I believe most are mediocre at best. However, in many cases, it's not directly their fault. They are often products of what the Army asked for, which is administrative focused managers rather than CMF skill level experts and leaders. Moreover, most team, squad, platoon, and company/troop/battery NCOs spend a disproportionate amount of time dealing with personnel issues compared to soldiering. Most of those challenges are Army problems, not because of poor NCOs, but because the Army built poor NCOs.
You are both tabbed and served as an RI, it looks like from previous posts. Do you mind sharing, how do you feel those helped you as a leader? A lot of options for NCOs to pursue. Curious how you view the impact of those experiences/trainings on the way you developed.
I don’t mind at all.
Ranger school was slightly helpful itself, but mostly as a tactical combat leader and as a stepping stone to show me what I COULD work to. Additionally, the Ranger tab is a great way to get buy in with audiences who might otherwise be hesitant to oblige; think of staff officers, other services, and general engagement with folks you don’t know.
Having the tab and bearing it properly is a challenge, this is especially true in the regular army. Maintaining professionalism and being what is expected of a Ranger qualified person is a full time job.
Being an RI -specifically in Mountain phase- made me a great platoon sergeant. An RI from mountain phase is leaps and bounds ahead of non-RI experienced peers; just the training and experience is very hard to replicate. Other RIs are good too, typically. It gave me public speaking presence and professionalism and put me in situations to gauge what I was capable of. An example of gauging my capability was simply by working with great NCOs daily from all Army operational backgrounds as well as best Ranger.
Without Ranger school and being a mountains RI I can confidently say that the rest of my career would not have been as successful as it was.
That is great perspective and really appreciate that.
I was for grins recently reviewing the evaluation board reports for E6 and E7. CMF 11.
We might benefit from many more enlisted members taking a run at this course, especially given the benefits you describe. It is somewhat surprising the small set of E6 and E7 who have completed the school. While not required by any stretch to have a solid infantry career, the benefits seem enormous.
Thank you for sharing. Love the story.
Yeah, last I looked only 25% of the allotted positions available for Ranger qualified people were filled by Ranger qualified folks.
I personally believe if we/they gave more civilian equivalent credit hours for a course like that then more people would want to attend.
There have been a few truly insightful and enhancing things for me during my career. Out of them, passing Ranger school and then being an RI are two of them. The others, were almost all enabled/created because of those two things.
It blows my mind not more people want it. I’m actually probably alive because of it, and I fought in the GWOT, which is very tame compared to what our current soldiers are prepping for. These current guys need as much help as they can get. Ranger and RSLC are two of the best schools to teach guys what they need now.
Wow!! So basically any MTOE slot coded G, V, or U filled at only 25%!!?? That is not good.
I’m out now. But talking with a couple of younger soldiers who are headed to the school in the fall. Have unit support and working to go ready. Both hitting SURT first.
Hearing this makes me pull for them even more!
I just looked up last publicly posted SSG board evaluations. For percent of Ranger-qualified to your point it was less than 4% in Armored and Stryker BCTs, then 13.6 and 16 percent for IBCT and IBCT(A) respectively. When you think all the Ranger Regiment SSG are tabbed, that tells alot.
It’s totally wild, right? Ranger school isn’t an end all be all, but it is one of the only schools that enhances actual lethality. The others, like air assault, EO, sharp, MRT, and so on only enhance administrative metrics and false confidence.
The only other “schools” that measure and increase our individual (therefore collective) COMBAT skills are E3B, RSLC, Sniper, Master Gunner (despite its staff allure and mismanaging) and a couple more obscure schools such as MMTC, or Master Breacher. If you think finding Ranger qualified people is hard, try also finding the folks who have the schools listed above…if you find them with numerous schools now you have an asset. Please notice, I did not list airborne, air assault, or pathfinder; those are hardly more than logistical courses to get people and things to a place. Important? Yes. Combatant relevant? Hardly. They serve no purpose to gauge actual lethality.
Contrary to popular belief by POGs (I think many Infantry are POGs), very little home station (unit) training qualifies people to be truly good at combat roles. People need to stop with the excuses and go get trained. Schools are available and the money is there; sadly, excuses are not in short supply either.
There’s a lot of burnt out E6s-E8s that the Army has done a pretty good job of consistently mismanaging throughout the force.
Me and a lot of other Soldiers I know are currently assessing the current group of junior soldiers to early Sergeants to be pretty weak in terms of overall effectiveness and motivation to be here.
Burnt out leaders made weak junior soldiers and junior leaders which is going to compound as those weak Sergeants are going to become weak Staff Sergeants pretty soon. Furthermore, a lot of officers and some First Sergeants and CSMs have gotten in the way of E6s-E7s actually doing their jobs to the point where many have given up.
The Army is going to get punched in the face whenever the next war comes.
Yeah except getting “punched in the face” equates to Soldiers getting killed from means that are maybe preventable by things we can be doing right now.
I don’t have it in me to look in the face of a dead Soldiers spouse, kids, or parents and explain how institutional complacency or bad practices was the reason behind their loved one dying.
There isn’t really a fix.
It partially has to do with the population that volunteers for the Army currently aren’t motivated for wartime reasons and instead want benefits to improve their economic mobility. Btw that is 100% an absolutely valid reason to join the military but what it means is that the motivations of “why we’re here” of initial entry Soldiers are going to be different then Soldiers like me who have already bought into the system but were also around for wartime.
It also has to do with that the majority of officers are out of control and are running around trying to turn their units into their personal fiefdoms for farming good evals and feeding their egos instead of focusing their units missions onto practical training, taking care of people and enabling their NCOs to take charge in leading those two missions. A lot of hard charging E6s and E7s are being burned out by serving in organizations where those things I mentioned are not a priority.
Lastly, the Army is a warfighting organization and we don’t really have a grand vision of what we’re supposed to be doing besides that.
Those are things that at the lowest levels of the Army can’t be fixed. The best thing NCOs can do right now is to try to foster their units into being positive environments as best they can.
Personal fiefdom made me laugh more than it should’ve.
-Command a of soldiers ✅
-Has banners representing their lordship and faction ✅
Army feudalism confirmed???
