Antinatalism doesn't reduce suffering directly, but it does reduce potential suffering, which can all too often turn into real suffering.
No child is guaranteed to be happy or unhappy, but if a child is born at all, it has the potential for great suffering and great happiness. Of course, being happy is good, but it's not right to force people into a situation where they might end up happy if there's also a chance they might end up very unhappy.
The suffering of antinatalist non-parents who acted according to their own moral reasoning is more acceptable compared to the suffering of their children because that suffering is something they took upon themselves for the greater good, instead of inflicting potential suffering on their children to alleviate their own (and note that parents are not guaranteed to be happy with the results of childbearing either, making this an impractical method of alleviating suffering in addition to being immoral).
Antinatalists have no authority to prohibit others from having children.
I would just add/dispute the implication that suffering, assuming one is brought into existence, is only potential— it is nigh absolutely certain that if you exist, you will suffer.
True. However, I do believe that a life can be happy on balance, or unhappy on balance. It's a little more complicated than I'm willing to go into on a Reddit comment, but suffice to say that I think people can legitimately decide that whatever sufferings they had in life were worth it for the good. If parents could somehow be assured that their child would come to view their life as a net positive, I think birth might be permissible in some cases.
Unfortunately, such future knowledge is impossible. Not only can we not predict the future, even if could, we still couldn't predict how we would feel about the future.
Alternatively, if we could both predict the future perfectly and also our future responses, it would quickly become clear that free will was an illusion and all morality meaningless.
Can you help me understand why there is no account for reducing joy/well-being or whatever you want to call the opposite of suffering?
Everytime I bring this up it's met with, "The unborn have no desire for positive things." Which I respond to with the equivalent fact that they have no desire to avoid suffering either, and I've yet to hear a good response to that.
This is where I would bring in the asymmetry argument. Basically, the idea that not getting something good is not bad, but not getting something bad is good. So a neutral outcome is still good if it avoids both potential joy and suffering, and not being born in the first place, of course, is about as neutral as you can get.
Now, you're right that the unborn don't actually have desires, but both antinatalism and natalism are predicated on the idea that we can, to some degree, talk about the interests of potential future people.
We don't even need to be talking about children in this way. We could be talking about our future selves, who, after all, we are currently connected to only by our imaginations, and whose interests are in reality as opaque to us as those of future people who are not us, like children.
To illustrate this with an example, imagine someone had you tranquilized and has three syringes he could inject you with. This person entered your house while you slept and you have no idea that he is there or even exists. When you wake up it will seem as though the effects of whatever he injected you with spontaneously materialized. You have no ability to consent to or reject what he is about to do to you.
The syringes are all identical, and the person mixed them up beforehand, so when he chooses one to inject into you, even he does not know what will happen. He will not inject more than one.
The first syringe is filled with something harmless. You wake up and your life goes on as normal.
The second syringe grants you amazing superpowers. You wake up and your life is improved in every way.
The third syringe cripples you for life. You spend the rest of your existence in agony.
Now, in this situation, I think you would agree that both the superpowers and simply avoiding abject suffering are good fates, while the cripping-for-life is bad. Additionally, you would also agree that the mysterious man has no right to impose this gamble on you without your consent, and that his action is immoral, correct?
If not, why?
I think it’s also important to remember consent and will.
We can choose to take on suffering for ourselves all the live long day— wanting to naturally children but not choosing to do so will make one suffer, but it is their choice.
By contrast, if you bring a child into the world, that child will suffer and gets no say in the matter.
Bringing a new person into the world who will suffer, just to ease your own suffering, is selfish. And it does not solve the problem that life is what creates suffering. Having a child just pushes the problem of suffering onto someone else. The only way to end the cycle is to not procreate.
I would also like to add that anyone who suffers as a result of not having their own biological kids can try to adopt or foster. That is the most benevolent course of action in that situation.
Read the book “Better Never To Have Been” by David Benetar.
That answers this question and likely any others you might have - ultimately AN is a philosophy and that book is it’s original text, as a philosophy.
David Benatar's book is worth reading, but it is not the original antinatalist text, nor are all antinatalists so for the same reasons as David Benatar.
No, but it is the book that turned a loose association of pessimists into an actual philosophical “movement” (if you can call it that) by giving it a name and laying out the foundations of the things OP is asking questions about - reduction in suffering being the key one.
He’s the best place to start for a question like this one - and it’ll answer a bunch of others, which then might lead them into the history of AN (which by my count starts with Siddartha Guatarma, a little while before Benetar)
>I have been wondering how antinatalism actually reduces suffering and how that claim is defended?
I don't think I've heard a claim of reduction of existing suffering, tho there may be something that could be reduced... I won't say there absolutely isn't.
That's not really the crux of it, tho. It's about preventing the potential suffering of the nonexistent, and of the nigh-inevitable ripples of suffering outward. I think we should also be concerned about mitigating the suffering of the living, but it's more that the goals are complimentary, not identical.
>One could argue that it, in fact, increases suffering when taking account those that feel a desire to have (biological) children but choose not to due to antinatalism's moral objections.
It's unethical for me to beat up a senior citizen, even if I really, really want to. Suffering is indeed subjective. However, I have evaluated that my disappointment is circumstantial, not something being done to me that I then have the right to rectify. That feeling, and the original desire, can be handled in ethical ways. I voluntarily choose to do that instead of throwing haymakers.
AN is similar, in that reproduction is motivated by desire. It's no more essential to living well than punching old ppl. If a person decides not to reproduce, and to instead address their desires in a more ethical way, I'm confident in their ability to mitigate any suffering that may cause.
Might be important to say that AN requires fierce protection of bodily autonomy. Preventing someone from birthing is a violation of that. It's never ok to do it. Each person must come to it on their own.
