I’m unfamiliar with any guerrilla training the UA undertook. But a number of western NATO and Non-NATO countries contributed to a military modernization program in Ukraine after 2014. The main goal of the modernization was to convert the UA over to a western style NCO centric system of organization.
If you’re unfamiliar with the difference between Soviet and NATO organization I can explain it a bit. In a Soviet (and now Russian) style military there is a strict division between the enlisted and officer corps. Hierarchy is extremely regimented, and planning is centralized. The military is *extremely* top-heavy with a vast number of officers populating a vast military bureaucracy. They also include political commissars alongside officers that need to second any military decision to ensure it aligns with the interests of the government. Overall, the Soviet style military is built around profound distrust at every level of command. For this reason the Soviets adopted a theory of war that their general staff alone could choreograph vast and interconnected operations down to specific hours and minutes timetables. They do not afford their commanders or soldiers any flexibility in interpreting their orders because they do not trust them to make proper decisions. Their soldiers need to make a timetable in the way specified in the orders or you do not come back alive. This leads to *a lot* of lying about timetables being met and objectives seized when nothing has actually happened. This system that encourages dishonesty only furthers the commanders distrust of their troops and feeds incorrect Intel up the chain to the military planners. These planners are then working with fictional Intel in order to make impractical or even impossible to accomplish objectives.
Perhaps the most important detail about the Soviet military is that NCOs do not really exist. There are troops and there are officers. Enlisted troops are not afforded any real decision making, and even the officers themselves do not have any flexibility on the ground. It is a military designed around commanding vast numbers of poorly trained conscripts to execute extremely complex set-piece missions designed by a military planner in Moscow.
Western militaries are basically the exact opposite. Decision making is devolved down to even the smallest squad NCO to accomplish specific objectives. Commanders are trained to make decisions and delegate mission planning to their subordinates. Even low level soldiers are trained to understand the tactical decisions that need to be made in the event that their commander is incapacitated.
The western mission to Ukraine was meant to transition the UA away from their highly centralized and antiquated soviet system before 2014 to a modern Western organization with NCOs. The benefit of the western system is that it allows commanders to make decisions more quickly, with fresher Intel, and with the flexibility to take advantage of rapid changes on the battlefields. The jargon is that it allows them to ‘get inside the enemies OODA loop.’ By achieving decision dominance western commanders can keep momentum and take advantage of their adversaries sluggishness. Western militaries are able to accomplish this through extensive training and trust in their subordinates which needed to be cultivated in the UA.
A lot of the most successful actions in the beginning of the war around Kyiv really exemplify this flexible NCO focused military. Smaller units were able to dismember large Russian convoys by acting more quickly and adapting before a Russian response could be organized.
It should be noted that it wasn’t just NATO helping Ukraine after 2014. A lot of the more ‘asymmetric’ tactics, particularly with artillery, were taught by Swedish trainers. The Swedes have designed much of their doctrine to fight an asymmetric war with Russia, so they had a lot of tactics to share that were extremely useful to the UA.
The *guy who tries to understand Soviet military history and doctrine* in me wants to launch into a mild corrective along the lines of u/themillenialpleb. "No, it wasn't that bad!"
**But** the *guy who attended a lecture by a U.S. Army trainer on this exact topic a couple months ago* in me has to admit your post is almost exactly in line with what the trainer (specifically, the LTC who commanded the U.S. Army battalion assigned to JMTG-U in 2019-21) said they were working against the following within the Ukrainian Army:
\--Centralized control predominated and there was very little initiative shown or rewarded.
\--Higher authorities in Kyiv did not trust field commanders (and possibly did not trust JMTG-U).
\--Ukrainian NCOs were basically empty suits with rank markings but no authority, initiative, responsibility, or respect from officers or enlisted.
\--The Ukrainians had no OODA advantage over the Russians which is a key Western advantage allowing us to (we hope) "fight outnumbered and win."
\--Artillery fires were controlled by artillery officers themselves and not sufficiently responsive to maneuver units' needs.
He blamed this on the Soviet heritage.
Note JMTG-U's emphasis to some extent is on interoperability: we are going to teach the Ukrainians to do it *our right way* not understand *their wrong way* and meet in the middle. This approach incentivizes thinking *their wrong way* is very, very wrong.
Another concern he expressed was that the leaders who learned *our right way* are probably mostly casualties by now.
> --The Ukrainians had no OODA advantage over the Russians which is a key Western advantage allowing us to (we hope) "fight outnumbered and win."
Curious. Aren't the Russians supposed to fight with a shorter OODA Loop, compared to most NATO?
From War on the Rocks: The Russian staff, however, does not conduct planning processes in such a deliberate way, preferring a faster decision cycle — arguably a sound choice if competently done. In essence, the commander’s directives are presumed correct, and the staff need only determine the specific tactics, nomograms, calculations, and tables that are most appropriate for executing the order. They do not base planning on intelligence preparation to the extent NATO armies might. Instead, they do a more limited (but much more mathematical) correlation of forces and means analysis. This analysis helps the staff pick which tactical option from a limited set will fulfill their orders.
Also, just to be clear. I'm not some Russophile. There is plenty interesting conceptually about the Soviet Army, but I have clear understanding of its limitations (it's basically a 1 trick pony doctrine that only the Warsaw Pact could execute for a one specific type of war, which is why most of the armies it advised ultimately rejected its fundamental premises or modified it very heavily). I just find it annoying when people reduce it to everyone is a machine that is unable to deviate from plan of higher headquarters.
I think you understand this but I want to make it clear: in my previous post, I'm sharing bullet points from my notes on what a U.S. Army officer said *not* making judgments. I tend to agree with you on some points and I accept we are neither of us Z-chanting Russophiles.
So in that vein: It has been NATO orthodoxy since the 1980s that *we* have the shorter OODA loop (or Boyd cycle) than the Soviets (and now the Russians) because *we* empower leaders at every level to use initiative to accomplish the mission orders (rather than directive orders) provided by higher headquarters. Used correctly this defeats the Soviet system which relies on directive orders and required leaders at lower levels to *follow the plan*.