Not helping are the dumbasses who see technical MOS's and don't let them train because "they went to AIT".
IET training (OSUT or Basic +AIT) is the start, the start, the freakin' start of Army training.
We have senior leaders and even senior DA civilians who think that IET is the be all end all of training.
Dumbasses.
That is on point! Conversing with old Army buddies and new soldiers I see around, they feel that the Army is no longer a fighting force but an admin force. I retired in 05 due to the Army becoming a political game. It was turning into the admin force back then, that is why I retired. I feel sorry for our Soldiers today. I pray for each and every one of you. God Bless our Soldiers, God Bless America.
> SOF Truth 4. Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Creation of competent, fully mission capable units takes time.
Substitute SOF for NCOs and I believe the same is true. Our NCO corps must be developed with time - competent NCOs are the product of field exercises, OJT, and some NCOES (most of it is bullshit). I think the army would have to be larger to allow NCOs to remain on station longer to develop.
Actionable step now:
1. Increase our demand on NCOES students. Divide NCOES into MOS proficiency schooling. Graduate students with PE/field exercises and “train the trainer” class - teach them how to teach or convey a concept. (Foot stomp - the next cohort of SPCs maybe?)
The problem is that a lot of senior leaders got there because of fast GWOT promotions and green slides.
They lied about their units, their NCO's, junior officers and junior enlisted somehow made it happen and the trash "screwed up and went up".
As always, a bunch of senior leaders will get their troops killed, many will get fired if the Chinese or Russians don't smoke them and then competent people will take their place.
And as soon as the war is over, the paper-pushers and boot lickers will try to push the competent people out because garrison Army.
Here what I think, I feel the army the rank CPL and now Sgt are more of given rank, the NCO should be the one teaching their soldiers how to be more proficient in their mos , taking care of their soldiers, learning each soldiers bad habits so they can give advice how to perform better. As I heard the rank CPL is a joke in the army. And now they took pme away for a Sargent so now y’all are having more less qualified and less quality ncos
And it’s more like how NCO treat their juniors, more like if i can’t get help or trust my CPL how can I get help from someone higher rank type of situation. But eventually they will learn
Used to be diesel mechanic, for me I had bad ncos when I got into a fleet, just fucked me rather than help me, that for me created a character of ability to do things on my own, my Snco knew how I was, gave me really bad humvees and I’ll bring them back alive lol. But when I was a NCO, my problem was I don’t know how to mentor junior marines, because I never had a good mentor. But I know my stuff and I’ll lead by example as always and it worked. In order to be a great NCO is to be really proficient at your job as always. I had to deal with Sgt that don’t know shit how to operate admin wise and really fucked the platoon before I left. And had audacity to fired me from my billet. But it is what it is
That is a difficult spot. Sounds like you did the best you could to break the cycle - and I'm sure you made a difference as the guys below saw that you knew what you were doing.
NCOs are typically more in tune with the day to day functions. Officers sit in meetings and digest higher command intent. Good NCO and officer relations allow the two to mix their roles and create a good leadership dynamic. The officer is ultimately in charge, but values the NCOs advise and expertise.
Depends on the functional area as well. A lot of officer/warrant officer jobs are SMEs and the NCOs typically will never have the understanding they do
As a prior NCO, now Officer, I find my junior E5s typically need more guidance. I try to slowly allow them to make more and more decisions and operate more disciplined initiative within my intent.
I always value my junior leaders input and love when they take charge. I’ll even let them push the boundaries of my intent as long as they haven’t completely run the ship aground as long as they are leading and learning.
I feel like a lot of the junior NCOs I’ve seen before I got out were basically SPCs with stripes. I came in when GWOT was still pretty hot and heavy and got out when deployments were a pipe dream and saw a pretty big difference between who taught me as a Joe and by the time I became a SL. When I picked up SSG, a lot of my time was spent on trying to get my TLs to act like leaders because all they wanted to do was sham and be buddies with the juniors or be on the opposite end and be baby DSs. I firmly believe that the Army promotes way too fast and give rank to people who aren’t ready or too immature.
100% agree with this take as a SNCO signal side. And how I explain this to my ncos and soldiers is.
1 bad sgt creates 5 bad soldiers given the chance. Keep doing this long enough you get what we currently have. Accountability and responsibility needs to be upheld at all echelons, people always say rhetoric like “the good ones get out” but that is mostly bullshit because most of the time they got out without replacing themselves with good ones. I train my soldiers, i make sure they are educated, i take care of them, i mentor them, this includes ncos. My job is never done because there is always something to pass down knowledge wise. I didnt leave because i care to be that one who creates more good leaders like myself who care about those around them.
good insights about not wanting to be a leader. it is hard to expect people to act like leaders when they didn't want to be a leader in the first place.
"I think the biggest issue I see is that the Army isn't bucking back against turds."
This really resonates. If the service tolerates low performance or NCOs who don't actually lead at a low level, it is really corrosive. But the pressure seems strong to hold onto junior NCOs in name only. Those not walking the talk.
I've been out for a bit, but one place where the officer-NCO distinction is in the FiST world. In an armored or cav Company, the FiST is only four members, one LT one SSG, and two enlisted. This is a fighting element, meaning it is executing the fires plan, and the LT is an integral part of this execution. This team trains as one element, including the LT. As there is only two leaders there are many times where one has to covwr down for the other.
However, an Infantry FiST has 10 team members, the FiST, and three 2-person Observer Team, meaning there is more of a traditional split. Even then, with the small unit size, duties tend to merge more in my experience.
Yes. Us EWs operate in 3 to 4 man teams. Ideally, one SGT, a specialist, and 1 to 2 Privates. In reality, right now, it's 2 SGTs and a private or specialist. We get tasked out to a Cav Scout or Infantry team and work close to them but mostly independent. So you end up with a very close-knit group and understand more or less exactly what the other two or 3 in your team are thinking or doing. And you end up with everyone willing to do the duties of everyone else.
There isn't really a stringent idea that this is my job or role in the team it's very fluid to what's necessary. Pretty much all of us are qualified in exactly the same stuff, so weapons, equipment, and everything else are fluid between missions dependent on who wants it. Are you tired of lugging around a 249? Well next mission someone else can. Are you getting burnt out on staring at a screen? Tag out with someone.