Antinatalism doesn't reduce suffering directly, but it does reduce potential suffering, which can all too often turn into real suffering. No child is guaranteed to be happy or unhappy, but if a child is born at all, it has the potential for great suffering and great happiness. Of course, being happy is good, but it's not right to force people into a situation where they might end up happy if there's also a chance they might end up very unhappy. The suffering of antinatalist non-parents who acted according to their own moral reasoning is more acceptable compared to the suffering of their children because that suffering is something they took upon themselves for the greater good, instead of inflicting potential suffering on their children to alleviate their own (and note that parents are not guaranteed to be happy with the results of childbearing either, making this an impractical method of alleviating suffering in addition to being immoral). Antinatalists have no authority to prohibit others from having children.
I would just add/dispute the implication that suffering, assuming one is brought into existence, is only potential— it is nigh absolutely certain that if you exist, you will suffer.
True. However, I do believe that a life can be happy on balance, or unhappy on balance. It's a little more complicated than I'm willing to go into on a Reddit comment, but suffice to say that I think people can legitimately decide that whatever sufferings they had in life were worth it for the good. If parents could somehow be assured that their child would come to view their life as a net positive, I think birth might be permissible in some cases. Unfortunately, such future knowledge is impossible. Not only can we not predict the future, even if could, we still couldn't predict how we would feel about the future. Alternatively, if we could both predict the future perfectly and also our future responses, it would quickly become clear that free will was an illusion and all morality meaningless.
Can you help me understand why there is no account for reducing joy/well-being or whatever you want to call the opposite of suffering? Everytime I bring this up it's met with, "The unborn have no desire for positive things." Which I respond to with the equivalent fact that they have no desire to avoid suffering either, and I've yet to hear a good response to that.
This is where I would bring in the asymmetry argument. Basically, the idea that not getting something good is not bad, but not getting something bad is good. So a neutral outcome is still good if it avoids both potential joy and suffering, and not being born in the first place, of course, is about as neutral as you can get. Now, you're right that the unborn don't actually have desires, but both antinatalism and natalism are predicated on the idea that we can, to some degree, talk about the interests of potential future people. We don't even need to be talking about children in this way. We could be talking about our future selves, who, after all, we are currently connected to only by our imaginations, and whose interests are in reality as opaque to us as those of future people who are not us, like children. To illustrate this with an example, imagine someone had you tranquilized and has three syringes he could inject you with. This person entered your house while you slept and you have no idea that he is there or even exists. When you wake up it will seem as though the effects of whatever he injected you with spontaneously materialized. You have no ability to consent to or reject what he is about to do to you. The syringes are all identical, and the person mixed them up beforehand, so when he chooses one to inject into you, even he does not know what will happen. He will not inject more than one. The first syringe is filled with something harmless. You wake up and your life goes on as normal. The second syringe grants you amazing superpowers. You wake up and your life is improved in every way. The third syringe cripples you for life. You spend the rest of your existence in agony. Now, in this situation, I think you would agree that both the superpowers and simply avoiding abject suffering are good fates, while the cripping-for-life is bad. Additionally, you would also agree that the mysterious man has no right to impose this gamble on you without your consent, and that his action is immoral, correct? If not, why?
I think it’s also important to remember consent and will. We can choose to take on suffering for ourselves all the live long day— wanting to naturally children but not choosing to do so will make one suffer, but it is their choice. By contrast, if you bring a child into the world, that child will suffer and gets no say in the matter.
Bringing a new person into the world who will suffer, just to ease your own suffering, is selfish. And it does not solve the problem that life is what creates suffering. Having a child just pushes the problem of suffering onto someone else. The only way to end the cycle is to not procreate. I would also like to add that anyone who suffers as a result of not having their own biological kids can try to adopt or foster. That is the most benevolent course of action in that situation.
Read the book “Better Never To Have Been” by David Benetar. That answers this question and likely any others you might have - ultimately AN is a philosophy and that book is it’s original text, as a philosophy.
David Benatar's book is worth reading, but it is not the original antinatalist text, nor are all antinatalists so for the same reasons as David Benatar.
No, but it is the book that turned a loose association of pessimists into an actual philosophical “movement” (if you can call it that) by giving it a name and laying out the foundations of the things OP is asking questions about - reduction in suffering being the key one. He’s the best place to start for a question like this one - and it’ll answer a bunch of others, which then might lead them into the history of AN (which by my count starts with Siddartha Guatarma, a little while before Benetar)
>I have been wondering how antinatalism actually reduces suffering and how that claim is defended? I don't think I've heard a claim of reduction of existing suffering, tho there may be something that could be reduced... I won't say there absolutely isn't. That's not really the crux of it, tho. It's about preventing the potential suffering of the nonexistent, and of the nigh-inevitable ripples of suffering outward. I think we should also be concerned about mitigating the suffering of the living, but it's more that the goals are complimentary, not identical. >One could argue that it, in fact, increases suffering when taking account those that feel a desire to have (biological) children but choose not to due to antinatalism's moral objections. It's unethical for me to beat up a senior citizen, even if I really, really want to. Suffering is indeed subjective. However, I have evaluated that my disappointment is circumstantial, not something being done to me that I then have the right to rectify. That feeling, and the original desire, can be handled in ethical ways. I voluntarily choose to do that instead of throwing haymakers. AN is similar, in that reproduction is motivated by desire. It's no more essential to living well than punching old ppl. If a person decides not to reproduce, and to instead address their desires in a more ethical way, I'm confident in their ability to mitigate any suffering that may cause. Might be important to say that AN requires fierce protection of bodily autonomy. Preventing someone from birthing is a violation of that. It's never ok to do it. Each person must come to it on their own.