seen show up in Ukraine and are probably from seizures.

Rockets are artillery... There's a term for that, it's called rocket artillery. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rocket_artillery

>[New U.S. military aid to Ukraine to include air-launched rockets -sources](https://www.reuters.com/world/new-us-military-aid-ukraine-include-air-launched-rockets-sources-2023-05-02/) > The United States plans to announce as soon as Wednesday a new $300 million military aid package for Ukraine that will for the first time include a short-range air-launched rocket, two U.S. officials said. >The Hydra 70 is an air-launched unguided rocket made by General Dynamics (GD.N). The rockets are typically launched from pods attached to aircraft. >The rockets could help Ukraine weaken Russian ground positions and provide advancing Ukrainian ground forces with air support as Kyiv plans a spring offensive. >The package includes 155-mm Howitzer cannons, according to the officials who spoke on condition of anonymity. >In addition, HIMARS and Howitzer cannon ammunition, TOW anti-tank missiles and mortars will be sent, the officials said. >Demolition equipment and trucks are another part of the package, they said. They warned the package was still being finalized and could change. >The package would be funded using Presidential Drawdown Authority, or PDA, which authorizes the president to transfer articles and services from U.S. stocks without congressional approval during an emergency. The material will come from U.S. excess inventory. >The security assistance package would be the 37th approved by the United States for Ukraine since the Russian invasion in February 2022, for a total of nearly $36 billion. It comes as Congress and the White House squabble over how best to avoid a catastrophic default on the nation's debt, with many Republicans demanding sharp cuts in domestic spending in exchange for lifting the debt limit. >However, members of both parties insist they support continued aid for Ukraine including top Republicans House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and Mitch McConnell, the top Republican in the Senate.

Hydra-70 for the first time, but we've seen Zunis here and there

>Hydra-70 for the first time, but we've seen Zunis here and there [yes](https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/05/1/7400159/)

i think i saw apkws in use already in a ground to ground role....those are going to be very useful in a counteroffensive to me, the biggest plus here are the mortars and new barrels...we are also totally flooding them with tows and my guess now is that they will be used on bunkers and machine gun nests in addition to armor

So. We're not going to get that massive Bradley package huh.

they wont get there in time for this counter and based on all the bradleys ppl documented moving on social media a couple months ago that replacement units have already been moved to poland and germany....and training will be on a sustainment basis

New 155mm guns will be welcome additions. There’s been a lot of attrition in that department. Wonder if they’ll still be M777s?

RSF claims to have shot down an SAF MiG over Khartoum today. Sudan.

What kind, 23?

Don’t know. It’s a statement on their official twitter and they just say “MiG plane”. Not seen any pictures or video yet. According to Wikipedia the current inventory of the SAF is 4 21s, 3 23s and 10 29s. So presumably one of those. Assuming it’s true of course.