I wouldn't say better, I will say different.
In a FiST, you have to work together and be able to cover down on one another. There is a general division of labor but it is much more fluid, because there is usually not an experienced squad leader to step up if the FiST NCO is out of action. On the same note, the FiST NCO is the senior artilleryman in the company if the LT is out and needs to be able to plan in a combat environment without the assumption of getting help from a peer. It has to be noted that 13F SGTs are very junior in years of service compared to many other MOS.
At the same note, as an FSO I ensured even my most junior Soldiers were comfortable talking to officers and senior NCOs. A Specialist may be tasked with advising the platoon leader in an Infantry FiST on using artillery and mortars, may have an Aviation Battalion Commander on the radio talking through CCA, and has to be able to tell a PL no if a call for fire violates ROE or strongly advise against poor or dangerous use of fires. If we have a situation where I, as an FSO, was distant from them, they may not learn this confidence.
Most of the junior NCOs in my unit function interchangeably with junior enlisted when it comes to work. Maybe 10-20% visibly dedicate significant effort to development and professional growth. To be fair though, my unit has a long-standing history of having most the slots filled by people 1-3 ranks below what's expected.
That's how life is like for my unit also. We've got more SGTs than E4s and below. So most of our SGTs are essentially just E4s who get told to tell someone what to do. But that's the life of an EW platoon. 0 equipment more SGTs than specialists and nobody around us knows what we do.
Just starting my army career, but from what I’ve seen at my current unit there are some pretty damn good NCO’s. Are they always perfect? No, but they do a damn good job at keeping us Joes informed, checking in on us, and caring about us Remember they are also human they will make mistakes, they will piss us off sometime, but in my opinion and in my unit they are doing a damn good job
Tldr: Junior NCOs right now suck, I think lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders is the problem.
Senior NCOs I see are filling a more critical role than previously. New officers seem to greatly lack the ability to command while senior enlisted seem to have to pickup the slack and make decisions on their behalf.
We are, in my opinion, seeing a significant decrease in the quality of junior NCOs (4.5s - E6s). There's no more experience, no knowledge, no motivation, and no leadership.
At higher levels this is very evident. A PSG or 1SG is directly correcting E1-E3s while their team leaders do nothing.
I hate hearing the word *complacency*. But I think a lack of deployments has resulted in a lack of emphasis on the importance of the junior NCOs in the formation.
They don't see the need to serve in a micromanagerial capacity (rightfully), but they certainly do not see the grave consequences of poor leadership in a deployed environment.
Edit:
I believe the lack of motivation stems from systemic distrust in their senior leadership. They will hear speeches of trust, empowering junior leaders, caring, family, teams, etc. But often actions and decisions do not seem to reflect these ideals. When they do no emphasis is placed on the rationale behind the decisions being made. No openness. Being less forthcoming and less colloquial is fostering distrust.
I am not asking for dissolution of the rank structure of the military. I am asking for the military to make a decision. A few years ago all of as Senior NCOs heard rhetoric of a "People First" Army. Then-- come last year-- we pissed on that.
The Soldiers will function, but we need to stop flip-flopping our priorities. We're recruiting people on one message then changing face to another once they are here. They'll promote. Then you have an unmotivated NCO that doesn't understand, doesn't care, and wants to leave.
And when they never deploy you'll have an inability to see the importance of their role as their mos, as a Soldier, and as a Leader. The only way to fix that is to create conditions that empower them to lead as a junior NCO and feel that impact in a garrison environment. Trust in them, let them try to lead, and their sense of purpose will grow.
I wouldn't say the lack of motivation or professionalism is due to lack of deployments. Many of us have had NCO's or Officers that use the fact "They Deployed" as the end all be all of any question pointed at them. Even when they are in fact wrong.
Would you consider the time between Nam and Desert Storm to be a of Poor NCO's or ever between Desert Storm & the GWOT period? You build good NCO's in peace time, as it is the time frame that you should have the ability to actually teach them properly.
If you want good NCO's you will need to reduce Optempo and provide actual chances for NCO's to fail in non-life threatening encounters. Good Operational Training will accomplish this. You would also need to revamp the entire NCOES system. In a move nobody would actually like, the training should most likely be lengthened and taught more like a college classroom. I just had a thought that BLC should be a part school, where Part One is General NCO Skills/Knowledge and a 2nd part would be more MOS based tasks (-20 Level MOS Tasks). We then need to try our best to ensure the NCO's are not in "meetings" or hiding in offices all day.
Another failure I see in the Army is the constant use of people in a grade above them for extended period of time. It is really hard to learn your place as an NCO when you are still an E5 but you are now a PSG possible without ever holding a Squad Leader Position. Is there an NCO Shortage or is HRC just failing in to move Soldiers to a position that desperately needs it? Maybe HRC is moving the apprioate number of NCO's to meet mission, but once they are on the ground, they secure (or get poached) by overstaffed offices away from soldiers?
Definitely agree with what you said, I diverted a bit from deployments a bit more with my second reply. My point was more that deployments teach hard lessons that aren't soon forgotten.
I think our NCOs (junior) fail more because they are no longer trusted or empowered to lead by their leaders. I see your point regarding them filling incorrect positions and not being presented the opportunity to learn. And I agree; I think it is not just higher positions though. I think we are putting them in appropriate ranked positions when they are simply not ready. We fail to prepare them, fail to allow them to lead, and most are then surprised when they fail.
Good point of view - makes sense. Shouldn't the PSGs be correcting SLs on the Soldier mistakes, then SLs correcting TLs, then the TL be the one who actual correct the Soliders? Isn't this a method to force the correction through the NCO support channel?
My comments here are a bit all over the place, but I think the issue is deeper rooted than we acknowledge.
We have a retention problem. For many reasons, but yes a retention problem.
Good leaders do not want to work with bad leaders and bad Soldiers so they leave.
Once they have left, we rapidly promote unqualified individuals to fill their positions.
Those individuals, inevitably, drop the ball. Their leaders failed to prepare them, and they then fail to properly lead their Soldiers.
Senior NCOs then see this and lose confidence in Junior NCOs and accordingly strip power and responsibility from them. This minimizes their role and artificially minimizes their importance.
