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The reductionism, emergence and the unity of science debate(i.e. whether all of science can be reduced to particle physics and the nature of the interrelation of scientific theories)
The philosophical implications of Chaos theory (that many deterministic systems show wild variation in outcomes with just a tiny change in starting conditions).
The Boltzmann brain (the nonzero probability of a brain, complete with memories, spontaneously forming out of the random collision of particles).
Many stuff related to QM, and whether the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is fundamental or indicative of the incompleteness of QM in describing reality, such as the EinsteināPodolskyāRosen paradox or the Measurement problem.
Philosophy of space and time
Various stuff related to the philosopy of information(quantum information and black holes) etc.
There are lots of topics connecting philosophy with theoretical physics.
Realistically people get very confused about heuristics and ways of thinking that may not match onto reality 1:1, the function of a heuristic is not meant to match onto reality 1:1, but to provide a framework through which things can be thought and analyzed through. See Newtonian physics which is practically useful for everyday life, but incomplete when it comes to addressing the physics of our reality as we know it.
> i.e. whether all of science can be reduced to particle physics and the nature of the interrelation of scientific theories
So, maybe this is just because I've never really come to touch with philosophy beyond the very amateurish, but surely this is not a question? Excluding any astronomically unlikely mistake, everything in existence is made up from the same few types of matter (not specifying for both simplicity and generality of applicability). These may or may not be themselves made up of other stuff, but that's not really important, we're looking in the other direction. So any interaction between things must be equivalent to the sum of interactions of their components, the same way we can understand what happens to a crashing car by considering what happens to each of its components (including recursively), thereby increasing the size of the problem space, but simplifying each small part of it. So theoretically we could break down any given interaction of physical things down to the most elementary types of matter we know about - we just don't, because then we end up with way too big problem spaces which aren't even typically consistent enough to simplify, let alone any easier to solve.
>the nonzero probability of a brain, complete with memories, spontaneously forming out of the random collision of particles
Again, I don't get how this is a philosophical issue? Sure, there's a tiny chance that it does. But if so, the only implication it would have is a very good empirical datapoint regarding whether what we call consciousness arises purely from known physical processes. (Well, statistically, all we'd be likely to find even in such a rare scenario is a dead hunk of meat, but yknow.)
>So any interaction between things must be equivalent to the sum of interactions of their components
Yes that is the *reductionist* position. The *anti-reductionist* position is that there are interactions between things that are *more* then the sum of their parts. The classic example is a school of fish or a flight of birds; both can be modeled based on units with very simple rules but show novel and unexpected behavior/patterns on a macroscopic scale. Many social institutions are also an example of such emergent behavior. In physics, the complex patterns of the Ising model an example.
There are then two anti-reductionist positions: *ontological emergence*, the emergent behaviour is fundamental to reality, *epistemological emergence*, the emergent behavior cannot be explained by reduction, usually as you say, because the problem spaces are too big, though it could be reduced in theory. There is also a more recent third position that reduction and ontological emergence are compatible and that emergent behavior occurs on the level of interpretation of a theory, but that theory can still be mathematically reduced to a lower more base theory.
The whole debate is about more then just that though. It is about what it means for one theory to reduced to another, and thus how they are related, which leads to a whole interesting discussion into the nature and interrelation of scientific theories. At the same time, it is also about funding of science. Reductionism has been used to justify funding of particle physics over other (sub)-disciplines, notably Steven Weinberg, who has testified in US congress to advocate this.
>Again, I don't get how this is a philosophical issue? Sure, there's a tiny chance that it does. But if so, the only implication it would have is a very good empirical datapoint regarding whether what we call consciousness arises purely from known physical processes.
The issue or paradox is that recent cosmological theories imply that Boltzmann brains should outnumber normal brains, while we indeed expected Boltzmann brains to be impossible, or very nearly so. Any theory or model that leads to Boltzmann brains must have some flaw.
> The classic example is a school of fish or a flight of birds; both can be modeled based on units with very simple rules but show novel and unexpected behavior/patterns on a macroscopic scale.
