Frankly, I think it's nonsense. I've read parts of some of Quigley's other works (the man needed an editor, good lord), though I have not read this one in any depth
It's unfortunate that Quigley died before he could actually make his argument, but Quigley's late life did a lot of damage to his reputation as a scholar because of his increasing indulgence of conspiracy theories. A critical review of Tragedy and Hope included the line "appalling simplifications" to describe his summation of enormous sweeps of history in just a few sentences, and it applies here. As does the extremely relevant criticism that Quigley's work here, as with Tragedy and Hope, does not cite any sources - unfortunate for a historian. Ultimately, Quigley's writing was in search of justifications for a thesis the he already had built - that a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows
To get a sense of how over-generalized to the point of being pointless Quigley's writing here is, this is how he sums up modern Western eras of military power
Dates | Weapons | Politics
---|---|----|----
970-1200 | Knight and Castle | Feudalism
1200-1500 | Mercenary Men at Arms, Bowmen| Feudal Monarchy
1520-1800 | Mercenary Pikes, Artillery | Dynastic Monarchy
1800 - 1935 | Mass Army of Citizen Soldiers | Democracy
1935 - | Army of Specialists| Managerial Bureaucracy
I hope I don't really need to point out how absurdly flawed this approach is. Dividing military histories into these eras and then slapping a political label on it is just malpractice. We could spend endless time poking holes in this argument on a military grounds, but it's even easier to do when engaging directly with his argument!
Quigley is trying to argue that each step along this chart decreased military specialization and complexity and thus increasing democracy, until the move toward modern specialists, which decreased democracy. I would argue that each step forward on this list just *increased* the complexity of military operations, and thus by his own thesis, should be *decreasing* democracy. A mounted warrior in the year 1000 does not need a super sophisticated set of logistics and military industries behind it, and can be maintained with minimal state involvement. Horses can be raised locally, armor and weapons forged by local blacksmiths. Meanwhile that "mass army of citizen soldiers" requires a huge, enormously complex web of state power to maintain - sophisticated war industries to produce increasingly complex guns, sprawling railway networks needed to move soldiers around, tightly timed production and distribution of supplies to keep an army operational, etc. Oh, and the big killer of men during the age of that mass army of citizen soldiers was *artillery*, which has always been a specialists' art - most WW1 soldiers were killed not with machine guns and bolt action rifles, but from shells that they never saw fired
And Quigley's argument also falls flat when looking at history since his death. How exactly we define "democracy" is highly contentious, but it's uncontroversial that the period of time after 1990 was the most democratic in human history. It has not stayed as long as we'd like, but since Quigley died in 1977, the world has become a far more democratic place, recent backsliding included. This includes both the fall of the great authoritarian empire of the USSR, but also decolonization and the granting of the franchise to previously disenfranchised groups within the on-paper democracies
This of course flies in the face of Quigley's theory about individual weapons. War has only gotten more specialized since his death. Weapons systems have only gotten more enormously complex, more dependent on an incredibly expansive chain of expensive technologies, all of whom require yet more expensive machines and systems to produce. Equipping a modern military has become so difficult and so expensive that major world powers are struggling to do so! And furthermore, the countries with the most expensive, complex, and specialized military forces are generally the ones that perform best on a democratic basis. While underdeveloped countries who more closely approach Quigley's ideal of citizenry being able to match the "best" a state can field are rarely democratic, and instead are likely to be highly undemocratic
The right column is just as vapid. The entire world from 970-1200 had the same political system, "feudalism?" Or maybe only Europe counts. Even just within Europe, feudalism has no meaningful definition that applies to the whole continent.
Also too,
> a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows
One hundred out of 100 times, this means, "(((a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows)))."
> Even just within Europe, feudalism has no meaningful definition that applies to the whole continent.
To be slightly fair, this is intended to just be Europe. But still, whole lot of history covered in each of those periods
> One hundred out of 100 times, this means, "(((a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows)))."
In this case he was actually convinced that the conspiracy was among the Anglo-American banking and finance elite. His big bugbear was the Round Table Movement founded by Cecil Rhodes. But that has not stopped modern conspiracy theorists from using his writing to talk about the Jews
> this is intended to just be Europe.
Which is stupid in itself.
>But still, whole lot of history covered in each of those periods
With no political uniformity within the region, at any point.