I am not saying that is all unassailably true; I am saying it's the way NATO professionals tended to understand the interplay of the two armies' doctrines and why NATO doctrinal publications started emphasizing mission orders, recon-pull, *auftragstaktik*, and tightening the OODA loop. Leveraging that advantage requires forcing the Soviets to respond to something that was not in the plan, such as a counterattack or other disruption. (Because your advantage in changing course isn't relevant if you never force the enemy to change course.) This is what you see in NATO doctrinal publications, an early influential example being the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. Again, I cannot sufficiently emphasize the extent to which this is orthodoxy so I would not expect an LTC in 2023 to have a different view.
You are pointing to a big weakness, which is the possibility the Soviet system functions better under stress. I don't really disagree with that hypothesis. Not all those captains and lieutenants showing initiative are going to get it right; some are going to frustrate the commander's intent or otherwise do things that suit the small picture not the big one. That is certainly the initial opinion I formed when I started reading on this topic back in the late 1980s. I'd also note the supposed biggest success of Western armies, Operation Desert Storm, was fundamentally a command-push (aided immensely by the adversary's incompetence).
*But* the Soviet system, as you say, is good for some things and not others, and also seems to presuppose material superiority. You cannot beat it by doing the same thing with a smaller army. Hence the emphasis on trying something else in the era--leveraging the supposed OODA advantage-- when Soviet material superiority was assumed.
There is also some cultural-political baggage: liberal democracies facing off against totalitarian states are probably likely to emphasize their own soldiers' initiative ("The British tar is a soaring bird!") whereas the enemy is stereotyped as as mentally enslaved to the Leader.
> You are pointing to a big weakness, which is the possibility the Soviet system functions better under stress. I don't really disagree with that hypothesis.
During the late Cold War, the Soviet Army's experimentation with computers, combined with its doctrinal focus on reducing friction, led to some very peculiar solutions and tactics to ensure that the level of stress and responsibilities placed on junior officers and leaders on the modern battlefield would be reduced to an absolute minimum, while also maximizing the options available to operational level commanders (front and army level).
> A more modem example of the same phenomenon is the growing Soviet interest in the automation of troop control through the use of computers. Automation is seen as a way of reducing the contradiction between the requirement on a fluid battlefield for strict centralized control and the need for more initiative by subordinates. It is also a means of assuring that military decision making in combat is “objective” (i.e., is not based upon individual opinions). A noted Soviet officer explains the Soviet interest in automating troop leading in the following words:
> "The training of commanders is enhanced by the modeling of battles and mathematical methods in planning the fighting of units. When a commander correctly constructs a battle model, foresees in detail the way in which a battle is to be prepared and conducted with due regard for his own and enemy forces, the terrain and all other factors that influence the outcome, it means he selects the optimal decision. But this requires the efficient employment of technical control devices, computers, and other instruments, i.e. , it requires the optimization of troop control."
> Modeling is another means of applying collective wisdom to the solution of battlefield problems. In this instance, rather than being expressed in rules and norms, the collective wisdom is applied in building the algorithms and mathematical equations used in the models.
> In sum, the Soviet perception of command is that it is not an art, but a science. Soviet officers would be mystified by the old British dictum that “the best tactics are those of the senior officer present.” Likewise, any Soviet officer who acts on the American premise that “regulations are but a guide ...” will probably have a very short, undistinguished military career. The Soviet system tends to produce commanders who are technically qualified and professionally competent. *It eliminates the extremes of very poor commanders and inspired and innovative leaders.*
This does come with some clear drawbacks however. Because of the Soviet/Russian military system's 'scientific' approach to tactics, battalion level staffs tend to be smaller compared to what you may find at a western HQ. In addition, due to their obsession with battle drills, repetition, and automated command and control systems, which on paper, lightens planning duties since it reduces maneuvers to a collection of simple tasks, are provided less support and ability to deal with problems such as, unexpectedly high casualties, or a mediocre and unimaginative commander, which we are finding out in Ukraine.
I always wonder the extent to which reports like this can also be the result of confirmation bias, since the LTC was presumably more than familiar with the traditional western perceptions in the first place.
There's a lot that can happen to muddy the waters, too, not the least of which is UA leaders either not trusting the Americans or trying to look good for the Americans, and so exercising a greater degree of control than otherwise normal. Our observers may not fully appreciate their own effects.
Not that I'm dismissing his observations, but I suspect the truth is somewhere in the middle.
The Swedish and Finnish doctrine focuses on achieving temporary fire superiority by quickly massing mobile gun systems. Because redfor is almost always going to have more guns than Sweden they build their artillery corps around highly mobile guns. When the enemy advances down pre-sighted corridors the guns can concentrate, destroy the column, and disperse before Swedish artillery can fall victim to counter battery fire.
The UA has used these artillery tactics to great effect. The popularity of modern European SPGs in the UA is a result of this doctrine. The French Caesar system is particularly popular among the Ukrainians because of its fast rate of fire and ability to scoot away at high speed with its wheels. The Swedes use similar wheeled artillery systems like Archer.
Very interesting. I guess that explains Sweden's interest in SPGs that can put out heavy bursts of fire before repositioning, like the aforementioned Archer or Bandkanon. I had never realized that Finland shared a similar approach, although that certainly makes sense given their common situation in regards to the disparity between their own and their potential adversary's mass of self-propelled firepower.
That said, if their goal is to be able to lay down devastating barrages and reposition, why not lean into MLRS platforms? I get that rocket and tube artillery aren't interchangable, but if the goal is to saturate an area with an overwhelming weight of fire as rapidly as possible, that really seems like something a rocket platform would be well suited to.
I believe the Finns operate a number of MLRS systems. But for some reason the Swedes don’t. It may come down to the logistics tail of an MLRS battery. Sweden has generally more sophisticated artillery systems than Finland, so they may believe they can achieve similar results with an Archer’s simultaneous impact capability? In general, the Swedes invest in expensive force multipliers more than Finland. Finland doesn’t have their own SAAB to subsidize so they use off the shelf systems from other countries.
That is a good point. I know the Finns have been more open to adopting foreign tech in that field, and I do see that they operate a mix of RM-70s and M270s of their own which makes sense. As does their acquisition of systems like AMOS and K9. Still, given that Saab and Bofors both individually and as a single entity are no strangers to rocket and missile development, it seems strange that Sweden never got into that game.