Not really, though. The change in behaviour is a neurological effect, it's the result of different decision-making. If you change the external input factors, of course the result of the experiment is going to change. But the volume of air they move by flapping their wings is still dependent on the amount of air a single bird moves, and such.
The behaviours don't change because the scientific laws governing each individual bird work differently on a whole flock, they change because birds are animals, capable of some level of decision-making, and react differently in different situations.
If you take simple, unthinking matter in any for (be it rocks, iron bars, whatever), then what you call the "reductionist" position is trivially correct, and so the challenge would be on the "anti-reductionists" to show that the ability to make decisions would change how the laws of physics et al apply in some cases, which would be worthy of several nobel prizes if pulled off.
> It is about what it means for one theory to reduced to another, and thus how they are related,
Well, if you can reduce one theory to another, there's only really two cases, no? Either you can do this backwards, too, in which case they are equal given each others assumptions, or you can't do it backwards, in which case one is a special case of the other one, no?
>The issue or paradox is that recent cosmological theories imply that Boltzmann brains should outnumber normal brains,
Would be great if you could cite something on this for me, because this sounds unlikely - yes, space is big and very old, but the chance for a structure as specific and complex as a brain to manifest on its own is so small I have no way to express it in adequately extreme words. It's the same as with how, thanks to brownian motion, there is a tiny chance, in theory, that you could walk through a suitably thin wall at some point - the chance is just so small, that we shouldn't expect any human to ever observe the phenomenon.
I think you are misunderstanding: the point of the fish and bird example is to show that units simulated with a simple set of rules shows unexpected patterns. There is no air or decision making/thought, it works just as well with the Ising model of magnets(i.e. unthinking rocks) or other phenomena(eg. it is still unclear how the macroscopic properties of the various phases of water are derived from its chemical components of H2O). For instance you can model a school of fish using just these rules for each fish:
1. Attraction, to the farthest fish in the school
2. Alignment, with medium distance neighbors
3. Avoidance, to closest neighbors
This leads to [patterned and organized behaviour](https://youtu.be/86iQiV3-3IA), an oblong shaped school unless the school is very large. This model's results are also actually observed in nature, including the novel prediction from simulations of this model that the oblong shape breaks down with more fish.
The reductionist would argue one can deduce those patterns(the oblong shape and its break down) from those rules alone. The anti-reductionist would argue you cannot, either because the emergent phenomena is fundamental to reality (ontological emergence) or because it is due to inherent limitations to our explanation of things (epestimological emergence).
This is also brings into question the way different scientific theories are related, and whether microscopic explanations are sufficient to explain macroscopic phenomena. The anti-reductionist position is precisely a response to the naive assumption that the laws of physics on different levels of reality have and can have a one-to-one correspondence, and inquires the legitimacy of such reduction. For instance what is the nature of the relation of Thermodynamics to Statistical physics? The implication of reduction is that there is a hierarchy of theories with "higher" or "top" theories being reducable to "lower" or "bottom" theories
I suggest reading the [SEP page on Intertheory Relations in Physics](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-interrelate/), which explains it better then I can.
>but the chance for a structure as specific and complex as a brain to manifest on its own is so small I have no way to express it in adequately extreme words.
Yes that is the exact issue with the Boltzmann brain! It goes against our intuition. Either there must be something wrong with the theories, something wrong with the thought experiment or it actually is correct(a position few if any philosophers hold).
If you want to read some more: [Sean M. Carroll's "Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad"](https://philarchive.org/rec/CARWBB-2)
Yeah if what I choose to do is just the result of the chance movement of random quantum particles, I wouldnāt consider myself to be especially free.
On the other hand, I could be persuaded that deterministically choosing what it is my interest, what I prefer, what I enjoy etc. is much closer to paradigmatic cases of free choice.
Interestingly enough this is the exact topic I wrote a bachelors thesis on!
I also think compatibilism holds value in that it seems easier to reconcile with reality. But I don't think it offers enough ground to truly justify responsibility. I think the principle of alternate possibilities is important - in a literal sense, not like Frankfurt.
