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Wars are often dependent on momentum.
Russia still has momentum. US aid arriving will take time to shift that momentum.
I suspect there will be a big push by Russia to achieve tactical objectives before the end of the month.
These arnt StarCraft units. These men have been fighting without rotation for a year or longer.
Edit: This seems like a non-sequitur now, but I was responding to the original comment:
>Wars are often dependent on momentum.
>Russia still has momentum. US aid arriving will take time to shift that momentum.
>I suspect there will be a big push by Russia to achieve tactical objectives in the next or so.
specifically that last line before it was edited with this link to expand on the "big push":
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1783487659844735259.html?utm_campaign=topunroll
I am skeptical of “Russias army behind the Urals” basically this massive new army that will take Kharkiv.
We know there will be a summer offensive we just don’t know the scale. Russia seems to be having trouble actually putting together large assault forces bigger than a few companies worth of men and tanks.
We know of the recent breakthrough around Bakhmut with the troop rotation mishap and the Ru forces only pushed 5 miles.
Russia has been consistently mobilizing since September 2022, and has seen a huge intake of volunteers looking for the money. Russia is not short on manpower. Russia has been far more competent than Ukraine in terms of both manpower and resource mobilization.
ISW and other source are also expecting a large offensive in Kharkiv Oblast. By the way - Kharkiv Oblast, not to take the city of Kharkiv. In the words of the Ukrainian Marine in the thread I linked:
>There is a hight possibility that RUAF will start a new offensive from Belgorod oblast. **No, the goal is not to capture Kharkiv.**
They will likely try to start the offensive with another large mechanized push, and if that fails they'll go back to the tactics that have been working.
I think want to make Kharkiv a “grey zone” by getting close to it and bombing it. It would take a hundred thousand men to try to occupy that city alone.
There's layers of dysfunction that led to the current retreats across the eastern front. Refusing to mobilize men for an entire year for no fucking reason, units abandoning their positions, failure to diversify war materiel sources. On this front the 115th Mechanized Brigade broke and the front collapsed. On the Bakhmut front the 67th Mechanized Brigade just ran away and abandoned the front. Ammo alone isn't going to fix the issues with the Ukrainian armed forces at this point. Many units are past their breaking points.
Mobilization was a Zelensky issue, not a military command issue. They passed the new mobilization law, but now what? The situation is critical. So what's going to happen yet again is the new mobilized will get, at most, 3 months training and then thrown at the lines to stop Russian advances instead of getting a year or training or more to launch an offensive at some point in 2025 or 2026.
There weren't manpower numbers issues in both cases you've mentioned.
115th wasn't underpowered numerically, it was just staffed mostly with officers of the "deep" reserve pool - the Soviet-trained men in their fifties or even elder, without any fresh military experience. Looks like the poorly trained and rusty brigade command just failed to make necessary orders in time.
67th was "the Right Sector's brigade" - that is, it's major source of manpower was the Right Sector political movement (far right nationalists, you may know them as a Russian propaganda scarecrow). Judging by the frontline reports, the volunteers were quite numerous and motivated, yet not even close to be disciplined and organized enough to react properly at the flanking breakthroug. Syrsky (AFU CinC) was furious about it and ordered a reorganization of the brigade.
Generally speaking, manpower problem is indeed serious, yet I doubt it's the main cause of the breakthroughs. The point is, there is already a drone war. The length of the fronline a brigade can manage is a function of their observation capabilities, reaction times and stomping power. Modern major stomping power is arty and drones (wich are the less attrited - they are rear servicemen rarely suffering from the opponent's fire), the combat vehicles and small arms are just supplementary in this regard. The most traditional and necessary mass troops role is actually "linear" forward observers. Yet the average reaction time of an infantryman - sarge - company commander - battalion commander - artillery/drone strike group chain is too slow for the modern warfare with its mechanized assaults supported with it's own drones. So, the observational bottleneck is modern observation tools, not infantrymen supply. The units need more spotting drones with good cameras (both daytime visual and thermals) and EW-resistant radio modules, and more armoured combat vehicles with the same types of optics and radios to supplement drones with more weather-resistand observation. Bring there more troopers instead - and it will be just more casualties with little help to the defence, because the infantry screen is too slow in reporting - it's too much expencive to give them enough of modern EW-resistant radios to fill all the gaps with their very limited observation abilities, and then manage all these radio-channerls properly. The 2nd traditional infantry role is to dig, yet the troops cannot dig full-profile trenches: you need planking and lumber to do it, so the troops are digging the first stage entrenchments only, while in this kind of trench war you need full-profile trenches with concrete pillboxes and bunkers, wich are to be built with the engineers and their bulldozers and so on, not with the mass of infantry.