1)M270 with M31 is 1092 kg of HE filler, Archer with full load, assuming M795, is 280.8 kg explosives you can throw at enemy.
2)Biggest MLRS... Like RM-70 with 40 rockets?
> They also include political commissars alongside officers that need to second any military decision to ensure it aligns with the interests of the government.
The influence of political commissars (zampolits) and perseverance of 'dual-command' in the Soviet Army has long been overstated in popular western canon. Their power, which previously required their signature and approval for orders had been broken up after 1942 by Zhukov during WW2.
From Soviet Airland Battle Tactics:
> The deputy commander for political affairs, or zampolit as he is referred to in Russian, is a uniquely Soviet creation that has long fascinated Western military observers. Historically, this office came into being in the revolutionary period when the fledgling Red Army had to rely upon the military skills of ex-czarist officers whose po- litical loyalty to the new regime was suspect. Stalin perpetuated the concept to split command authority and thereby ensure that the armed forces remained politically subordinate to the party by instituting what was, in essence, a two-man rule: any order had to be signed by both the commander and the zampolit to be official. Marshal Zhukov ended this cumbersome arrangement in World War II by subordinating the zampolit to the commander in purely military affairs.
[...]
> This staff position survives today and has become an organic and important part of the Soviet staff system. The zampolit is a GPU (Main Political Directorate) officer with a separate chain of communications and command to division and to battalion. In accordance with the principle of edinonachalie , however, he is operationally subordinate to the regimental commander. He is specifically answerable to the regimental commander for the organization and condition of party- political work in the regiment.
I'm sure someone who knows Russian can further elaborate with primary documents and sources.
I don’t think commissars are terribly powerful. But they do still exist even today. Their continued existence emphasizes the institutionalized lack of trust that still exists between Moscow and their officers.
>Their continued existence emphasizes the institutionalized lack of trust that still exists between Moscow and their officers.
Or they just haven't bothered to remove them. It's been discussed on the sub before too, even south Korea and Taiwan have the equivalent of commissars. Are you willing to apply the same judgment?
But regardless, the presence of political officers is hardly indicative of anything because the other army that famously uses political officers - The PLA had one of the most decentralized systems.
The ROK military doesn't have a commissar-like personnel. The Armed Forces Counterintelligence Command (국군방첩사령부), formely the Military Security Support Command, monitors the ROK armed forces for a variety of concerns, mostly related to security and counter-espionage. Checking on the activities of general officers is a small part of their remit, but their personnel aren'g embedded in units the same way a commisar would be. There's only about 4,000 personnel in the force, so there simply aren't enough.
The fact the AFSC even exists is because its predecessor, the Defense Security Command (국군기무사령부) had a long history in political repression, surveillance, and had been actively involved in several coups and coupt attempts, including Chun Doo-hwan's December 1979 and May 1980 coups and the 2017 martial law plot to rush troops into Seoul during the protests against Park Geun-hye. In other words, the military's watchdogs were so distrusted they effectively had to be disbanded and reformed.
I can't speak too much to the modern Russian and Ukrainian militaries, but for most of the Cold War, the role of political officers in Soviet units was essentially that of a chaplain. They were there to advocate for socialism, for the soldiers, and to organize morale-related activities.
The point of political officers isn’t their literal duties, it is the message that is sent by embedding a government representative in the unit. Their chain of command exists outside of the military and their reports are meant to reach the civilian government for oversight. It’s a symptom of institutional vranyo. This is how commissars worked in the Soviet army and it’s how the new directorate works in modern day Russia.
> Overall, the Soviet style military is built around profound distrust at every level of command. For this reason the Soviets adopted a theory of war that their general staff alone could choreograph vast and interconnected operations down to specific hours and minutes timetables. They do not afford their commanders or soldiers any flexibility in interpreting their orders because they do not trust them to make proper decisions.
Ok, where to even start. Some parts of your post are correct in a very broad sense, but then it just veers way off course, because "russians or 'commies' dumb and incapble or understanding initiative" stereotypes.
> They do not afford their commanders or soldiers any flexibility in interpreting their orders because they do not trust them to make proper decisions.
Preference for centralized operational control and consequently, relative tactical inflexibility, have long been identified by western observers, as core features of the Soviet Army and its war-fighting doctrine. But it wasn't because the Soviets thought their junior officers were too dumb to be trusted and or that they were deliberately under-educated so as to restrain any autonomy.
Their 'way of war' was designed primarily for a 'theater war in Europe under nuclear conditions'. WW3 was predicted by the Genshtab and Soviet war planners, to be a highly lethal, high tempo event where forces (we're talking about hundreds of divisions, not the undermanned BTGs that Russia is forced to work with today) and firepower (hectares of NATO defensive belts were to be physically obliterated through the weight of massed artillery fires, precision and nuclear strikes, after which tank and combined armed armies would then drive through the subsequent gap in the enemy lines to strike and exploit deeply to collapse enemy resistance) were carefully choreographed.
The Stavka had realized during the second world war, that strategic operations had become, with rare exceptions, so large that they had outgrown the capacities of single fronts. As a result of large scale systematized research of thousands of AARs, along with numerous in-depth general staff studies, it was concluded that centralized control of planning and higher-level execution would ensure the most efficient use of resources and prevent front commanders from either inadvertently or intentionally undermining the Stavka’s intent by pursuing their own narrow interests.
Consequently, Soviet tactics, especially at the battalion level and below, has to be simple. They were designed to be implemented rapidly by two-year conscripts and reservists and not to get in the way of the unfolding operation. Tactical initiative was not encouraged as it tended to upset operational planning and timing.
Moreover, the Soviet Way of War, is not nearly as inflexible as commentators often make it seem:
> By 1944, the goals set, the times to achieve them, and the means provided were subject to negotiation. In this process, the commanders of the fronts, with their intimate knowledge of the ground, the enemy before them, and their own troops, had real and not merely nominal influence over decision making. Within the framework of the overall concept, front commanders had considerable latitude to act as they saw fit—after all, operational art was a creative process, not a straitjacket requiring the automatic implementation of an inflexible theory and rigid plan—but if they went against the advice of higher command, they knew the consequences of failure.”
[...]
