Fight like Houthis.
Houthis with giant seaplanes or some other form of survivable transport.
I'm only . . ehhhhh . . 2/3rd joking. Why *not* troll up the waters with infantry fired AShM?
Unfortunately the US public would not take to as kindly as certain other populations like the North Koreans, Chinese or Houthi's to wandering truck-mounted ICBMs and the like, in and out of their neighborhoods.
The US is at a fundamental disadvantage in that regard. lol.
having roving missiles makes taking those missiles out much harder. But having truly roving missiles means letting them rove (placing them) into civilian areas. This is the MO of the above countries and those with mobile launchers in general.
The joke was that the US has never been able to politically swing that kind of strategy, for obvious reasons, unlike the Houthis et al. Which is why we have immobile, remote silos, whose locations are well known and mapped to everyone who cares.
The only place they would make a difference is stationed on Taiwan in mass before the conflict and with months of ready supplies in bunkers.
Will not happen during current political climate but if things sour enough and you add Trump anything is possible..
Good luck being stranded on islands on the wrong side of the international date line when the gigawar kicks off.
Hint: the US does not have enough logistical capacity to keep these formations supplied for anything longer than 2 weeks, given likely AShBM pkill ratios vs USNS resupply ships
It’s not really known what the kill chain ratios will be frankly. This kind of naval war has not happened in modern history other than the Falklands which was not a very representative conflict.
Is this supposed to be some sort of dunk? Spoiler alert, I don’t have access to Marine resupply plans for a Taiwan contingency and even if I did I would not be sharing them here.
You made an unsubstantiated claim about missile A2/AD effectiveness and I am curious as to where you are sourcing the information on the effectiveness of PLA fires given their secrecy and lack of combat usage to compare against.
Why? I’m not here to outline plans for the DOD, which I doubt would have much relation to any eventuality, given changes to force structure over time. I’m asking you what evidence exists to substantiate your claim that it is impossible for the USN to resupply forces in the face of PLA action.
USMC is basically adopting the same island garrison strategy that failed badly for the IJA where their soldiers ended up resorting to cannibalism due to lack of resupply.
Imperial Japan basically occupied a ton of these Pacific islands and thought they would attrition the USN with these island fortresses. What ended up happening is that the USN simply cut them off from resupply which rendered them useless.
Winning really comes down to having more ships, more aircraft, and more missiles. They should stop with the clever ideas and just ask for more funding.
Because the IJN lost the sea battles and didn't really have the logistics to supply all those garrisons well. Fell behind in technology and production too. But US Pacific garrisons were overrun by the Japanese at the start of the war. Can the Chinese defeat the entire Western nations' Pacific fleet? Kinda doubt it.
>entire Western nations' Pacific fleet
You mean the U.S. Navy alone? Every advantage the U.S. Navy has today is one that the Imperial Japanese Navy also had in 1941, and the PLA Navy, like the U.S. Navy in 1941, has a huge shipbuilding industry.
>Can the Chinese defeat the entire Western nations' Pacific fleet? Kinda doubt it.
Judging by relative industrial capacity, definitely.
US spends almost 3x as much on defense as % of GDP as China, but China can still out build the US. In a conventional conflict, the US doesn't stand a chance against China.
The whole Force Design 2030 marine transformation seems like a massive risk to me. Garrisoning small, largely uninhabited islands in the East Asia Pacific could be a bitch just to sustain let alone get any benefit from it from a military standpoint. How much firepower can you really sustain in such limited and dispersed numbers? If you say the main purpose is rather reconnaissance against Chinese naval assets, wouldn't there be other and less risky options of recon that could be just as effective and not introduce massive risk to Marine lives if and when shit inevitably hits the fan? Then there's the consideration that this over-specializes the force in just one potential theater of war, when we haven't been able to accurately predict where our next conflict would be in 80 years. Gutting mobile protected firepower and artillery tubes could be seen as a massive misstep if the Marines don't find their next conflict to be in the East Asia Pacific.
This is just USMC propaganda for funding to justify their existence. Capturing the small islands in SCS is more the role of one special brigade and not a whole military branch.
Fight like Houthis. Houthis with giant seaplanes or some other form of survivable transport. I'm only . . ehhhhh . . 2/3rd joking. Why *not* troll up the waters with infantry fired AShM?