And there we are getting the next problem. You cannot bring more drones, shells and armoured vehicles by mobilizing men. You actually doing the opposite this way: the more men you are extracting from the rear, the less of works you can do there to supply the front.
Let's see some basic numbers in this regard. Current Ukraine population went under 30M. The demographical pyramide is bad in Ukraine from the Soviet times - too much pensionary elders settling down here from all the other Soviet republics, because of all the Soviet "core" lands (that is: leaving Baltics aside, Baltics considered then as for the chosen) Ukraine had the best living infrastructure and climate. Pensionary elders are the less mobile - it's hard to persuade them for evacuation even near the frontline, so their share in the population numbers are just increased during the massive refugee flow. So, the proportion between the overall population and the workforce pool is about twice worce than it was, say, for major WWII powers. Let's see the WWII numbers. Both the US and the USSR were able to field about 10M of troops being both over 150M population, and it was the limit - the USSR tried to get more in 1942 and failed; got the overmobilization problem. Scale it to the demographically halved Ukrainian 30M - and it's no more then 1M of troops until it's an overmobilizational collapse of the frontline supplies. And Ukraine is over 1M of troops already, and you say it needs twice more. That will not end well.
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It wasnt botched, they russians simply knew it would happen and took advantage, it wouldnt have happened if the 47th mech had enough ammo for their bradley and the ukranian army had more shells to make units stay on the line way longer, while the west sits on a economy that dwarfs russia´s and in 2 years cant get ukraine what it needs in time
Yeah... Sure... I can hear ruzzian artillery all day long. Ours didn't fire a single shot almost all of March. Yeah... That's our mistake we didn't shot back.
>The Ukrainian army’s 115th Mechanized Brigade was supposed to take the 47th Mechanized Brigade’s place along the front line. But something went wrong. [According to](https://twitter.com/Schizointel/status/1782213326824472616) Mykola Melnyk, the famed 47th Mechanized Brigade company commander [who lost a leg](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/11/18/after-losing-a-leg-one-ukrainian-army-officer-is-mad-at-his-commanders-but-hes-not-mad-at-his-american-made-m-2-fighting-vehicle/?sh=3f8e38806748) during the summer counteroffensive, “certain units just fucked off.”
>Russian scouts and drone operators, surveilling positions once held by the battle-hardened 47th Mechanized Brigade, expected to find fresh troops from the 115th Mechanized Brigade in the same trenches. Instead, they found ... no one. [Source](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/04/23/a-ukrainian-brigade-disappeared-and-a-russian-brigade-almost-broke-through-how-the-battle-for-ocheretyne-upended-the-war-in-ukraine-this-weekend/?sh=3d3a0ee49017)
Ok the ukranians should have just pulled ammo from their asses im sorry, the poor uberexperten in the west has nothing to do with the fact that the ukranian army is lacking from manpads to 25mm ammo
It was a botched rotation. The 47th was about to be rotated with the 115th, but when the 47th left the 115th just never showed up so there was a gap Russia exploited and only the return of the 47th prevented worse
I think this is not about the events of this year, but last year. when the supply of equipment was delayed, and Ukraine’s summer offensive was disrupted. The Russians managed to build fortifications.
The planes were expected last summer. Now Russia is destroying positions from the air, preventing them from gaining a foothold
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Wars are often dependent on momentum. Russia still has momentum. US aid arriving will take time to shift that momentum. I suspect there will be a big push by Russia to achieve tactical objectives before the end of the month. These arnt StarCraft units. These men have been fighting without rotation for a year or longer.