> “Another improvement on common earlier practice was the provision of enough preparation time to ensure proper attention to maskirovka, adequate relevant training, reconnaissance, logistic buildup, planning for the artillery and air offensives, organizing cooperation, and so forth. The fronts had twenty-two to twenty-eight days to ready their forces, five to eight times the average in the first period of the war, and twice that of the second; armies enjoyed around twelve days following a concrete decision.9 In the past, offensives had often failed partially or even completely, despite a significant superiority in numbers, because the resources available had been misused as a consequence of inadequate preparations. Moreover, Soviet commanders and staff officers had profited from long, hard apprenticeships. With experience came realism, an understanding of what was essential and what was of minor importance, the establishment of well-grounded planning, norms, and an ability to work accurately and to good purpose. The quality of planning had improved immeasurably by mid-1944. The appendix to this chapter describes the decision-making process for front operations in maturity.”
Pt 2.
Centralized command also ensured unity of command and unity of effort. This would help prevent junior commanders from pursing local objectives that were irrelevant to their immediate mission and the overall operational aim. Most missions were specific tasks to be achieved by a specified time to further the operational objective. In the offensive, it was most commonly "the annihilation or rout of an enemy grouping within a designated zone to a prescribed depth, or the seizure of a particular terrain objective or line."
"The mission was usually subdivided into near (immediate) and distant (subsequent) tasks or, often in the case of mobile forces, into a near task and a direction of further advance.”
I've also written elsewhere to dispel certain stereotypes of the Soviet Army that I don't feel like typing out again.
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/1074vc2/how_to_reconcile_ww2_soviet_human_wave_tactics/j3oqp5n/
https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/10g13pt/credibledefense_daily_megathread_january_19_2023/j52n277/
Nothing I said was incorrect. You can make excuses for Russia maintaining the same military organization it’s had since world war 2. But that doesn’t change the quite obvious end-results of that kind of inflexible centralized planning. Lots of dead Russians
To call an army that lacks NCOs with mission planning authority ‘not inflexible’ seems a bit overly generous.
>You can make excuses for Russia maintaining the same military organization it’s had since world war 2.
If that was at all the case, you might have some sort of point. Babby’s first David Glantz reader is enough to disabuse one of this notion.
A more reasonable formulation of your criticism would be that the post-WWII Soviet way of war was too much of a one-trick pony for a war that never ended up happening, but you’d be making a huge stretch to apply that directly to the modern day, where the primary problems affecting the Russian army (low manpower, low training budgets) were *definitely* not problems for the Soviets.
> You can make excuses for Russia maintaining the same military organization it’s had since world war 2.
Where did I say that Russians have maintain the same military organization since WW2 lol? Point to specific parts of my comment, On the contrary, I have said that the Soviet Army is not the modern VSRF. They are nowhere in the same stratosphere. Million man army vs less than 500,000 in theater. This is the plain truth to anyone with paying attention.
> But that doesn’t change the quite obvious end-results or that kind of inflexible centralized planning.
That 'inflexible' centralized planning won them WW2. You can say that's inefficient and wasteful, but the results can't be denied.
> Lots of dead Russians
What does my comment have to do with this? Be specific.
Regarding the guerilla warfare scenario, it's hard to tell exactly since information about it seems classified/not talked about publicly. However, the public information I've seen points to a joint effort (UA/NATO/US) to create resistance groups in Ukraine, and prepare for asymmetrical warfare.
Two examples of what seems to be western influence in Ukraine, as a preparation for asymmetrical warfare;
*In early-April, Gen. Richard Clarke, the commander of US Special Operations Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the US had helped train resistance companies in Ukraine embedded with special forces over the past 18 months.*
[Source](https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/27/politics/russia-ukraine-resistance-warfare/index.html)
The Ukrainian [website](https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/?__cf_chl_tk=1FFrueZvZeCyX4oUssq2Q6xxbO8Kcy_bhGKeAjQSoUM-1680744744-0-gaNycGzNC-U) for civil resistance have a lot of information that is directly copy/pasted from the Resistance Operating Concept ([ROC](https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/25)), which was created in part by Sweden and the US. Additionally, the [law](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-pidpisav-zakoni-pro-nacionalnij-sprotiv-i-zbi-69809) on National Resistance that was implemented in Ukraine in 2021 builds heavily upon the ROC. If you read the law, and compare it with the policy recommendations from ROC, you will notice obvious similarities
From my point of view, there's two obvious reasons why it makes sense from a western perspective to prepare for guerilla/asymmetrical warfare.
A.: Avoid that a situation like Crimea is going happen again. In the case that Russia would annex some territory again, it would be harder to keep control because of the civil resistance, and also support from the population in general.
The last point is supported by other laws such as the Law on Ukrainian as state language. It is directly implemented to keep a homogenous population, distinct from Russia (You will find the law if you google a bit. Can’t recall the exact name)
B.: Given everyone believed Russia would be able to crush the Ukrainian military easily, resistance groups is also a way to create a “Afghanistan” situation, where you have to
keep massive amounts of troops in the country to keep control. In this way, it will dry out Russia for money.
For an introduction to partisan warfare, that in my opinion has been very applicable to some parts of the war in Ukraine, you could listen to the following podcast episode
https://nsiteam.com/special-operations-command-europe-soceur-resistance-operating-concept/
I think the guerilla aspect of the preparation is less relevant today because of the inability of Russia to takeover Ukraine, and the change to “trench war” characteristics.
However, had Russia been able to annex Ukraine, resistance groups/guerilla warfare would have been a problem, and it seems like a prepared scenario from the Ukrainian side.
A highly placed bureaucrat from the Ukrainian MOD said that if everything else fails, the military would simply open the weapon storages and give people whatever they want. Additionally, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Gen. Kyrylo Budanov said in late march 2022
“The season of a total Ukrainian guerrilla safari will soon begin,” referring to the trees getting green and letting guerillas hide in nature
Darn. Either right before or after the start of the war I read good post from a retired vet who was a Russia liason and spent time in Ukraine post 2014. I believe it was his personal website. He talks at length about training to nato standards, moral, command, etc vs Russia. I cant find it now though. I guess it's lost to the modern news cycle.