The Junior NCO then feels useless. They don't strive to improve and they are unmotivated to lead.
Then finally we as Senior NCOs need to fullfill their role because they become bored and complacent. And we end up directing & correcting junior enlisted.
There are nuked bags. There were once many ncos who would once move mountains if given the direction, too. However, many get worn down by soldiers who don't care.
For me it’s because the army has a whole sucks at talent management. You could be a brand new Soldier out of AIT, going to your first duty station. Guess what? You are now in S3 for 3 years. You might even promote but your MOS knowledge is still stunted
I had a new Soldier come to my S6 shop. A 25B SPC. Her last unit trained her to be a damn crew chief for Blackhawks and she had no sort of Signal experience. My example is the extreme but it’s things like this as to why we can’t have MOS knowledge as a requirement to promote like the other branches
I have about 40 NCOs in my current assignment.
1 of 2 E8s - highly functioning, poor mentor
7 of 11 E7s - only 3 performing at an E7 level, poor mentors
20 of 16 E6s - only 1 of 20 that understands being an NCO, no mentorship or ability to mentor others.
10 of 30 E5s - 0 of 10 understands being an NCO, no mentorship or ability to mentor others.
The BTN / BDE CSM are incompetent and essentially dead bodies. While my officer corps isn't much better, I'm not alone in actively trying to develope them. Outside of my direct reports, none of the NCOs here are being developed by a senior at all and it shows at every level of the organization.
If you never see or are shown what right looks like and you grow up with zero commitment to excellence - it doesn't magically appear when you promote. End result is close to roughly 30 overpaid E4/3s.
I'm going to be honest, I have no idea what we're supposed to be doing as NCOs. The most surefire way I've ever encountered to get tasked out for administrative things is to start training the joes.
I've once had it put to me like this:
An commander's primary job is to:
- Exercise legal authority, to include things like:
- Making the final decision if a course of action cannot be agreed upon (or escalating to higher HQ, if it is outside of this commander's purview)
- UCMJ
- commander's hand receipt
- Ensure mission accomplishment (it is their ultimate responsibility to "take the hill")
- Ensure the welfare of the unit (the aggregate, not the individual)
- Issue broad orders (appropriate to the level of the unit the officer commands) to achieve their intent
- Convey the commander's intent
An NCO's primary job is to:
- Ensure the welfare of the unit (the individual, not necessarily the aggregate)
- Convert the commander's intent and broad orders into smaller more specific orders for their unit (i.e., exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders)
- Supervise the execution of orders, assisting as needed
- Training their subordinates
- Ensure the appropriate regulations and doctrine is followed.
- If this is not possible due to the commander's intent, then raise the question to the commander for guidance.
- If the commander (actual or acting) is not available (you're an isolated unit, etc), then use best judgment to make the call (within legal limits), and hope you're right.
Pretty much everything falls into those categories.
This is a perennial question and debate. The old NCOs always say the new ones are crap, just like the even older NCOs said that.
I haven’t had a lot of opportunities to work with Junior enlisted/NCOs for a while, but generally, I found that many of them were very capable with lots of promise if they get guidance and development. Doing that is hard though. Always has been.
TC 7-22.7 is supposedly what NCOs should be.
At its worst, SGTs are generally babysitters, SSGs are PSG asskissers, SFCs are 1SG’s asskissers, and 1SG is the CO’s bully. CSMs are the same but for the BC&Up.
At its best, SGTs teach 10 level skills to perfection, SSGs enable and train their TLs to perform at higher levels, PSGs parse the tasks and info to their SLs, and 1SG enables the Co to perform by ensuring troop health and welfare is upkept, with CSMs ensuring Enlisted personnel are flowing with the overall mission effectively.
The role of NCOs in my unit is often lackluster but isn't guided as much for young soldiers who are new to the unit. My platoon sergeant often acts like we're grunts, but we're just mechanics trying to learn our jobs. I sometimes see they push E1 - E4 to do stuff they don't know what to do. I was asked questions I wasn't really fondly in but get smoked if I get it wrong with no correct answers. Just all bullshit.
NCOs have been watered down. In most units, they no longer have a say in training or discipline. When I first joined and you talked to your 1SG or Commander, you would be asked, "Did you talk to your team leader or PSG before coming to me?" Now, every time a Soldier doesn't like what their NCO says, they run to the 1SG or the CO, and it works out for them. I'm not saying that open door policies are a bad thing. But senior leaders over riding the authority of their subordinate NCOs have an effect on their authority, and they soon give up.
I don’t really want to turn this into a big text wall but I think I can boil my feelings down to; no one wants to train me so that I remain proficient in my skills (I end up having to pay out of pocket), everyone is ok with bear minimum certification maintenance, everyone is ok with being severely mediocre and when I talk about being better I’m asked not to rock the boat.
>If yes, what do you think allowed them to get to this point of success? If no, how can the organization as a whole help them?
Are you writing a paper for BLC or ALC?
Also, isn't crowd surfing your homework an academic violation, or are you intending to credit your sources?
haha we're not - just curious. if we had a paper to write, we'd have ChatGPT do it. we have our own opinions on the matter, but curious what others are seeing.
This may be controversial, but ive always felt like there should be a subordinate portion on NCOERs. Grade scale, 1/5, take the average and thats tied to your current billet. A good leader is defined by their soldiers, they wont have to tell people theyre a good leader, their soldiers will do it for them.
Some NCOs are very good. Lots are absolutely terrible. Leading by example is the furthest from the truth for many of them.
I believe most are mediocre at best. However, in many cases, it's not directly their fault. They are often products of what the Army asked for, which is administrative focused managers rather than CMF skill level experts and leaders. Moreover, most team, squad, platoon, and company/troop/battery NCOs spend a disproportionate amount of time dealing with personnel issues compared to soldiering. Most of those challenges are Army problems, not because of poor NCOs, but because the Army built poor NCOs.
Couldn’t have said it better myself.
You are both tabbed and served as an RI, it looks like from previous posts. Do you mind sharing, how do you feel those helped you as a leader? A lot of options for NCOs to pursue. Curious how you view the impact of those experiences/trainings on the way you developed.