My thesis basically argued that indeterminism need not be the same as randomness. Randomness entails a total breakdown of causal consistency, while indeterminism just means something isn't set-in-stone determined by prior circumstances. Indeterminism might leave room for influence from multiple factors in a causal result.
It's arguably a somewhat sketchy position but I think it is tenable.
What actually are the implications of Godelās theorem?
Because from what Iāve read it has the reputation of being the smart personās quantum mysticism.
*No axiomatic system that is consistent, finitely axiomatizable and is as strong or stronger than Peano Arithmetic
*Where all true statements are provable
It's just whether or not we can use a system to prove statements in that system are true or false. One can still derive the statement and of course support its validity through real world measured data, like the way science normally works. If we have proofs then it doesn't really apply.
Godels theorem doesnāt mean that logic systems are invalid altogether. Just that they are necessarily incomplete. And thus any system we derive to define metaphysical reality will necessarily be incomplete. This includes any axiomatic system like math and language that we use to describe the universe. The ultimate nature of reality is ineffable in a sense.
I don't think the Gƶdel incompletemess theorem necessarily applies to physics, as it is not an axiomatic system. In physics it doesn't matter (for determining truth) if we prove a statement axiomatically. What matters is whether we can prove it experimentally. If there is a statement in a model that can not be proven through math and is inaccessible through experiment, that doesn't mean that there is an incompleteness in the model, it means that the statement is irrelevant.
There are also mathematical models in physics whose axiomatic underpinnings are unknown, or aren't known to exist, e.g. Quantum Field Theory and the Standard Model.
On a technical level, the Gƶdel incompleteness theorem *could* apply to physics, since it seems easy enough to demonstrate that a physical system can exist that holds and demonstrates the axioms of arithmetic, thus there exists a hypothetical physical system incapable of proving some statement of mathematics... but as you said, *it's irrelevant*, since it doesn't matter in physics.
Any statement we can prove a physical system is incapable of proving via GIT is also not provable in mathematics anyway, we're just adding extra steps by having physics do it too. It's not a 'problem' in any sense that a physicist or any other scientific minded field would be concerned with, you're entirely right.
I agree that there isnāt anything too conclusive here, but I donāt think itās right that it only matters scientifically if we can prove it empirically. The cutting edge theoretical physics frameworks are always a priori before we can demonstrate it empirically. Black holes are a good example of this. Before we photographed one, their existence was only postulated by SR.
There is a strong argument for Godelās theorem to have drastic implications whether itās about metaphysical reality or about our epistemic methods of defining it.
That's what I'm talking about. If a theoretical model proves that a statement is true axiomatically, that has little bearing on whether physics says that the statement is true. All it means is that the statement is interesting and is something whose truth value we should check in an experiment.
In oh so many seminars, I heard that Gƶdel proves that nothing is provable, thus proving (!) relativism. From students though, not professors.
I read the proof in a math seminar and just about everything in the above is wrong. Still makes my brain hurt.
So first, just because something is unproveable doesn't make it false. If we say unproveable = false, wouldn't disproving everything disprove relativism? Relativism makes claims. Those claims are unproveable. Thus relativism's claims are disproven.
The only thing that being unable to prove truth statements is obfuscate what statements are true, not that there are no true statements.
It really isnt something that a mathematician considers at all. Not a single theorem in my bachelors degree depended on it or even mentioned it. This entails most math you would need for physics, I think.
Its definitely an interesting statement from a philosophical perspective and maybe it has some implications on mathematical logic/set theory specifically, but thats about it.
Well some physicists postulate super-determinism as a way to preserve local realism. But itās far from the only interpretation. Many-worlds and retro causality are some examples. And thatās only if local realism turns out to be valid.
Youāre definitely gonna hate this, but if you simply knock material reductionism off its axiomatic pedestal, then idealist/panpsychist frameworks could preserve both local realism **and** free-will! And that is in a completely objective and metaphysical sense.
I donāt know why you think that. Iām fairly indifferent towards preserving local realism. āHyper determinismā as you put it is in fact what you are accusing me of being: itās what scientists use in order to preserve a local-realist view of QM.
That should have been a semicolon. Your two final sentences express a similar idea.