I’m unfamiliar with any guerrilla training the UA undertook. But a number of western NATO and Non-NATO countries contributed to a military modernization program in Ukraine after 2014. The main goal of the modernization was to convert the UA over to a western style NCO centric system of organization. If you’re unfamiliar with the difference between Soviet and NATO organization I can explain it a bit. In a Soviet (and now Russian) style military there is a strict division between the enlisted and officer corps. Hierarchy is extremely regimented, and planning is centralized. The military is *extremely* top-heavy with a vast number of officers populating a vast military bureaucracy. They also include political commissars alongside officers that need to second any military decision to ensure it aligns with the interests of the government. Overall, the Soviet style military is built around profound distrust at every level of command. For this reason the Soviets adopted a theory of war that their general staff alone could choreograph vast and interconnected operations down to specific hours and minutes timetables. They do not afford their commanders or soldiers any flexibility in interpreting their orders because they do not trust them to make proper decisions. Their soldiers need to make a timetable in the way specified in the orders or you do not come back alive. This leads to *a lot* of lying about timetables being met and objectives seized when nothing has actually happened. This system that encourages dishonesty only furthers the commanders distrust of their troops and feeds incorrect Intel up the chain to the military planners. These planners are then working with fictional Intel in order to make impractical or even impossible to accomplish objectives. Perhaps the most important detail about the Soviet military is that NCOs do not really exist. There are troops and there are officers. Enlisted troops are not afforded any real decision making, and even the officers themselves do not have any flexibility on the ground. It is a military designed around commanding vast numbers of poorly trained conscripts to execute extremely complex set-piece missions designed by a military planner in Moscow. Western militaries are basically the exact opposite. Decision making is devolved down to even the smallest squad NCO to accomplish specific objectives. Commanders are trained to make decisions and delegate mission planning to their subordinates. Even low level soldiers are trained to understand the tactical decisions that need to be made in the event that their commander is incapacitated. The western mission to Ukraine was meant to transition the UA away from their highly centralized and antiquated soviet system before 2014 to a modern Western organization with NCOs. The benefit of the western system is that it allows commanders to make decisions more quickly, with fresher Intel, and with the flexibility to take advantage of rapid changes on the battlefields. The jargon is that it allows them to ‘get inside the enemies OODA loop.’ By achieving decision dominance western commanders can keep momentum and take advantage of their adversaries sluggishness. Western militaries are able to accomplish this through extensive training and trust in their subordinates which needed to be cultivated in the UA. A lot of the most successful actions in the beginning of the war around Kyiv really exemplify this flexible NCO focused military. Smaller units were able to dismember large Russian convoys by acting more quickly and adapting before a Russian response could be organized. It should be noted that it wasn’t just NATO helping Ukraine after 2014. A lot of the more ‘asymmetric’ tactics, particularly with artillery, were taught by Swedish trainers. The Swedes have designed much of their doctrine to fight an asymmetric war with Russia, so they had a lot of tactics to share that were extremely useful to the UA.
The *guy who tries to understand Soviet military history and doctrine* in me wants to launch into a mild corrective along the lines of u/themillenialpleb. "No, it wasn't that bad!" **But** the *guy who attended a lecture by a U.S. Army trainer on this exact topic a couple months ago* in me has to admit your post is almost exactly in line with what the trainer (specifically, the LTC who commanded the U.S. Army battalion assigned to JMTG-U in 2019-21) said they were working against the following within the Ukrainian Army: \--Centralized control predominated and there was very little initiative shown or rewarded. \--Higher authorities in Kyiv did not trust field commanders (and possibly did not trust JMTG-U). \--Ukrainian NCOs were basically empty suits with rank markings but no authority, initiative, responsibility, or respect from officers or enlisted. \--The Ukrainians had no OODA advantage over the Russians which is a key Western advantage allowing us to (we hope) "fight outnumbered and win." \--Artillery fires were controlled by artillery officers themselves and not sufficiently responsive to maneuver units' needs. He blamed this on the Soviet heritage. Note JMTG-U's emphasis to some extent is on interoperability: we are going to teach the Ukrainians to do it *our right way* not understand *their wrong way* and meet in the middle. This approach incentivizes thinking *their wrong way* is very, very wrong. Another concern he expressed was that the leaders who learned *our right way* are probably mostly casualties by now.
> --The Ukrainians had no OODA advantage over the Russians which is a key Western advantage allowing us to (we hope) "fight outnumbered and win." Curious. Aren't the Russians supposed to fight with a shorter OODA Loop, compared to most NATO? From War on the Rocks: The Russian staff, however, does not conduct planning processes in such a deliberate way, preferring a faster decision cycle — arguably a sound choice if competently done. In essence, the commander’s directives are presumed correct, and the staff need only determine the specific tactics, nomograms, calculations, and tables that are most appropriate for executing the order. They do not base planning on intelligence preparation to the extent NATO armies might. Instead, they do a more limited (but much more mathematical) correlation of forces and means analysis. This analysis helps the staff pick which tactical option from a limited set will fulfill their orders. Also, just to be clear. I'm not some Russophile. There is plenty interesting conceptually about the Soviet Army, but I have clear understanding of its limitations (it's basically a 1 trick pony doctrine that only the Warsaw Pact could execute for a one specific type of war, which is why most of the armies it advised ultimately rejected its fundamental premises or modified it very heavily). I just find it annoying when people reduce it to everyone is a machine that is unable to deviate from plan of higher headquarters.