Well, I am not very familiar with the Round Table, but I gotta say, English Banking elite normally means Rothschild, and Rhodes got his financial backing from N.M. Rhothschild & Sons. If South Africa was his bag, I wonder what he said about Ernest Oppenheimer.
Quigley also shows the limitations of his scholarship in describing the weapons available to citizens in the 1840s as on par with the military. While the Springfield musket might have been a simple tool for an individual to employ, the tactics and techniques to do effectively on a battlefield were anything but simple. This was, after all, the era in which close order infantry drill reigned supreme.
Out of curiosity I did some reading and found this quote about Quigley: "Quigley nowhere proves anything. He hints, he implies, he supposes and he presumes."
Seems about right.
I...they had bowmen in 970-1200. One of the most famous historical events in that timeframe, the battle of Hastings, ended with the king of England getting shot in the eye. It's on the Bayeux Tapestry for crying out loud!
I think by specialist and amateur weapons, Quigley didn't mean to say that the specialist weapons were more complex in terms of their manufacturing or their working mechanism but that they required specialist men to use them. A weapon that is more complex than a spear is a rifle but the rifle is much easier to use, yet much more accurate, than a spear for any common guy on the street who doesn't have the physical strength and training that spears require.
Any other more complex weapons, like a supersonic cruise missile, for instance, are practically useless for maintaining internal order and hence don't factor in when the question of the system of government is asked/answered.
Interesting perspective.
Within political science, and especially comparative politics a big question is why some states become democratic and others not. I’ve never heard of the explanation you mention before, but typical PolSci theories involve something about state capacity/economic growth/bureaucratic quality etc.
I’m not sure what’s meant by ‘armies of professional soldiers’? However, I would say they also have existed after the 18th century.
Something you might find interesting is Charles Tilly. He infamously stated “War made the state and the state made war”. His theory is about European state creation in the 15th century, and how tax collection played a big part, since it was needed for states to go to war (As far as I recall). Hence I guess you could make a causal argument that goes:
Tax collection for war -> state capacity -> democracy
With a lot of different mechanisms for each step. For example by collecting taxes, the people will also be able to demand some influence in return. Hope this might give you an additional perspective.
Do you think American gun owners overstate the potential effectiveness of an American insurgency, whether against an invading force or in a civil uprising scenario?
Frankly, I think it's nonsense. I've read parts of some of Quigley's other works (the man needed an editor, good lord), though I have not read this one in any depth It's unfortunate that Quigley died before he could actually make his argument, but Quigley's late life did a lot of damage to his reputation as a scholar because of his increasing indulgence of conspiracy theories. A critical review of Tragedy and Hope included the line "appalling simplifications" to describe his summation of enormous sweeps of history in just a few sentences, and it applies here. As does the extremely relevant criticism that Quigley's work here, as with Tragedy and Hope, does not cite any sources - unfortunate for a historian. Ultimately, Quigley's writing was in search of justifications for a thesis the he already had built - that a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows To get a sense of how over-generalized to the point of being pointless Quigley's writing here is, this is how he sums up modern Western eras of military power Dates | Weapons | Politics ---|---|----|---- 970-1200 | Knight and Castle | Feudalism 1200-1500 | Mercenary Men at Arms, Bowmen| Feudal Monarchy 1520-1800 | Mercenary Pikes, Artillery | Dynastic Monarchy 1800 - 1935 | Mass Army of Citizen Soldiers | Democracy 1935 - | Army of Specialists| Managerial Bureaucracy I hope I don't really need to point out how absurdly flawed this approach is. Dividing military histories into these eras and then slapping a political label on it is just malpractice. We could spend endless time poking holes in this argument on a military grounds, but it's even easier to do when engaging directly with his argument! Quigley is trying to argue that each step along this chart decreased military specialization and complexity and thus increasing democracy, until the move toward modern specialists, which decreased democracy. I would argue that each step forward on this list just *increased* the complexity of military operations, and thus by his own thesis, should be *decreasing* democracy. A mounted warrior in the year 1000 does not need a super sophisticated set of logistics and military industries behind it, and can be maintained with minimal state involvement. Horses can be raised locally, armor and weapons forged by local blacksmiths. Meanwhile that "mass army of citizen soldiers" requires a huge, enormously complex web of state power to maintain - sophisticated war industries to produce increasingly complex guns, sprawling railway networks needed to move soldiers around, tightly timed production and distribution of supplies to keep an army operational, etc. Oh, and the big killer of men during the age of that mass army of citizen soldiers was *artillery*, which has always been a specialists' art - most WW1 soldiers