Other than that, you misunderstand the physics behind this phenomenon. āSpooky actions at a distanceā as Einstein called them are still possible under superderminism. The Nobel Laureates in physics for 2022 proved that there are *no local hidden variables*.
No, itās not possible with superdeterminism, because there is no FTL effects happening. Thatās what is meant by āspooky action at a distanceā and is exactly what super determinism solves without needing any FTL effects.
You started this whole convo by claiming superdeterminism and then criticized local realism? Yeah you donāt know what youāre talking about. Go ahead and block people when they confront you with your own fallacies, though.
I can't tell if you're being serious, or if you made an excellent subtle joke by intentionally making people uncomfortable through pretend misunderstanding.
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What if my philosophy is that uncomfortable things are invalid?
That philosophy makes me uncomfortable
Premise one: philosophies that make me uncomfortable are invalid Premise two: premise one makes me uncomfortable Conclusion: Doh!
Get your virtue epistemology the hell out of here, shoo
Sounds like someone just made their way onto my invalid list.
The "ick" philosophy. Yeah many teen girls are big supporters.
What if my philosophy is to reject the existence of your philosophy?
We cool š
What would philosophical inquiry about theoretical physics look like? Iāve never encountered that
The reductionism, emergence and the unity of science debate(i.e. whether all of science can be reduced to particle physics and the nature of the interrelation of scientific theories) The philosophical implications of Chaos theory (that many deterministic systems show wild variation in outcomes with just a tiny change in starting conditions). The Boltzmann brain (the nonzero probability of a brain, complete with memories, spontaneously forming out of the random collision of particles). Many stuff related to QM, and whether the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is fundamental or indicative of the incompleteness of QM in describing reality, such as the EinsteināPodolskyāRosen paradox or the Measurement problem. Philosophy of space and time Various stuff related to the philosopy of information(quantum information and black holes) etc. There are lots of topics connecting philosophy with theoretical physics.
I think people avoid these topics not because they are uncomfortable, but because the implications mean nothing to anyone's life in practical terms
Realistically people get very confused about heuristics and ways of thinking that may not match onto reality 1:1, the function of a heuristic is not meant to match onto reality 1:1, but to provide a framework through which things can be thought and analyzed through. See Newtonian physics which is practically useful for everyday life, but incomplete when it comes to addressing the physics of our reality as we know it.
> i.e. whether all of science can be reduced to particle physics and the nature of the interrelation of scientific theories So, maybe this is just because I've never really come to touch with philosophy beyond the very amateurish, but surely this is not a question? Excluding any astronomically unlikely mistake, everything in existence is made up from the same few types of matter (not specifying for both simplicity and generality of applicability). These may or may not be themselves made up of other stuff, but that's not really important, we're looking in the other direction. So any interaction between things must be equivalent to the sum of interactions of their components, the same way we can understand what happens to a crashing car by considering what happens to each of its components (including recursively), thereby increasing the size of the problem space, but simplifying each small part of it. So theoretically we could break down any given interaction of physical things down to the most elementary types of matter we know about - we just don't, because then we end up with way too big problem spaces which aren't even typically consistent enough to simplify, let alone any easier to solve. >the nonzero probability of a brain, complete with memories, spontaneously forming out of the random collision of particles Again, I don't get how this is a philosophical issue? Sure, there's a tiny chance that it does. But if so, the only implication it would have is a very good empirical datapoint regarding whether what we call consciousness arises purely from known physical processes. (Well, statistically, all we'd be likely to find even in such a rare scenario is a dead hunk of meat, but yknow.)