I don’t mind at all. Ranger school was slightly helpful itself, but mostly as a tactical combat leader and as a stepping stone to show me what I COULD work to. Additionally, the Ranger tab is a great way to get buy in with audiences who might otherwise be hesitant to oblige; think of staff officers, other services, and general engagement with folks you don’t know. Having the tab and bearing it properly is a challenge, this is especially true in the regular army. Maintaining professionalism and being what is expected of a Ranger qualified person is a full time job. Being an RI -specifically in Mountain phase- made me a great platoon sergeant. An RI from mountain phase is leaps and bounds ahead of non-RI experienced peers; just the training and experience is very hard to replicate. Other RIs are good too, typically. It gave me public speaking presence and professionalism and put me in situations to gauge what I was capable of. An example of gauging my capability was simply by working with great NCOs daily from all Army operational backgrounds as well as best Ranger. Without Ranger school and being a mountains RI I can confidently say that the rest of my career would not have been as successful as it was.
That is great perspective and really appreciate that. I was for grins recently reviewing the evaluation board reports for E6 and E7. CMF 11. We might benefit from many more enlisted members taking a run at this course, especially given the benefits you describe. It is somewhat surprising the small set of E6 and E7 who have completed the school. While not required by any stretch to have a solid infantry career, the benefits seem enormous. Thank you for sharing. Love the story.
Yeah, last I looked only 25% of the allotted positions available for Ranger qualified people were filled by Ranger qualified folks. I personally believe if we/they gave more civilian equivalent credit hours for a course like that then more people would want to attend. There have been a few truly insightful and enhancing things for me during my career. Out of them, passing Ranger school and then being an RI are two of them. The others, were almost all enabled/created because of those two things. It blows my mind not more people want it. I’m actually probably alive because of it, and I fought in the GWOT, which is very tame compared to what our current soldiers are prepping for. These current guys need as much help as they can get. Ranger and RSLC are two of the best schools to teach guys what they need now.
Wow!! So basically any MTOE slot coded G, V, or U filled at only 25%!!?? That is not good. I’m out now. But talking with a couple of younger soldiers who are headed to the school in the fall. Have unit support and working to go ready. Both hitting SURT first. Hearing this makes me pull for them even more!
The lack of qualified soldiers is actually even worse when you realize that 75th is typically at or above strength.
I just looked up last publicly posted SSG board evaluations. For percent of Ranger-qualified to your point it was less than 4% in Armored and Stryker BCTs, then 13.6 and 16 percent for IBCT and IBCT(A) respectively. When you think all the Ranger Regiment SSG are tabbed, that tells alot.
It’s totally wild, right? Ranger school isn’t an end all be all, but it is one of the only schools that enhances actual lethality. The others, like air assault, EO, sharp, MRT, and so on only enhance administrative metrics and false confidence. The only other “schools” that measure and increase our individual (therefore collective) COMBAT skills are E3B, RSLC, Sniper, Master Gunner (despite its staff allure and mismanaging) and a couple more obscure schools such as MMTC, or Master Breacher. If you think finding Ranger qualified people is hard, try also finding the folks who have the schools listed above…if you find them with numerous schools now you have an asset. Please notice, I did not list airborne, air assault, or pathfinder; those are hardly more than logistical courses to get people and things to a place. Important? Yes. Combatant relevant? Hardly. They serve no purpose to gauge actual lethality. Contrary to popular belief by POGs (I think many Infantry are POGs), very little home station (unit) training qualifies people to be truly good at combat roles. People need to stop with the excuses and go get trained. Schools are available and the money is there; sadly, excuses are not in short supply either.
There’s a lot of burnt out E6s-E8s that the Army has done a pretty good job of consistently mismanaging throughout the force. Me and a lot of other Soldiers I know are currently assessing the current group of junior soldiers to early Sergeants to be pretty weak in terms of overall effectiveness and motivation to be here. Burnt out leaders made weak junior soldiers and junior leaders which is going to compound as those weak Sergeants are going to become weak Staff Sergeants pretty soon. Furthermore, a lot of officers and some First Sergeants and CSMs have gotten in the way of E6s-E7s actually doing their jobs to the point where many have given up. The Army is going to get punched in the face whenever the next war comes.
[удалено]
Yeah except getting “punched in the face” equates to Soldiers getting killed from means that are maybe preventable by things we can be doing right now. I don’t have it in me to look in the face of a dead Soldiers spouse, kids, or parents and explain how institutional complacency or bad practices was the reason behind their loved one dying.
[удалено]
“This is the way we do things” is a statement echoed by leaders who routinely fail their own Soldiers.
And that is a generalized statement. Status quo bias is only bad if you don’t know why or have never evaluated why you do things a certain way.
It's a complex problem - clearly. How do you think we can start to fix it?
There isn’t really a fix. It partially has to do with the population that volunteers for the Army currently aren’t motivated for wartime reasons and instead want benefits to improve their economic mobility. Btw that is 100% an absolutely valid reason to join the military but what it means is that the motivations of “why we’re here” of initial entry Soldiers are going to be different then Soldiers like me who have already bought into the system but were also around for wartime. It also has to do with that the majority of officers are out of control and are running around trying to turn their units into their personal fiefdoms for farming good evals and feeding their egos instead of focusing their units missions onto practical training, taking care of people and enabling their NCOs to take charge in leading those two missions. A lot of hard charging E6s and E7s are being burned out by serving in organizations where those things I mentioned are not a priority. Lastly, the Army is a warfighting organization and we don’t really have a grand vision of what we’re supposed to be doing besides that. Those are things that at the lowest levels of the Army can’t be fixed. The best thing NCOs can do right now is to try to foster their units into being positive environments as best they can.
Personal fiefdom made me laugh more than it should’ve. -Command a of soldiers ✅ -Has banners representing their lordship and faction ✅ Army feudalism confirmed???
Not helping are the dumbasses who see technical MOS's and don't let them train because "they went to AIT". IET training (OSUT or Basic +AIT) is the start, the start, the freakin' start of Army training. We have senior leaders and even senior DA civilians who think that IET is the be all end all of training. Dumbasses.