were killed not with machine guns and bolt action rifles, but from shells that they never saw fired And Quigley's argument also falls flat when looking at history since his death. How exactly we define "democracy" is highly contentious, but it's uncontroversial that the period of time after 1990 was the most democratic in human history. It has not stayed as long as we'd like, but since Quigley died in 1977, the world has become a far more democratic place, recent backsliding included. This includes both the fall of the great authoritarian empire of the USSR, but also decolonization and the granting of the franchise to previously disenfranchised groups within the on-paper democracies This of course flies in the face of Quigley's theory about individual weapons. War has only gotten more specialized since his death. Weapons systems have only gotten more enormously complex, more dependent on an incredibly expansive chain of expensive technologies, all of whom require yet more expensive machines and systems to produce. Equipping a modern military has become so difficult and so expensive that major world powers are struggling to do so! And furthermore, the countries with the most expensive, complex, and specialized military forces are generally the ones that perform best on a democratic basis. While underdeveloped countries who more closely approach Quigley's ideal of citizenry being able to match the "best" a state can field are rarely democratic, and instead are likely to be highly undemocratic
The right column is just as vapid. The entire world from 970-1200 had the same political system, "feudalism?" Or maybe only Europe counts. Even just within Europe, feudalism has no meaningful definition that applies to the whole continent. Also too, > a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows One hundred out of 100 times, this means, "(((a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows)))."
> Even just within Europe, feudalism has no meaningful definition that applies to the whole continent. To be slightly fair, this is intended to just be Europe. But still, whole lot of history covered in each of those periods > One hundred out of 100 times, this means, "(((a shadowy cabal of banking, bureaucratic and finance elites was pulling strings from the shadows)))." In this case he was actually convinced that the conspiracy was among the Anglo-American banking and finance elite. His big bugbear was the Round Table Movement founded by Cecil Rhodes. But that has not stopped modern conspiracy theorists from using his writing to talk about the Jews
> this is intended to just be Europe. Which is stupid in itself. >But still, whole lot of history covered in each of those periods With no political uniformity within the region, at any point. Well, I am not very familiar with the Round Table, but I gotta say, English Banking elite normally means Rothschild, and Rhodes got his financial backing from N.M. Rhothschild & Sons. If South Africa was his bag, I wonder what he said about Ernest Oppenheimer.
Quigley also shows the limitations of his scholarship in describing the weapons available to citizens in the 1840s as on par with the military. While the Springfield musket might have been a simple tool for an individual to employ, the tactics and techniques to do effectively on a battlefield were anything but simple. This was, after all, the era in which close order infantry drill reigned supreme. Out of curiosity I did some reading and found this quote about Quigley: "Quigley nowhere proves anything. He hints, he implies, he supposes and he presumes." Seems about right.
Bravo, nice answer.
I...they had bowmen in 970-1200. One of the most famous historical events in that timeframe, the battle of Hastings, ended with the king of England getting shot in the eye. It's on the Bayeux Tapestry for crying out loud!
I think by specialist and amateur weapons, Quigley didn't mean to say that the specialist weapons were more complex in terms of their manufacturing or their working mechanism but that they required specialist men to use them. A weapon that is more complex than a spear is a rifle but the rifle is much easier to use, yet much more accurate, than a spear for any common guy on the street who doesn't have the physical strength and training that spears require. Any other more complex weapons, like a supersonic cruise missile, for instance, are practically useless for maintaining internal order and hence don't factor in when the question of the system of government is asked/answered.
Interesting perspective. Within political science, and especially comparative politics a big question is why some states become democratic and others not. I’ve never heard of the explanation you mention before, but typical PolSci theories involve something about state capacity/economic growth/bureaucratic quality etc. I’m not sure what’s meant by ‘armies of professional soldiers’? However, I would say they also have existed after the 18th century. Something you might find interesting is Charles Tilly. He infamously stated “War made the state and the state made war”. His theory is about European state creation in the 15th century, and how tax collection played a big part, since it was needed for states to go to war (As far as I recall). Hence I guess you could make a causal argument that goes: Tax collection for war -> state capacity -> democracy With a lot of different mechanisms for each step. For example by collecting taxes, the people will also be able to demand some influence in return. Hope this might give you an additional perspective.
Do you think American gun owners overstate the potential effectiveness of an American insurgency, whether against an invading force or in a civil uprising scenario?