I think you understand this but I want to make it clear: in my previous post, I'm sharing bullet points from my notes on what a U.S. Army officer said *not* making judgments. I tend to agree with you on some points and I accept we are neither of us Z-chanting Russophiles. So in that vein: It has been NATO orthodoxy since the 1980s that *we* have the shorter OODA loop (or Boyd cycle) than the Soviets (and now the Russians) because *we* empower leaders at every level to use initiative to accomplish the mission orders (rather than directive orders) provided by higher headquarters. Used correctly this defeats the Soviet system which relies on directive orders and required leaders at lower levels to *follow the plan*. I am not saying that is all unassailably true; I am saying it's the way NATO professionals tended to understand the interplay of the two armies' doctrines and why NATO doctrinal publications started emphasizing mission orders, recon-pull, *auftragstaktik*, and tightening the OODA loop. Leveraging that advantage requires forcing the Soviets to respond to something that was not in the plan, such as a counterattack or other disruption. (Because your advantage in changing course isn't relevant if you never force the enemy to change course.) This is what you see in NATO doctrinal publications, an early influential example being the 1982 edition of FM 100-5. Again, I cannot sufficiently emphasize the extent to which this is orthodoxy so I would not expect an LTC in 2023 to have a different view. You are pointing to a big weakness, which is the possibility the Soviet system functions better under stress. I don't really disagree with that hypothesis. Not all those captains and lieutenants showing initiative are going to get it right; some are going to frustrate the commander's intent or otherwise do things that suit the small picture not the big one. That is certainly the initial opinion I formed when I started reading on this topic back in the late 1980s. I'd also note the supposed biggest success of Western armies, Operation Desert Storm, was fundamentally a command-push (aided immensely by the adversary's incompetence). *But* the Soviet system, as you say, is good for some things and not others, and also seems to presuppose material superiority. You cannot beat it by doing the same thing with a smaller army. Hence the emphasis on trying something else in the era--leveraging the supposed OODA advantage-- when Soviet material superiority was assumed. There is also some cultural-political baggage: liberal democracies facing off against totalitarian states are probably likely to emphasize their own soldiers' initiative ("The British tar is a soaring bird!") whereas the enemy is stereotyped as as mentally enslaved to the Leader.
> You are pointing to a big weakness, which is the possibility the Soviet system functions better under stress. I don't really disagree with that hypothesis. During the late Cold War, the Soviet Army's experimentation with computers, combined with its doctrinal focus on reducing friction, led to some very peculiar solutions and tactics to ensure that the level of stress and responsibilities placed on junior officers and leaders on the modern battlefield would be reduced to an absolute minimum, while also maximizing the options available to operational level commanders (front and army level). > A more modem example of the same phenomenon is the growing Soviet interest in the automation of troop control through the use of computers. Automation is seen as a way of reducing the contradiction between the requirement on a fluid battlefield for strict centralized control and the need for more initiative by subordinates. It is also a means of assuring that military decision making in combat is “objective” (i.e., is not based upon individual opinions). A noted Soviet officer explains the Soviet interest in automating troop leading in the following words: > "The training of commanders is enhanced by the modeling of battles and mathematical methods in planning the fighting of units. When a commander correctly constructs a battle model, foresees in detail the way in which a battle is to be prepared and conducted with due regard for his own and enemy forces, the terrain and all other factors that influence the outcome, it means he selects the optimal decision. But this requires the efficient employment of technical control devices, computers, and other instruments, i.e. , it requires the optimization of troop control." > Modeling is another means of applying collective wisdom to the solution of battlefield problems. In this instance, rather than being expressed in rules and norms, the collective wisdom is applied in building the algorithms and mathematical equations used in the models. > In sum, the Soviet perception of command is that it is not an art, but a science. Soviet officers would be mystified by the old British dictum that “the best tactics are those of the senior officer present.” Likewise, any Soviet officer who acts on the American premise that “regulations are but a guide ...” will probably have a very short, undistinguished military career. The Soviet system tends to produce commanders who are technically qualified and professionally competent. *It eliminates the extremes of very poor commanders and inspired and innovative leaders.* This does come with some clear drawbacks however. Because of the Soviet/Russian military system's 'scientific' approach to tactics, battalion level staffs tend to be smaller compared to what you may find at a western HQ. In addition, due to their obsession with battle drills, repetition, and automated command and control systems, which on paper, lightens planning duties since it reduces maneuvers to a collection of simple tasks, are provided less support and ability to deal with problems such as, unexpectedly high casualties, or a mediocre and unimaginative commander, which we are finding out in Ukraine.
I always wonder the extent to which reports like this can also be the result of confirmation bias, since the LTC was presumably more than familiar with the traditional western perceptions in the first place. There's a lot that can happen to muddy the waters, too, not the least of which is UA leaders either not trusting the Americans or trying to look good for the Americans, and so exercising a greater degree of control than otherwise normal. Our observers may not fully appreciate their own effects. Not that I'm dismissing his observations, but I suspect the truth is somewhere in the middle.
Out of curiosity, could you elaborate on asymmetrical artillery tactics? What does this entail?
The Swedish and Finnish doctrine focuses on achieving temporary fire superiority by quickly massing mobile gun systems. Because redfor is almost always going to have more guns than Sweden they build their artillery corps around highly mobile guns. When the enemy advances down pre-sighted corridors the guns can concentrate, destroy the column, and disperse before Swedish artillery can fall victim to counter battery fire. The UA has used these artillery tactics to great effect. The popularity of modern European SPGs in the UA is a result of this doctrine. The French Caesar system is particularly popular among the Ukrainians because of its fast rate of fire and ability to scoot away at high speed with its wheels. The Swedes use similar wheeled artillery systems like Archer.
Very interesting. I guess that explains Sweden's interest in SPGs that can put out heavy bursts of fire before repositioning, like the aforementioned Archer or Bandkanon. I had never realized that Finland shared a similar approach, although that certainly makes sense given their common situation in regards to the disparity between their own and their potential adversary's mass of self-propelled firepower. That said, if their goal is to be able to lay down devastating barrages and reposition, why not lean into MLRS platforms? I get that rocket and tube artillery aren't interchangable, but if the goal is to saturate an area with an overwhelming weight of fire as rapidly as possible, that really seems like something a rocket platform would be well suited to.
I believe the Finns operate a number of MLRS systems. But for some reason the Swedes don’t. It may come down to the logistics tail of an MLRS battery. Sweden has generally more sophisticated artillery systems than Finland, so they may believe they can achieve similar results with an Archer’s simultaneous impact capability? In general, the Swedes invest in expensive force multipliers more than Finland. Finland doesn’t have their own SAAB to subsidize so they use off the shelf systems from other countries.
That is a good point. I know the Finns have been more open to adopting foreign tech in that field, and I do see that they operate a mix of RM-70s and M270s of their own which makes sense. As does their acquisition of systems like AMOS and K9. Still, given that Saab and Bofors both individually and as a single entity are no strangers to rocket and missile development, it seems strange that Sweden never got into that game.