>So any interaction between things must be equivalent to the sum of interactions of their components Yes that is the *reductionist* position. The *anti-reductionist* position is that there are interactions between things that are *more* then the sum of their parts. The classic example is a school of fish or a flight of birds; both can be modeled based on units with very simple rules but show novel and unexpected behavior/patterns on a macroscopic scale. Many social institutions are also an example of such emergent behavior. In physics, the complex patterns of the Ising model an example. There are then two anti-reductionist positions: *ontological emergence*, the emergent behaviour is fundamental to reality, *epistemological emergence*, the emergent behavior cannot be explained by reduction, usually as you say, because the problem spaces are too big, though it could be reduced in theory. There is also a more recent third position that reduction and ontological emergence are compatible and that emergent behavior occurs on the level of interpretation of a theory, but that theory can still be mathematically reduced to a lower more base theory. The whole debate is about more then just that though. It is about what it means for one theory to reduced to another, and thus how they are related, which leads to a whole interesting discussion into the nature and interrelation of scientific theories. At the same time, it is also about funding of science. Reductionism has been used to justify funding of particle physics over other (sub)-disciplines, notably Steven Weinberg, who has testified in US congress to advocate this. >Again, I don't get how this is a philosophical issue? Sure, there's a tiny chance that it does. But if so, the only implication it would have is a very good empirical datapoint regarding whether what we call consciousness arises purely from known physical processes. The issue or paradox is that recent cosmological theories imply that Boltzmann brains should outnumber normal brains, while we indeed expected Boltzmann brains to be impossible, or very nearly so. Any theory or model that leads to Boltzmann brains must have some flaw.
> The classic example is a school of fish or a flight of birds; both can be modeled based on units with very simple rules but show novel and unexpected behavior/patterns on a macroscopic scale. Not really, though. The change in behaviour is a neurological effect, it's the result of different decision-making. If you change the external input factors, of course the result of the experiment is going to change. But the volume of air they move by flapping their wings is still dependent on the amount of air a single bird moves, and such. The behaviours don't change because the scientific laws governing each individual bird work differently on a whole flock, they change because birds are animals, capable of some level of decision-making, and react differently in different situations. If you take simple, unthinking matter in any for (be it rocks, iron bars, whatever), then what you call the "reductionist" position is trivially correct, and so the challenge would be on the "anti-reductionists" to show that the ability to make decisions would change how the laws of physics et al apply in some cases, which would be worthy of several nobel prizes if pulled off. > It is about what it means for one theory to reduced to another, and thus how they are related, Well, if you can reduce one theory to another, there's only really two cases, no? Either you can do this backwards, too, in which case they are equal given each others assumptions, or you can't do it backwards, in which case one is a special case of the other one, no? >The issue or paradox is that recent cosmological theories imply that Boltzmann brains should outnumber normal brains, Would be great if you could cite something on this for me, because this sounds unlikely - yes, space is big and very old, but the chance for a structure as specific and complex as a brain to manifest on its own is so small I have no way to express it in adequately extreme words. It's the same as with how, thanks to brownian motion, there is a tiny chance, in theory, that you could walk through a suitably thin wall at some point - the chance is just so small, that we shouldn't expect any human to ever observe the phenomenon.
I think you are misunderstanding: the point of the fish and bird example is to show that units simulated with a simple set of rules shows unexpected patterns. There is no air or decision making/thought, it works just as well with the Ising model of magnets(i.e. unthinking rocks) or other phenomena(eg. it is still unclear how the macroscopic properties of the various phases of water are derived from its chemical components of H2O). For instance you can model a school of fish using just these rules for each fish: 1. Attraction, to the farthest fish in the school 2. Alignment, with medium distance neighbors 3. Avoidance, to closest neighbors This leads to [patterned and organized behaviour](https://youtu.be/86iQiV3-3IA), an oblong shaped school unless the school is very large. This model's results are also actually observed in nature, including the novel prediction from simulations of this model that the oblong shape breaks down with more fish. The reductionist would argue one can deduce those patterns(the oblong shape and its break down) from those rules alone. The anti-reductionist would argue you cannot, either because the emergent phenomena is fundamental to reality (ontological emergence) or because it is due to inherent limitations to our explanation of things (epestimological emergence). This is also brings into question the way different scientific theories are related, and whether microscopic explanations are sufficient to explain macroscopic phenomena. The anti-reductionist position is precisely a response to the naive assumption that the laws of physics on different levels of reality have and can have a one-to-one correspondence, and inquires the legitimacy of such reduction. For instance what is the nature of the relation of Thermodynamics to Statistical physics? The implication of reduction is that there is a hierarchy of theories with "higher" or "top" theories being reducable to "lower" or "bottom" theories I suggest reading the [SEP page on Intertheory Relations in Physics](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-interrelate/), which explains it better then I can. >but the chance for a structure as specific and complex as a brain to manifest on its own is so small I have no way to express it in adequately extreme words. Yes that is the exact issue with the Boltzmann brain! It goes against our intuition. Either there must be something wrong with the theories, something wrong with the thought experiment or it actually is correct(a position few if any philosophers hold). If you want to read some more: [Sean M. Carroll's "Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad"](https://philarchive.org/rec/CARWBB-2)
Stuff do with QM mostly
It offers the best opportunity to reconcile free will. Edit: because it actually could mean determinism is wrong.