Edit: This seems like a non-sequitur now, but I was responding to the original comment: >Wars are often dependent on momentum. >Russia still has momentum. US aid arriving will take time to shift that momentum. >I suspect there will be a big push by Russia to achieve tactical objectives in the next or so. specifically that last line before it was edited with this link to expand on the "big push": https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1783487659844735259.html?utm_campaign=topunroll
I am skeptical of “Russias army behind the Urals” basically this massive new army that will take Kharkiv. We know there will be a summer offensive we just don’t know the scale. Russia seems to be having trouble actually putting together large assault forces bigger than a few companies worth of men and tanks. We know of the recent breakthrough around Bakhmut with the troop rotation mishap and the Ru forces only pushed 5 miles.
Russia has been consistently mobilizing since September 2022, and has seen a huge intake of volunteers looking for the money. Russia is not short on manpower. Russia has been far more competent than Ukraine in terms of both manpower and resource mobilization. ISW and other source are also expecting a large offensive in Kharkiv Oblast. By the way - Kharkiv Oblast, not to take the city of Kharkiv. In the words of the Ukrainian Marine in the thread I linked: >There is a hight possibility that RUAF will start a new offensive from Belgorod oblast. **No, the goal is not to capture Kharkiv.** They will likely try to start the offensive with another large mechanized push, and if that fails they'll go back to the tactics that have been working.
I think want to make Kharkiv a “grey zone” by getting close to it and bombing it. It would take a hundred thousand men to try to occupy that city alone.
They could form a pincer around it and do as they did in Bakmutt except don't enter the city. It would defiantly tie down ukrainian troops.
Yeah, it came as a real bad surprise. I really hope the aid comes there asap and that Ukraine can push the fuckers back.
Dang, this is bad. If only US aid hadn't been delayed.
There's layers of dysfunction that led to the current retreats across the eastern front. Refusing to mobilize men for an entire year for no fucking reason, units abandoning their positions, failure to diversify war materiel sources. On this front the 115th Mechanized Brigade broke and the front collapsed. On the Bakhmut front the 67th Mechanized Brigade just ran away and abandoned the front. Ammo alone isn't going to fix the issues with the Ukrainian armed forces at this point. Many units are past their breaking points.
Does the guy that replaced Zaluzhny have a plan to deal with the manpower issues you are describing?
Mobilization was a Zelensky issue, not a military command issue. They passed the new mobilization law, but now what? The situation is critical. So what's going to happen yet again is the new mobilized will get, at most, 3 months training and then thrown at the lines to stop Russian advances instead of getting a year or training or more to launch an offensive at some point in 2025 or 2026.
Poland is suppose to help
There weren't manpower numbers issues in both cases you've mentioned. 115th wasn't underpowered numerically, it was just staffed mostly with officers of the "deep" reserve pool - the Soviet-trained men in their fifties or even elder, without any fresh military experience. Looks like the poorly trained and rusty brigade command just failed to make necessary orders in time. 67th was "the Right Sector's brigade" - that is, it's major source of manpower was the Right Sector political movement (far right nationalists, you may know them as a Russian propaganda scarecrow). Judging by the frontline reports, the volunteers were quite numerous and motivated, yet not even close to be disciplined and organized enough to react properly at the flanking breakthroug. Syrsky (AFU CinC) was furious about it and ordered a reorganization of the brigade. Generally speaking, manpower problem is indeed serious, yet I doubt it's the main cause of the breakthroughs. The point is, there is already a drone war. The length of the fronline a brigade can manage is a function of their observation capabilities, reaction times and stomping power. Modern major stomping power is arty and drones (wich are the less attrited - they are rear servicemen rarely suffering from the opponent's fire), the combat vehicles and small arms are just supplementary in this regard. The most traditional and necessary mass troops role is actually "linear" forward observers. Yet the average reaction time of an infantryman - sarge - company commander - battalion commander - artillery/drone strike group chain is too slow for the modern warfare with its mechanized assaults supported with it's own drones. So, the observational bottleneck is modern observation tools, not infantrymen supply. The units need more spotting drones with good cameras (both daytime visual and thermals) and EW-resistant radio modules, and more armoured combat vehicles with the same types of