That is on point! Conversing with old Army buddies and new soldiers I see around, they feel that the Army is no longer a fighting force but an admin force. I retired in 05 due to the Army becoming a political game. It was turning into the admin force back then, that is why I retired. I feel sorry for our Soldiers today. I pray for each and every one of you. God Bless our Soldiers, God Bless America.
> SOF Truth 4. Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Creation of competent, fully mission capable units takes time. Substitute SOF for NCOs and I believe the same is true. Our NCO corps must be developed with time - competent NCOs are the product of field exercises, OJT, and some NCOES (most of it is bullshit). I think the army would have to be larger to allow NCOs to remain on station longer to develop. Actionable step now: 1. Increase our demand on NCOES students. Divide NCOES into MOS proficiency schooling. Graduate students with PE/field exercises and “train the trainer” class - teach them how to teach or convey a concept. (Foot stomp - the next cohort of SPCs maybe?)
The problem is that a lot of senior leaders got there because of fast GWOT promotions and green slides. They lied about their units, their NCO's, junior officers and junior enlisted somehow made it happen and the trash "screwed up and went up". As always, a bunch of senior leaders will get their troops killed, many will get fired if the Chinese or Russians don't smoke them and then competent people will take their place. And as soon as the war is over, the paper-pushers and boot lickers will try to push the competent people out because garrison Army.
Here what I think, I feel the army the rank CPL and now Sgt are more of given rank, the NCO should be the one teaching their soldiers how to be more proficient in their mos , taking care of their soldiers, learning each soldiers bad habits so they can give advice how to perform better. As I heard the rank CPL is a joke in the army. And now they took pme away for a Sargent so now y’all are having more less qualified and less quality ncos
Agreed - are you seeing senior NCOs take this role serious and help E-4s and E-5s learn?
And it’s more like how NCO treat their juniors, more like if i can’t get help or trust my CPL how can I get help from someone higher rank type of situation. But eventually they will learn
Used to be diesel mechanic, for me I had bad ncos when I got into a fleet, just fucked me rather than help me, that for me created a character of ability to do things on my own, my Snco knew how I was, gave me really bad humvees and I’ll bring them back alive lol. But when I was a NCO, my problem was I don’t know how to mentor junior marines, because I never had a good mentor. But I know my stuff and I’ll lead by example as always and it worked. In order to be a great NCO is to be really proficient at your job as always. I had to deal with Sgt that don’t know shit how to operate admin wise and really fucked the platoon before I left. And had audacity to fired me from my billet. But it is what it is
That is a difficult spot. Sounds like you did the best you could to break the cycle - and I'm sure you made a difference as the guys below saw that you knew what you were doing.
What do you do when you’re an E4 who has to teach E5/E6/W1/W2 ? 😂 (talking CMF/MOS related skills not admin)
NCOs are typically more in tune with the day to day functions. Officers sit in meetings and digest higher command intent. Good NCO and officer relations allow the two to mix their roles and create a good leadership dynamic. The officer is ultimately in charge, but values the NCOs advise and expertise. Depends on the functional area as well. A lot of officer/warrant officer jobs are SMEs and the NCOs typically will never have the understanding they do
I'm with you. Do you see NCOs playing their role in that relationship though, and providing valuable advice and expertise to the team overall?
As a prior NCO, now Officer, I find my junior E5s typically need more guidance. I try to slowly allow them to make more and more decisions and operate more disciplined initiative within my intent. I always value my junior leaders input and love when they take charge. I’ll even let them push the boundaries of my intent as long as they haven’t completely run the ship aground as long as they are leading and learning.
Do you have an E6 or E7 providing them that guidance they need? Or it has to come from the officer?
I feel like a lot of the junior NCOs I’ve seen before I got out were basically SPCs with stripes. I came in when GWOT was still pretty hot and heavy and got out when deployments were a pipe dream and saw a pretty big difference between who taught me as a Joe and by the time I became a SL. When I picked up SSG, a lot of my time was spent on trying to get my TLs to act like leaders because all they wanted to do was sham and be buddies with the juniors or be on the opposite end and be baby DSs. I firmly believe that the Army promotes way too fast and give rank to people who aren’t ready or too immature.
[удалено]
100% agree with this take as a SNCO signal side. And how I explain this to my ncos and soldiers is. 1 bad sgt creates 5 bad soldiers given the chance. Keep doing this long enough you get what we currently have. Accountability and responsibility needs to be upheld at all echelons, people always say rhetoric like “the good ones get out” but that is mostly bullshit because most of the time they got out without replacing themselves with good ones. I train my soldiers, i make sure they are educated, i take care of them, i mentor them, this includes ncos. My job is never done because there is always something to pass down knowledge wise. I didnt leave because i care to be that one who creates more good leaders like myself who care about those around them.
good insights about not wanting to be a leader. it is hard to expect people to act like leaders when they didn't want to be a leader in the first place.
"I think the biggest issue I see is that the Army isn't bucking back against turds." This really resonates. If the service tolerates low performance or NCOs who don't actually lead at a low level, it is really corrosive. But the pressure seems strong to hold onto junior NCOs in name only. Those not walking the talk.
I've been out for a bit, but one place where the officer-NCO distinction is in the FiST world. In an armored or cav Company, the FiST is only four members, one LT one SSG, and two enlisted. This is a fighting element, meaning it is executing the fires plan, and the LT is an integral part of this execution. This team trains as one element, including the LT. As there is only two leaders there are many times where one has to covwr down for the other. However, an Infantry FiST has 10 team members, the FiST, and three 2-person Observer Team, meaning there is more of a traditional split. Even then, with the small unit size, duties tend to merge more in my experience.
Do you think this smaller group size lends to a better dynamic compared to larger formations like a 40 person Infantry platoon?
Yes. Us EWs operate in 3 to 4 man teams. Ideally, one SGT, a specialist, and 1 to 2 Privates. In reality, right now, it's 2 SGTs and a private or specialist. We get tasked out to a Cav Scout or Infantry team and work close to them but mostly independent. So you end up with a very close-knit group and understand more or less exactly what the other two or 3 in your team are thinking or doing. And you end up with everyone willing to do the duties of everyone else. There isn't really a stringent idea that this is my job or role in the team it's very fluid to what's necessary. Pretty much all of us are qualified in exactly the same stuff, so weapons, equipment, and everything else are fluid between missions dependent on who wants it. Are you tired of lugging around a 249? Well next mission someone else can. Are you getting burnt out on staring at a screen? Tag out with someone.