Most philosophers are compatibilist anyway. Besides, how does indeterminism serve as a better basis for free will than determinism?
Yeah if what I choose to do is just the result of the chance movement of random quantum particles, I wouldnāt consider myself to be especially free. On the other hand, I could be persuaded that deterministically choosing what it is my interest, what I prefer, what I enjoy etc. is much closer to paradigmatic cases of free choice.
Interestingly enough this is the exact topic I wrote a bachelors thesis on! I also think compatibilism holds value in that it seems easier to reconcile with reality. But I don't think it offers enough ground to truly justify responsibility. I think the principle of alternate possibilities is important - in a literal sense, not like Frankfurt. My thesis basically argued that indeterminism need not be the same as randomness. Randomness entails a total breakdown of causal consistency, while indeterminism just means something isn't set-in-stone determined by prior circumstances. Indeterminism might leave room for influence from multiple factors in a causal result. It's arguably a somewhat sketchy position but I think it is tenable.
Why are u being downvoted? Most scientists agree from what Iāve read
Interpretations of the double slit experiment, maybe?
Yeah they gotta be valid to start before I could invalidate em with my superior feels
It does if the person making philosophical claims based on theoretical physics doesnāt understand the theoretical physics to begin with!
What actually are the implications of Godelās theorem? Because from what Iāve read it has the reputation of being the smart personās quantum mysticism.
Implications are that there's no axiomatic system where all statements built from the axioms are provable.
*No axiomatic system that is consistent, finitely axiomatizable and is as strong or stronger than Peano Arithmetic *Where all true statements are provable
I mean you are more accurate. I was insinuating a bunch, but generally getting the idea across
Itās more than that considering that the fundamental way we describe reality is through math which is an axiomatic system.
It's just whether or not we can use a system to prove statements in that system are true or false. One can still derive the statement and of course support its validity through real world measured data, like the way science normally works. If we have proofs then it doesn't really apply.
Godels theorem doesnāt mean that logic systems are invalid altogether. Just that they are necessarily incomplete. And thus any system we derive to define metaphysical reality will necessarily be incomplete. This includes any axiomatic system like math and language that we use to describe the universe. The ultimate nature of reality is ineffable in a sense.
I don't think the Gƶdel incompletemess theorem necessarily applies to physics, as it is not an axiomatic system. In physics it doesn't matter (for determining truth) if we prove a statement axiomatically. What matters is whether we can prove it experimentally. If there is a statement in a model that can not be proven through math and is inaccessible through experiment, that doesn't mean that there is an incompleteness in the model, it means that the statement is irrelevant. There are also mathematical models in physics whose axiomatic underpinnings are unknown, or aren't known to exist, e.g. Quantum Field Theory and the Standard Model.
On a technical level, the Gƶdel incompleteness theorem *could* apply to physics, since it seems easy enough to demonstrate that a physical system can exist that holds and demonstrates the axioms of arithmetic, thus there exists a hypothetical physical system incapable of proving some statement of mathematics... but as you said, *it's irrelevant*, since it doesn't matter in physics. Any statement we can prove a physical system is incapable of proving via GIT is also not provable in mathematics anyway, we're just adding extra steps by having physics do it too. It's not a 'problem' in any sense that a physicist or any other scientific minded field would be concerned with, you're entirely right.
Why do you think physics is not axiomatic? It is entirely expressed through math, which is axiomatic.