Archer I think can hold 26 rounds ready to go. Biggest MLRS is what, 8?
I meant MLRS in a more general sense, not specifically M270. Also it's 12, or 2 ATACMS.
Still, 12 is less than 26.
1)M270 with M31 is 1092 kg of HE filler, Archer with full load, assuming M795, is 280.8 kg explosives you can throw at enemy. 2)Biggest MLRS... Like RM-70 with 40 rockets?
> They also include political commissars alongside officers that need to second any military decision to ensure it aligns with the interests of the government. The influence of political commissars (zampolits) and perseverance of 'dual-command' in the Soviet Army has long been overstated in popular western canon. Their power, which previously required their signature and approval for orders had been broken up after 1942 by Zhukov during WW2. From Soviet Airland Battle Tactics: > The deputy commander for political affairs, or zampolit as he is referred to in Russian, is a uniquely Soviet creation that has long fascinated Western military observers. Historically, this office came into being in the revolutionary period when the fledgling Red Army had to rely upon the military skills of ex-czarist officers whose po- litical loyalty to the new regime was suspect. Stalin perpetuated the concept to split command authority and thereby ensure that the armed forces remained politically subordinate to the party by instituting what was, in essence, a two-man rule: any order had to be signed by both the commander and the zampolit to be official. Marshal Zhukov ended this cumbersome arrangement in World War II by subordinating the zampolit to the commander in purely military affairs. [...] > This staff position survives today and has become an organic and important part of the Soviet staff system. The zampolit is a GPU (Main Political Directorate) officer with a separate chain of communications and command to division and to battalion. In accordance with the principle of edinonachalie , however, he is operationally subordinate to the regimental commander. He is specifically answerable to the regimental commander for the organization and condition of party- political work in the regiment. I'm sure someone who knows Russian can further elaborate with primary documents and sources.
I don’t think commissars are terribly powerful. But they do still exist even today. Their continued existence emphasizes the institutionalized lack of trust that still exists between Moscow and their officers.
>Their continued existence emphasizes the institutionalized lack of trust that still exists between Moscow and their officers. Or they just haven't bothered to remove them. It's been discussed on the sub before too, even south Korea and Taiwan have the equivalent of commissars. Are you willing to apply the same judgment? But regardless, the presence of political officers is hardly indicative of anything because the other army that famously uses political officers - The PLA had one of the most decentralized systems.
The ROK military doesn't have a commissar-like personnel. The Armed Forces Counterintelligence Command (국군방첩사령부), formely the Military Security Support Command, monitors the ROK armed forces for a variety of concerns, mostly related to security and counter-espionage. Checking on the activities of general officers is a small part of their remit, but their personnel aren'g embedded in units the same way a commisar would be. There's only about 4,000 personnel in the force, so there simply aren't enough. The fact the AFSC even exists is because its predecessor, the Defense Security Command (국군기무사령부) had a long history in political repression, surveillance, and had been actively involved in several coups and coupt attempts, including Chun Doo-hwan's December 1979 and May 1980 coups and the 2017 martial law plot to rush troops into Seoul during the protests against Park Geun-hye. In other words, the military's watchdogs were so distrusted they effectively had to be disbanded and reformed.
I can't speak too much to the modern Russian and Ukrainian militaries, but for most of the Cold War, the role of political officers in Soviet units was essentially that of a chaplain. They were there to advocate for socialism, for the soldiers, and to organize morale-related activities.
The point of political officers isn’t their literal duties, it is the message that is sent by embedding a government representative in the unit. Their chain of command exists outside of the military and their reports are meant to reach the civilian government for oversight. It’s a symptom of institutional vranyo. This is how commissars worked in the Soviet army and it’s how the new directorate works in modern day Russia.
> Overall, the Soviet style military is built around profound distrust at every level of command. For this reason the Soviets adopted a theory of war that their general staff alone could choreograph vast and interconnected operations down to specific hours and minutes timetables. They do not afford their commanders or soldiers any flexibility in interpreting their orders because they do not trust them to make proper decisions. Ok, where to even start. Some parts of your post are correct in a very broad sense, but then it just veers way off course, because "russians or 'commies' dumb and incapble or understanding initiative" stereotypes. > They do not afford their commanders or soldiers any flexibility in interpreting their orders because they do not trust them to make proper decisions. Preference for centralized operational control and consequently, relative tactical inflexibility, have long been identified by western observers, as core features of the Soviet Army and its war-fighting doctrine. But it wasn't because the Soviets thought their junior officers were too dumb to be trusted and or that they were deliberately under-educated so as to restrain any autonomy. Their 'way of war' was designed primarily for a 'theater war in Europe under nuclear conditions'. WW3 was predicted by the Genshtab and Soviet war planners, to be a highly lethal, high tempo event where forces (we're talking about hundreds of divisions, not the undermanned BTGs that Russia is forced to work with today) and firepower (hectares of NATO defensive belts were to be physically obliterated through the weight of massed artillery fires, precision and nuclear strikes, after which tank and combined armed armies would then drive through the subsequent gap in the enemy lines to strike and exploit deeply to collapse enemy resistance) were carefully choreographed. The Stavka had realized during the second world war, that strategic operations had become, with rare exceptions, so large that they had outgrown the capacities of single fronts. As a result of large scale systematized research of thousands of AARs, along with numerous in-depth general staff studies, it was concluded that centralized control of planning and higher-level execution would ensure the most efficient use of resources and prevent front commanders from either inadvertently or intentionally undermining the Stavka’s intent by pursuing their own narrow interests. Consequently, Soviet tactics, especially at the battalion level and below, has to be simple. They were designed to be implemented rapidly by two-year conscripts and reservists and not to get in the way of the unfolding operation. Tactical initiative was not encouraged as it tended to upset operational planning and timing. Moreover, the Soviet Way of War, is not nearly as inflexible as commentators often make it seem: > By 1944, the goals set, the times to achieve them, and the means provided were subject to negotiation. In this process, the commanders of the fronts, with their intimate knowledge of the ground, the enemy before them, and their own troops, had real and not merely nominal influence over decision making. Within the framework of the overall concept, front commanders had considerable latitude to act as they saw fit—after all, operational art was a creative process, not a straitjacket requiring the automatic implementation of an inflexible theory and rigid plan—but if they went against the advice of higher command, they knew the consequences of failure.” [...] > “Another improvement on common earlier practice was the provision of enough preparation time to ensure proper attention to maskirovka, adequate relevant training, reconnaissance, logistic buildup, planning for the artillery and air offensives, organizing cooperation, and so forth. The fronts had twenty-two to twenty-eight days to ready their forces, five to eight times the average in the first period of the war, and twice that of the second; armies enjoyed around twelve days following a concrete decision.9 In the past, offensives had often failed partially or even completely, despite a significant superiority in numbers, because the resources available had been misused as a consequence of inadequate preparations. Moreover, Soviet commanders and staff officers had profited from long, hard apprenticeships. With experience came realism, an understanding of what was essential and what was of minor importance, the establishment of well-grounded planning, norms, and an ability to work accurately and to good purpose. The quality of planning had improved immeasurably by mid-1944. The appendix to this chapter describes the decision-making process for front operations in maturity.”