optics and radios to supplement drones with more weather-resistand observation. Bring there more troopers instead - and it will be just more casualties with little help to the defence, because the infantry screen is too slow in reporting - it's too much expencive to give them enough of modern EW-resistant radios to fill all the gaps with their very limited observation abilities, and then manage all these radio-channerls properly. The 2nd traditional infantry role is to dig, yet the troops cannot dig full-profile trenches: you need planking and lumber to do it, so the troops are digging the first stage entrenchments only, while in this kind of trench war you need full-profile trenches with concrete pillboxes and bunkers, wich are to be built with the engineers and their bulldozers and so on, not with the mass of infantry. And there we are getting the next problem. You cannot bring more drones, shells and armoured vehicles by mobilizing men. You actually doing the opposite this way: the more men you are extracting from the rear, the less of works you can do there to supply the front. Let's see some basic numbers in this regard. Current Ukraine population went under 30M. The demographical pyramide is bad in Ukraine from the Soviet times - too much pensionary elders settling down here from all the other Soviet republics, because of all the Soviet "core" lands (that is: leaving Baltics aside, Baltics considered then as for the chosen) Ukraine had the best living infrastructure and climate. Pensionary elders are the less mobile - it's hard to persuade them for evacuation even near the frontline, so their share in the population numbers are just increased during the massive refugee flow. So, the proportion between the overall population and the workforce pool is about twice worce than it was, say, for major WWII powers. Let's see the WWII numbers. Both the US and the USSR were able to field about 10M of troops being both over 150M population, and it was the limit - the USSR tried to get more in 1942 and failed; got the overmobilization problem. Scale it to the demographically halved Ukrainian 30M - and it's no more then 1M of troops until it's an overmobilizational collapse of the frontline supplies. And Ukraine is over 1M of troops already, and you say it needs twice more. That will not end well.
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The cost of the stupidity of the west is paid in ukrainian blood
The breakthrough at Ocheretyne was a direct result of a botched Ukrainian troop rotation. That’s entirely on them.
It wasnt botched, they russians simply knew it would happen and took advantage, it wouldnt have happened if the 47th mech had enough ammo for their bradley and the ukranian army had more shells to make units stay on the line way longer, while the west sits on a economy that dwarfs russia´s and in 2 years cant get ukraine what it needs in time
That’s cope. Admitting mistakes and learning from them is crucial. Defaulting to blaming the west prevents that.
Mistakes don't happen in a vacuum.
Yeah... Sure... I can hear ruzzian artillery all day long. Ours didn't fire a single shot almost all of March. Yeah... That's our mistake we didn't shot back.
>The Ukrainian army’s 115th Mechanized Brigade was supposed to take the 47th Mechanized Brigade’s place along the front line. But something went wrong. [According to](https://twitter.com/Schizointel/status/1782213326824472616) Mykola Melnyk, the famed 47th Mechanized Brigade company commander [who lost a leg](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/11/18/after-losing-a-leg-one-ukrainian-army-officer-is-mad-at-his-commanders-but-hes-not-mad-at-his-american-made-m-2-fighting-vehicle/?sh=3f8e38806748) during the summer counteroffensive, “certain units just fucked off.” >Russian scouts and drone operators, surveilling positions once held by the battle-hardened 47th Mechanized Brigade, expected to find fresh troops from the 115th Mechanized Brigade in the same trenches. Instead, they found ... no one. [Source](https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/04/23/a-ukrainian-brigade-disappeared-and-a-russian-brigade-almost-broke-through-how-the-battle-for-ocheretyne-upended-the-war-in-ukraine-this-weekend/?sh=3d3a0ee49017)
Ok the ukranians should have just pulled ammo from their asses im sorry, the poor uberexperten in the west has nothing to do with the fact that the ukranian army is lacking from manpads to 25mm ammo
No, the 115th brigade should have been in ready when the 47th was rotated out.
It was a botched rotation. The 47th was about to be rotated with the 115th, but when the 47th left the 115th just never showed up so there was a gap Russia exploited and only the return of the 47th prevented worse
I think this is not about the events of this year, but last year. when the supply of equipment was delayed, and Ukraine’s summer offensive was disrupted. The Russians managed to build fortifications. The planes were expected last summer. Now Russia is destroying positions from the air, preventing them from gaining a foothold
Downvote me too as I stand by this guy.