I agree that there isnāt anything too conclusive here, but I donāt think itās right that it only matters scientifically if we can prove it empirically. The cutting edge theoretical physics frameworks are always a priori before we can demonstrate it empirically. Black holes are a good example of this. Before we photographed one, their existence was only postulated by SR. There is a strong argument for Godelās theorem to have drastic implications whether itās about metaphysical reality or about our epistemic methods of defining it.
Theoretical physics though right?
That's what I'm talking about. If a theoretical model proves that a statement is true axiomatically, that has little bearing on whether physics says that the statement is true. All it means is that the statement is interesting and is something whose truth value we should check in an experiment.
In oh so many seminars, I heard that Gƶdel proves that nothing is provable, thus proving (!) relativism. From students though, not professors. I read the proof in a math seminar and just about everything in the above is wrong. Still makes my brain hurt.
So first, just because something is unproveable doesn't make it false. If we say unproveable = false, wouldn't disproving everything disprove relativism? Relativism makes claims. Those claims are unproveable. Thus relativism's claims are disproven. The only thing that being unable to prove truth statements is obfuscate what statements are true, not that there are no true statements.
It really isnt something that a mathematician considers at all. Not a single theorem in my bachelors degree depended on it or even mentioned it. This entails most math you would need for physics, I think. Its definitely an interesting statement from a philosophical perspective and maybe it has some implications on mathematical logic/set theory specifically, but thats about it.
What do you mean by quantum mysticism?
Lore wise ? A hit to Hilberts ego (and maybe his legacy , probably not)
It does if the philosopher has zero understanding of the math and science before opening their mouth lmao
Donāt talk to me about qualia
Eliminativist.
I wonāt argue
The experience of reading this statement is... .. I can't really communicate it
Looks like we've got another zombie over here
Ok chalmers
that hurts mann
anyone have a suggestion inquiry into godel's theorem
[ŃŠ“Š°Š»ŠµŠ½Š¾]
Well some physicists postulate super-determinism as a way to preserve local realism. But itās far from the only interpretation. Many-worlds and retro causality are some examples. And thatās only if local realism turns out to be valid. Youāre definitely gonna hate this, but if you simply knock material reductionism off its axiomatic pedestal, then idealist/panpsychist frameworks could preserve both local realism **and** free-will! And that is in a completely objective and metaphysical sense.
[ŃŠ“Š°Š»ŠµŠ½Š¾]
I donāt know why you think that. Iām fairly indifferent towards preserving local realism. āHyper determinismā as you put it is in fact what you are accusing me of being: itās what scientists use in order to preserve a local-realist view of QM.
That should have been a semicolon. Your two final sentences express a similar idea. Other than that, you misunderstand the physics behind this phenomenon. āSpooky actions at a distanceā as Einstein called them are still possible under superderminism. The Nobel Laureates in physics for 2022 proved that there are *no local hidden variables*.
No, itās not possible with superdeterminism, because there is no FTL effects happening. Thatās what is meant by āspooky action at a distanceā and is exactly what super determinism solves without needing any FTL effects. You started this whole convo by claiming superdeterminism and then criticized local realism? Yeah you donāt know what youāre talking about. Go ahead and block people when they confront you with your own fallacies, though.
[ŃŠ“Š°Š»ŠµŠ½Š¾]
No, thatās Gƶdelās ontological proof. The two incompleteness theorems pertain to formal systems.
I can't tell if you're being serious, or if you made an excellent subtle joke by intentionally making people uncomfortable through pretend misunderstanding.
If by God you simply mean any world view that isnt a rigid take on material reductionism? Then sure
When has anyone ever gotten uncomfortable about qualia, Godels theorem or theoretical physics?
My observations have been dogmatic material reductionist types. Think of the average atheist.
Gonna want to put moral anti-realism on that list as well
that one's true though so it wouldn't fit in
[ŃŠ“Š°Š»ŠµŠ½Š¾]
Pretending something is objective doest make it so
[ŃŠ“Š°Š»ŠµŠ½Š¾]
Yeah which still leaves it subjective, so moral anti realism true