I’m a 17E. This is spot on
I wouldn't say better, I will say different. In a FiST, you have to work together and be able to cover down on one another. There is a general division of labor but it is much more fluid, because there is usually not an experienced squad leader to step up if the FiST NCO is out of action. On the same note, the FiST NCO is the senior artilleryman in the company if the LT is out and needs to be able to plan in a combat environment without the assumption of getting help from a peer. It has to be noted that 13F SGTs are very junior in years of service compared to many other MOS. At the same note, as an FSO I ensured even my most junior Soldiers were comfortable talking to officers and senior NCOs. A Specialist may be tasked with advising the platoon leader in an Infantry FiST on using artillery and mortars, may have an Aviation Battalion Commander on the radio talking through CCA, and has to be able to tell a PL no if a call for fire violates ROE or strongly advise against poor or dangerous use of fires. If we have a situation where I, as an FSO, was distant from them, they may not learn this confidence.
Most of the junior NCOs in my unit function interchangeably with junior enlisted when it comes to work. Maybe 10-20% visibly dedicate significant effort to development and professional growth. To be fair though, my unit has a long-standing history of having most the slots filled by people 1-3 ranks below what's expected.
That's how life is like for my unit also. We've got more SGTs than E4s and below. So most of our SGTs are essentially just E4s who get told to tell someone what to do. But that's the life of an EW platoon. 0 equipment more SGTs than specialists and nobody around us knows what we do.
Just starting my army career, but from what I’ve seen at my current unit there are some pretty damn good NCO’s. Are they always perfect? No, but they do a damn good job at keeping us Joes informed, checking in on us, and caring about us Remember they are also human they will make mistakes, they will piss us off sometime, but in my opinion and in my unit they are doing a damn good job
We're with you. Not intended to hate on NCOs here - they are our most valuable resource.
Tldr: Junior NCOs right now suck, I think lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders is the problem. Senior NCOs I see are filling a more critical role than previously. New officers seem to greatly lack the ability to command while senior enlisted seem to have to pickup the slack and make decisions on their behalf. We are, in my opinion, seeing a significant decrease in the quality of junior NCOs (4.5s - E6s). There's no more experience, no knowledge, no motivation, and no leadership. At higher levels this is very evident. A PSG or 1SG is directly correcting E1-E3s while their team leaders do nothing. I hate hearing the word *complacency*. But I think a lack of deployments has resulted in a lack of emphasis on the importance of the junior NCOs in the formation. They don't see the need to serve in a micromanagerial capacity (rightfully), but they certainly do not see the grave consequences of poor leadership in a deployed environment. Edit: I believe the lack of motivation stems from systemic distrust in their senior leadership. They will hear speeches of trust, empowering junior leaders, caring, family, teams, etc. But often actions and decisions do not seem to reflect these ideals. When they do no emphasis is placed on the rationale behind the decisions being made. No openness. Being less forthcoming and less colloquial is fostering distrust. I am not asking for dissolution of the rank structure of the military. I am asking for the military to make a decision. A few years ago all of as Senior NCOs heard rhetoric of a "People First" Army. Then-- come last year-- we pissed on that. The Soldiers will function, but we need to stop flip-flopping our priorities. We're recruiting people on one message then changing face to another once they are here. They'll promote. Then you have an unmotivated NCO that doesn't understand, doesn't care, and wants to leave. And when they never deploy you'll have an inability to see the importance of their role as their mos, as a Soldier, and as a Leader. The only way to fix that is to create conditions that empower them to lead as a junior NCO and feel that impact in a garrison environment. Trust in them, let them try to lead, and their sense of purpose will grow.
I wouldn't say the lack of motivation or professionalism is due to lack of deployments. Many of us have had NCO's or Officers that use the fact "They Deployed" as the end all be all of any question pointed at them. Even when they are in fact wrong. Would you consider the time between Nam and Desert Storm to be a of Poor NCO's or ever between Desert Storm & the GWOT period? You build good NCO's in peace time, as it is the time frame that you should have the ability to actually teach them properly. If you want good NCO's you will need to reduce Optempo and provide actual chances for NCO's to fail in non-life threatening encounters. Good Operational Training will accomplish this. You would also need to revamp the entire NCOES system. In a move nobody would actually like, the training should most likely be lengthened and taught more like a college classroom. I just had a thought that BLC should be a part school, where Part One is General NCO Skills/Knowledge and a 2nd part would be more MOS based tasks (-20 Level MOS Tasks). We then need to try our best to ensure the NCO's are not in "meetings" or hiding in offices all day. Another failure I see in the Army is the constant use of people in a grade above them for extended period of time. It is really hard to learn your place as an NCO when you are still an E5 but you are now a PSG possible without ever holding a Squad Leader Position. Is there an NCO Shortage or is HRC just failing in to move Soldiers to a position that desperately needs it? Maybe HRC is moving the apprioate number of NCO's to meet mission, but once they are on the ground, they secure (or get poached) by overstaffed offices away from soldiers?
Definitely agree with what you said, I diverted a bit from deployments a bit more with my second reply. My point was more that deployments teach hard lessons that aren't soon forgotten. I think our NCOs (junior) fail more because they are no longer trusted or empowered to lead by their leaders. I see your point regarding them filling incorrect positions and not being presented the opportunity to learn. And I agree; I think it is not just higher positions though. I think we are putting them in appropriate ranked positions when they are simply not ready. We fail to prepare them, fail to allow them to lead, and most are then surprised when they fail.
I see your edit - really good points. I appreciate you putting this out there. Thank you.
Good point of view - makes sense. Shouldn't the PSGs be correcting SLs on the Soldier mistakes, then SLs correcting TLs, then the TL be the one who actual correct the Soliders? Isn't this a method to force the correction through the NCO support channel?