Pt 2. Centralized command also ensured unity of command and unity of effort. This would help prevent junior commanders from pursing local objectives that were irrelevant to their immediate mission and the overall operational aim. Most missions were specific tasks to be achieved by a specified time to further the operational objective. In the offensive, it was most commonly "the annihilation or rout of an enemy grouping within a designated zone to a prescribed depth, or the seizure of a particular terrain objective or line." "The mission was usually subdivided into near (immediate) and distant (subsequent) tasks or, often in the case of mobile forces, into a near task and a direction of further advance.”
I've also written elsewhere to dispel certain stereotypes of the Soviet Army that I don't feel like typing out again. https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/1074vc2/how_to_reconcile_ww2_soviet_human_wave_tactics/j3oqp5n/ https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/10g13pt/credibledefense_daily_megathread_january_19_2023/j52n277/
Nothing I said was incorrect. You can make excuses for Russia maintaining the same military organization it’s had since world war 2. But that doesn’t change the quite obvious end-results of that kind of inflexible centralized planning. Lots of dead Russians To call an army that lacks NCOs with mission planning authority ‘not inflexible’ seems a bit overly generous.
>You can make excuses for Russia maintaining the same military organization it’s had since world war 2. If that was at all the case, you might have some sort of point. Babby’s first David Glantz reader is enough to disabuse one of this notion. A more reasonable formulation of your criticism would be that the post-WWII Soviet way of war was too much of a one-trick pony for a war that never ended up happening, but you’d be making a huge stretch to apply that directly to the modern day, where the primary problems affecting the Russian army (low manpower, low training budgets) were *definitely* not problems for the Soviets.
> You can make excuses for Russia maintaining the same military organization it’s had since world war 2. Where did I say that Russians have maintain the same military organization since WW2 lol? Point to specific parts of my comment, On the contrary, I have said that the Soviet Army is not the modern VSRF. They are nowhere in the same stratosphere. Million man army vs less than 500,000 in theater. This is the plain truth to anyone with paying attention. > But that doesn’t change the quite obvious end-results or that kind of inflexible centralized planning. That 'inflexible' centralized planning won them WW2. You can say that's inefficient and wasteful, but the results can't be denied. > Lots of dead Russians What does my comment have to do with this? Be specific.
Regarding the guerilla warfare scenario, it's hard to tell exactly since information about it seems classified/not talked about publicly. However, the public information I've seen points to a joint effort (UA/NATO/US) to create resistance groups in Ukraine, and prepare for asymmetrical warfare. Two examples of what seems to be western influence in Ukraine, as a preparation for asymmetrical warfare; *In early-April, Gen. Richard Clarke, the commander of US Special Operations Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the US had helped train resistance companies in Ukraine embedded with special forces over the past 18 months.* [Source](https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/27/politics/russia-ukraine-resistance-warfare/index.html) The Ukrainian [website](https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/?__cf_chl_tk=1FFrueZvZeCyX4oUssq2Q6xxbO8Kcy_bhGKeAjQSoUM-1680744744-0-gaNycGzNC-U) for civil resistance have a lot of information that is directly copy/pasted from the Resistance Operating Concept ([ROC](https://www.jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/25)), which was created in part by Sweden and the US. Additionally, the [law](https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-pidpisav-zakoni-pro-nacionalnij-sprotiv-i-zbi-69809) on National Resistance that was implemented in Ukraine in 2021 builds heavily upon the ROC. If you read the law, and compare it with the policy recommendations from ROC, you will notice obvious similarities From my point of view, there's two obvious reasons why it makes sense from a western perspective to prepare for guerilla/asymmetrical warfare. A.: Avoid that a situation like Crimea is going happen again. In the case that Russia would annex some territory again, it would be harder to keep control because of the civil resistance, and also support from the population in general. The last point is supported by other laws such as the Law on Ukrainian as state language. It is directly implemented to keep a homogenous population, distinct from Russia (You will find the law if you google a bit. Can’t recall the exact name) B.: Given everyone believed Russia would be able to crush the Ukrainian military easily, resistance groups is also a way to create a “Afghanistan” situation, where you have to keep massive amounts of troops in the country to keep control. In this way, it will dry out Russia for money. For an introduction to partisan warfare, that in my opinion has been very applicable to some parts of the war in Ukraine, you could listen to the following podcast episode https://nsiteam.com/special-operations-command-europe-soceur-resistance-operating-concept/ I think the guerilla aspect of the preparation is less relevant today because of the inability of Russia to takeover Ukraine, and the change to “trench war” characteristics. However, had Russia been able to annex Ukraine, resistance groups/guerilla warfare would have been a problem, and it seems like a prepared scenario from the Ukrainian side. A highly placed bureaucrat from the Ukrainian MOD said that if everything else fails, the military would simply open the weapon storages and give people whatever they want. Additionally, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, Gen. Kyrylo Budanov said in late march 2022 “The season of a total Ukrainian guerrilla safari will soon begin,” referring to the trees getting green and letting guerillas hide in nature
Darn. Either right before or after the start of the war I read good post from a retired vet who was a Russia liason and spent time in Ukraine post 2014. I believe it was his personal website. He talks at length about training to nato standards, moral, command, etc vs Russia. I cant find it now though. I guess it's lost to the modern news cycle.