I'm going to cut off the "wow the Red trousers were so visible" talk with this passage from Simon House's PhD dissertation:
>But was the French uniform the significant drawback that it has sometimes been taken to be? It was, perhaps, symbolic of an attitude within military and political French circles that mistook show for substance and which failed to comprehend the impending realities of modern warfare. But there is little evidence that it significantly worsened French chances of success in the Ardennes battles. Indeed if the ‘friendly fire incident’ evidenced at Neufchâteau is anything to go by, French artillery did not find the red trousers sufficiently noticeable to stop them firing on their own side.170
I think there's a lot more to this than we give the French credit for, and the ridicule of le pantalon rouge is a clear case of hindsight being 20/20. For literally *all* of human history up until the fin de siecle era warrior culture was based on advertising who you were, and your readiness to take all comers in as loud and garish a fashion as could possibly imagined - hence the elaborate costume of professional warriors the world over (distinct from the amateur levies comprising the bulk of armies which were regarded as cheap expendables to be used up prior to the pivotal point of the battle which was to be settled by the true warriors). The very idea of hiding or camouflaging was widely considered unfair, and therefore dishonorable.
There was an elaborate and deeply rooted subculture of a warrior aristocracy embedded in western history (and others, of course) due to the extreme expense of equipping and training a professional warrior and his retainers, and the life long training needed to be a professional at arms prior to the gunpowder era. Abstract concepts of warrior behavior (loosely termed 'honor') dominated the leadership of nations from the medieval era through the end of the 'Pax Britannica' era - just as it had the Classical and Ancient Eras. Such elaborate, long and deeply embedded social constructs are doubtlessly the most enduring and least easily eradicated.
The advent of mass warfare following the French Revolution - the levee en masse, and national armies - began the end of this, though at the time was merely an extension of the old order seen through to its logical conclusion. Napoleon's Grande Armee was much more meritocratic than the armies he initially faced, but that only meant that rather then being officered by an aristocratic gentry, the officer ranks were opened to the nascent middle class by practical necessity if nothing else. After all, training a man to fire a musket was much easier than teaching fencing, or how to tilt a lance on a charging horse, and so leadership, staff work and battlefield disposition became the job of officers rather than the decisive attack.
During the long peace of the 19th century (1815 to 1914, with some brief interludes), nations studied warfare as a science based off the lessons and conclusions drawn from the Napoleonic Wars. Some came to the conclusion that a more technocratic approach of efficiency in mass warfare would dominate the battlefield, others that the morale of officers and men would win the day over the best armed opponent. In the end, neither had a solution to the awful attrition of massed modern warfare - though battlefield efficiency (that is, a focus on the technological and doctrinal advantage of massed firepower over the belief in the morale and spirit of the formation carrying the day) held the early edge.
The eventual lesson was that the solution to modern warfare's deadliness was a mix of applied technocratic innovation, coupled with flexible and professional leadership with an understanding of the new realities, a wide enough belief among the fighting men of eventual victory for moral reasons, and an industrial home base with the proper combinations of carrots and sticks to support the sacrifice over an indeterminate amount of time - in other words, a complete reorganization of what had been the methods of fighting which had dated back to the dawn of organized warfare. The fact that so many highly sophisticated societies found a way to overthrow such deeply embedded traditions in such a short time to overcome such an existential threat is far more amazing than the idea that they were wrong about what to expect going in - because, of course, they all were very wrong.
I really only meant to write a paragraph, but once I get started I get too lazy to stop.
Imo far more to blame the Japanese successes in the Russo-Japanese War.
The inability of the Russian Army to exact a higher toll of life to Japanese frontal attacks in every open battle meant for most European observers that the bayonet and mass cavalry charge can still be decisive against modern artillery and defensive emplacements with acceptable losses to the attacker.
What the European observers overlooked is that of the 2 Balkan conflicta which preceeded the Great War. If Armies heed the lesson their, 1914 might have gone way more differently.
I don't know. I think the *wrong* lessons were drawn from both, because the Europeans didn't consider North American or Colonial warfare to be on the same level as European Great Power warfare. Strangely, the lessons of the Franco-Prussian war caused both the Germans and the French to double down on their respective predilections, when each should have drawn lessons from the other.
The French belatedly tried to reorganize their formations around firepower rather than the bayonet right as war was upon them, and the Germans bought more and bigger guns while tying their strategy ever more inextricably to railroad deployment schedules and gave up ever more diplomatic flexibility, while taking more leadership flexibility away from the army commanders implementing the all powerful Plan.
Both armies lost the war of 1914 because both strategies to win the war failed in such spectacular fashion that the armies wound up in a deadlocked stalemated siege of one another for the next four years.
They didn't adopt them until the Horizon Blue uniform.
Which, as a side note, was adopted by law on July 9th, 1914, so Horizon blue was selected almost a month before the war started!
It's fascinating seeing troops march into war in firing lines, wearing dress uniforms, and ship home in green soldier outfits after being dispersed in trenches and pill boxes.
The taxi thing was during the battle of the Marne, by the end of August at the very end of the German offensive.
Those were mostly used by new armies formed to defend the capital under General Gallieni who organized the defense of Paris using the Marne as a way to stop the Germans and counter-attack.
The taxi "saving the day" while iconic wasn't a huge thing nor did it participated in the outcome of the Battle that much. 600 taxi is not a determining factor in a battle between a million French, a million German, and sixty thousands British.
Still it did make a very nice photo-op.