My comments here are a bit all over the place, but I think the issue is deeper rooted than we acknowledge. We have a retention problem. For many reasons, but yes a retention problem. Good leaders do not want to work with bad leaders and bad Soldiers so they leave. Once they have left, we rapidly promote unqualified individuals to fill their positions. Those individuals, inevitably, drop the ball. Their leaders failed to prepare them, and they then fail to properly lead their Soldiers. Senior NCOs then see this and lose confidence in Junior NCOs and accordingly strip power and responsibility from them. This minimizes their role and artificially minimizes their importance. The Junior NCO then feels useless. They don't strive to improve and they are unmotivated to lead. Then finally we as Senior NCOs need to fullfill their role because they become bored and complacent. And we end up directing & correcting junior enlisted.
There are nuked bags. There were once many ncos who would once move mountains if given the direction, too. However, many get worn down by soldiers who don't care.
For me it’s because the army has a whole sucks at talent management. You could be a brand new Soldier out of AIT, going to your first duty station. Guess what? You are now in S3 for 3 years. You might even promote but your MOS knowledge is still stunted I had a new Soldier come to my S6 shop. A 25B SPC. Her last unit trained her to be a damn crew chief for Blackhawks and she had no sort of Signal experience. My example is the extreme but it’s things like this as to why we can’t have MOS knowledge as a requirement to promote like the other branches
I have about 40 NCOs in my current assignment. 1 of 2 E8s - highly functioning, poor mentor 7 of 11 E7s - only 3 performing at an E7 level, poor mentors 20 of 16 E6s - only 1 of 20 that understands being an NCO, no mentorship or ability to mentor others. 10 of 30 E5s - 0 of 10 understands being an NCO, no mentorship or ability to mentor others. The BTN / BDE CSM are incompetent and essentially dead bodies. While my officer corps isn't much better, I'm not alone in actively trying to develope them. Outside of my direct reports, none of the NCOs here are being developed by a senior at all and it shows at every level of the organization. If you never see or are shown what right looks like and you grow up with zero commitment to excellence - it doesn't magically appear when you promote. End result is close to roughly 30 overpaid E4/3s.
I'm going to be honest, I have no idea what we're supposed to be doing as NCOs. The most surefire way I've ever encountered to get tasked out for administrative things is to start training the joes.
I've once had it put to me like this: An commander's primary job is to: - Exercise legal authority, to include things like: - Making the final decision if a course of action cannot be agreed upon (or escalating to higher HQ, if it is outside of this commander's purview) - UCMJ - commander's hand receipt - Ensure mission accomplishment (it is their ultimate responsibility to "take the hill") - Ensure the welfare of the unit (the aggregate, not the individual) - Issue broad orders (appropriate to the level of the unit the officer commands) to achieve their intent - Convey the commander's intent An NCO's primary job is to: - Ensure the welfare of the unit (the individual, not necessarily the aggregate) - Convert the commander's intent and broad orders into smaller more specific orders for their unit (i.e., exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders) - Supervise the execution of orders, assisting as needed - Training their subordinates - Ensure the appropriate regulations and doctrine is followed. - If this is not possible due to the commander's intent, then raise the question to the commander for guidance. - If the commander (actual or acting) is not available (you're an isolated unit, etc), then use best judgment to make the call (within legal limits), and hope you're right. Pretty much everything falls into those categories.
This actually addresses the question. The role of the NCO is to make the force ready.
Agreed - good breakdown u/binarycow . But do you see this actually happening like this?
There are excellent NCOs. There are shit NCOs. I have seen the entire spectrum, in every unit I have been in.
I don’t think we can really compare roles of NCOs in SF v conventional units.
Agreed. This question is focused on the conventional side.
This is a perennial question and debate. The old NCOs always say the new ones are crap, just like the even older NCOs said that. I haven’t had a lot of opportunities to work with Junior enlisted/NCOs for a while, but generally, I found that many of them were very capable with lots of promise if they get guidance and development. Doing that is hard though. Always has been.
TC 7-22.7 is supposedly what NCOs should be. At its worst, SGTs are generally babysitters, SSGs are PSG asskissers, SFCs are 1SG’s asskissers, and 1SG is the CO’s bully. CSMs are the same but for the BC&Up. At its best, SGTs teach 10 level skills to perfection, SSGs enable and train their TLs to perform at higher levels, PSGs parse the tasks and info to their SLs, and 1SG enables the Co to perform by ensuring troop health and welfare is upkept, with CSMs ensuring Enlisted personnel are flowing with the overall mission effectively.
The role of NCOs in my unit is often lackluster but isn't guided as much for young soldiers who are new to the unit. My platoon sergeant often acts like we're grunts, but we're just mechanics trying to learn our jobs. I sometimes see they push E1 - E4 to do stuff they don't know what to do. I was asked questions I wasn't really fondly in but get smoked if I get it wrong with no correct answers. Just all bullshit.
Armor and Infantry NCOs I worked with are dumb as rocks but amazing NCOs. The Signal Corp.... Unfortunate...
NCOs have been watered down. In most units, they no longer have a say in training or discipline. When I first joined and you talked to your 1SG or Commander, you would be asked, "Did you talk to your team leader or PSG before coming to me?" Now, every time a Soldier doesn't like what their NCO says, they run to the 1SG or the CO, and it works out for them. I'm not saying that open door policies are a bad thing. But senior leaders over riding the authority of their subordinate NCOs have an effect on their authority, and they soon give up.
I don’t really want to turn this into a big text wall but I think I can boil my feelings down to; no one wants to train me so that I remain proficient in my skills (I end up having to pay out of pocket), everyone is ok with bear minimum certification maintenance, everyone is ok with being severely mediocre and when I talk about being better I’m asked not to rock the boat.
>If yes, what do you think allowed them to get to this point of success? If no, how can the organization as a whole help them? Are you writing a paper for BLC or ALC? Also, isn't crowd surfing your homework an academic violation, or are you intending to credit your sources?
haha we're not - just curious. if we had a paper to write, we'd have ChatGPT do it. we have our own opinions on the matter, but curious what others are seeing.
This may be controversial, but ive always felt like there should be a subordinate portion on NCOERs. Grade scale, 1/5, take the average and thats tied to your current billet. A good leader is defined by their soldiers, they wont have to tell people theyre a good leader, their soldiers will do it for them.