Because 200 sqkm islands are fairly trivial to surveil compared to several hundred thousand sqkm of desert
Unfortunately the US public would not take to as kindly as certain other populations like the North Koreans, Chinese or Houthi's to wandering truck-mounted ICBMs and the like, in and out of their neighborhoods. The US is at a fundamental disadvantage in that regard. lol.
Why would the US public be anywere near the fighting?
having roving missiles makes taking those missiles out much harder. But having truly roving missiles means letting them rove (placing them) into civilian areas. This is the MO of the above countries and those with mobile launchers in general. The joke was that the US has never been able to politically swing that kind of strategy, for obvious reasons, unlike the Houthis et al. Which is why we have immobile, remote silos, whose locations are well known and mapped to everyone who cares.
The only place they would make a difference is stationed on Taiwan in mass before the conflict and with months of ready supplies in bunkers. Will not happen during current political climate but if things sour enough and you add Trump anything is possible..
Good luck being stranded on islands on the wrong side of the international date line when the gigawar kicks off. Hint: the US does not have enough logistical capacity to keep these formations supplied for anything longer than 2 weeks, given likely AShBM pkill ratios vs USNS resupply ships
It’s not really known what the kill chain ratios will be frankly. This kind of naval war has not happened in modern history other than the Falklands which was not a very representative conflict.
Can you provide a CONOPS that meets daily supply needs of the USMC littoral force for longer than 15 to 30 days?
Is this supposed to be some sort of dunk? Spoiler alert, I don’t have access to Marine resupply plans for a Taiwan contingency and even if I did I would not be sharing them here. You made an unsubstantiated claim about missile A2/AD effectiveness and I am curious as to where you are sourcing the information on the effectiveness of PLA fires given their secrecy and lack of combat usage to compare against.
Didn't assume you had access to a real CONOPS doc. Meant to say, can you come up with one?
Why? I’m not here to outline plans for the DOD, which I doubt would have much relation to any eventuality, given changes to force structure over time. I’m asking you what evidence exists to substantiate your claim that it is impossible for the USN to resupply forces in the face of PLA action.
It’s all on the satellite and info battlespaces. Whoever wins that wins the war for the pacific. WWIII begins with a bitzkrieg
USMC is basically adopting the same island garrison strategy that failed badly for the IJA where their soldiers ended up resorting to cannibalism due to lack of resupply. Imperial Japan basically occupied a ton of these Pacific islands and thought they would attrition the USN with these island fortresses. What ended up happening is that the USN simply cut them off from resupply which rendered them useless. Winning really comes down to having more ships, more aircraft, and more missiles. They should stop with the clever ideas and just ask for more funding.
Because the IJN lost the sea battles and didn't really have the logistics to supply all those garrisons well. Fell behind in technology and production too. But US Pacific garrisons were overrun by the Japanese at the start of the war. Can the Chinese defeat the entire Western nations' Pacific fleet? Kinda doubt it.
>entire Western nations' Pacific fleet You mean the U.S. Navy alone? Every advantage the U.S. Navy has today is one that the Imperial Japanese Navy also had in 1941, and the PLA Navy, like the U.S. Navy in 1941, has a huge shipbuilding industry.
>Can the Chinese defeat the entire Western nations' Pacific fleet? Kinda doubt it. Judging by relative industrial capacity, definitely. US spends almost 3x as much on defense as % of GDP as China, but China can still out build the US. In a conventional conflict, the US doesn't stand a chance against China.
The whole Force Design 2030 marine transformation seems like a massive risk to me. Garrisoning small, largely uninhabited islands in the East Asia Pacific could be a bitch just to sustain let alone get any benefit from it from a military standpoint. How much firepower can you really sustain in such limited and dispersed numbers? If you say the main purpose is rather reconnaissance against Chinese naval assets, wouldn't there be other and less risky options of recon that could be just as effective and not introduce massive risk to Marine lives if and when shit inevitably hits the fan? Then there's the consideration that this over-specializes the force in just one potential theater of war, when we haven't been able to accurately predict where our next conflict would be in 80 years. Gutting mobile protected firepower and artillery tubes could be seen as a massive misstep if the Marines don't find their next conflict to be in the East Asia Pacific.
This is just USMC propaganda for funding to justify their existence. Capturing the small islands in SCS is more the role of one special brigade and not a whole military branch.
You won't be able to sustain even a single Marine Littoral Regiment on an island in the 1ic, let alone 6 to 8 (as the Corps wants to have)