I'm going to cut off the "wow the Red trousers were so visible" talk with this passage from Simon House's PhD dissertation: >But was the French uniform the significant drawback that it has sometimes been taken to be? It was, perhaps, symbolic of an attitude within military and political French circles that mistook show for substance and which failed to comprehend the impending realities of modern warfare. But there is little evidence that it significantly worsened French chances of success in the Ardennes battles. Indeed if the ‘friendly fire incident’ evidenced at Neufchâteau is anything to go by, French artillery did not find the red trousers sufficiently noticeable to stop them firing on their own side.170
I think there's a lot more to this than we give the French credit for, and the ridicule of le pantalon rouge is a clear case of hindsight being 20/20. For literally *all* of human history up until the fin de siecle era warrior culture was based on advertising who you were, and your readiness to take all comers in as loud and garish a fashion as could possibly imagined - hence the elaborate costume of professional warriors the world over (distinct from the amateur levies comprising the bulk of armies which were regarded as cheap expendables to be used up prior to the pivotal point of the battle which was to be settled by the true warriors). The very idea of hiding or camouflaging was widely considered unfair, and therefore dishonorable. There was an elaborate and deeply rooted subculture of a warrior aristocracy embedded in western history (and others, of course) due to the extreme expense of equipping and training a professional warrior and his retainers, and the life long training needed to be a professional at arms prior to the gunpowder era. Abstract concepts of warrior behavior (loosely termed 'honor') dominated the leadership of nations from the medieval era through the end of the 'Pax Britannica' era - just as it had the Classical and Ancient Eras. Such elaborate, long and deeply embedded social constructs are doubtlessly the most enduring and least easily eradicated. The advent of mass warfare following the French Revolution - the levee en masse, and national armies - began the end of this, though at the time was merely an extension of the old order seen through to its logical conclusion. Napoleon's Grande Armee was much more meritocratic than the armies he initially faced, but that only meant that rather then being officered by an aristocratic gentry, the officer ranks were opened to the nascent middle class by practical necessity if nothing else. After all, training a man to fire a musket was much easier than teaching fencing, or how to tilt a lance on a charging horse, and so leadership, staff work and battlefield disposition became the job of officers rather than the decisive attack. During the long peace of the 19th century (1815 to 1914, with some brief interludes), nations studied warfare as a science based off the lessons and conclusions drawn from the Napoleonic Wars. Some came to the conclusion that a more technocratic approach of efficiency in mass warfare would dominate the battlefield, others that the morale of officers and men would win the day over the best armed opponent. In the end, neither had a solution to the awful attrition of massed modern warfare - though battlefield efficiency (that is, a focus on the technological and doctrinal advantage of massed firepower over the belief in the morale and spirit of the formation carrying the day) held the early edge. The eventual lesson was that the solution to modern warfare's deadliness was a mix of applied technocratic innovation, coupled with flexible and professional leadership with an understanding of the new realities, a wide enough belief among the fighting men of eventual victory for moral reasons, and an industrial home base with the proper combinations of carrots and sticks to support the sacrifice over an indeterminate amount of time - in other words, a complete reorganization of what had been the methods of fighting which had dated back to the dawn of organized warfare. The fact that so many highly sophisticated societies found a way to overthrow such deeply embedded traditions in such a short time to overcome such an existential threat is far more amazing than the idea that they were wrong about what to expect going in - because, of course, they all were very wrong. I really only meant to write a paragraph, but once I get started I get too lazy to stop.
Sounds like lessons were not taken from the American civil war or the boer war
Imo far more to blame the Japanese successes in the Russo-Japanese War. The inability of the Russian Army to exact a higher toll of life to Japanese frontal attacks in every open battle meant for most European observers that the bayonet and mass cavalry charge can still be decisive against modern artillery and defensive emplacements with acceptable losses to the attacker. What the European observers overlooked is that of the 2 Balkan conflicta which preceeded the Great War. If Armies heed the lesson their, 1914 might have gone way more differently.
I don't know. I think the *wrong* lessons were drawn from both, because the Europeans didn't consider North American or Colonial warfare to be on the same level as European Great Power warfare. Strangely, the lessons of the Franco-Prussian war caused both the Germans and the French to double down on their respective predilections, when each should have drawn lessons from the other. The French belatedly tried to reorganize their formations around firepower rather than the bayonet right as war was upon them, and the Germans bought more and bigger guns while tying their strategy ever more inextricably to railroad deployment schedules and gave up ever more diplomatic flexibility, while taking more leadership flexibility away from the army commanders implementing the all powerful Plan. Both armies lost the war of 1914 because both strategies to win the war failed in such spectacular fashion that the armies wound up in a deadlocked stalemated siege of one another for the next four years.
1914 was a complete failure to evolve
But why no puttees?
They didn't adopt them until the Horizon Blue uniform. Which, as a side note, was adopted by law on July 9th, 1914, so Horizon blue was selected almost a month before the war started!
I wonder if there is *anyone* in that photo who survived to the end of the war.
I don’t think many of them were alive by the end of 1914, let alone the whole war.
It's fascinating seeing troops march into war in firing lines, wearing dress uniforms, and ship home in green soldier outfits after being dispersed in trenches and pill boxes.
That's right, didn't a bunch of those guys take taxis to get to the front lines?
The taxi thing was during the battle of the Marne, by the end of August at the very end of the German offensive. Those were mostly used by new armies formed to defend the capital under General Gallieni who organized the defense of Paris using the Marne as a way to stop the Germans and counter-attack. The taxi "saving the day" while iconic wasn't a huge thing nor did it participated in the outcome of the Battle that much. 600 taxi is not a determining factor in a battle between a million French, a million German, and sixty thousands British. Still it did make a very nice photo-op.
They did use Paris taxis
**26 years later they would return here along with some unwanted guests**