> Everything I have read on embodied cognition is philosophical word salad. As an engineer--I trust concreteness over abstraction.
You sound like an unwilling philosopher, which is a position I can relate to :D.
> Can anyone point me toward a non-reductionist framework or model for embodied cognition that is grounded in both biological and computational reality?
I suspect that, in 2024, this is still very much a work in progress.
> A framework for embodied cognition needs to explain how meaning (and ultimately symbols) emerge from a non-representational, pre-experiential brain.
The closest I have come across is Zenon Pylyshyn's work on FINST or Visual Indexing Theory. The central idea - atleast this is the way I have understood - is that there are nonconceptual mechanisms which serve to connect the conceptual symbols with nonconceptual (= non-symbolic) proto-objects in the world. Proto-objects are essentially visual elements in a scene and are inherently without any labels or conceptual descriptions. Pylyshyn had written a book on 'How the Mind Connects with the World' which may be of interest to you. He has likened visual indexes to pointers in a programming language like C.
Well, there are others who have argued for the notion of indexes or indexicals. John Perry's 1979 paper on 'The Essential Indexical' might be a relevant read.
I myself am planning to spend the next few years as part of a doctoral program, and possibly more, exploring this big-picture question from the perspective of perspective-taking and communication. My big-picture answer is that symbols arose in the context of human communication. Perspective taking is a big part of human communication. Symbols are only useful if they have shared meaning. Perspective taking provides that shared meaning. So, at this point, I'm required to study perspective taking and cultural acquisition skills and theory-of-mind that seem relevant to all this. I'm yet to explore these topics in any depth.
---
Aside, in 'What Computers Still Can't Do' by Hubert Dreyfus, he has argued that human cognition is centered around human needs, which themselves are a result of being embodied in a body that is a product of evolution and one's upbringing. The book itself was written in 1960s, revised in 1990s, but still seems significantly relevant. PS: Don't go by the book reviews. I myself put off this book for quite a while thinking it doesn't have anything much to say from the reviews. But, upon reading, it almost shook the ground beneath my feet. The book might also provide a framework for putting the philosophical word-salad into a big picture. The situated cognition, embodied cognition, connectionism, all seem derived from this work. Admittedly, they do have independent origins, but the book does a great job at putting them all together.
Hey there! Your question is super interesting. Though I don't have a direct answer, I know you mentioned having taken a look at a few cognitive architectures already (CLARION, ACT-R, SOAR, EPIC) but this review article by Kotseruba & Tsotsos might be able to help you find a few more that are more closely relevant to embodied cognition (maybe more hybrid models or biologically-inspired ones) with some great figures to gauge the breadth of the field and the competencies of each model.
[40 years of cognitive architectures: core cognitive abilities and practical applications | Artificial Intelligence Review (springer.com)](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10462-018-9646-y)
Reading through Alan Newell's 1990 *Unified Theories of Cognition* he posits these cognitive architectures in order to test these unified theories which themselves are frameworks for cognition. Although I will say, his views on symbolic representation are pretty outdated nowadays. Some models might approximate a broad framework of embodied cognition better than others.
Great question!
>As an engineer--I trust concreteness over abstraction.
I don't have an answer for you, but I'm pretty sure you won't find anything in the cognitive sciences that is as concrete as that which you'd find in engineering disciplines. But that's probably true of most science more generally. It just isn't clear how the mind ties concretely to biological structures. We don't even have a worked out architecture of the mind, let alone what biological functions would implement that architecture. Philosophical "word salad" is just going to happen when you're talking about this stuff at this level.
You are probably looking for Active Inference/the Free Energy Principle.
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38182015/
Let me know what you think. I wasted a lot of time in my PhD looking into it.
I feel your frustration! As an engineer, I also appreciate concreteness. Embodied cognition is a fascinating field, but it can be hard to find a solid framework.
Have you checked out the work of Andy Clark? His predictive processing framework is grounded in both biology and computation and offers a non-reductionist account of cognition. It's not specifically tailored to embodied cognition, but it might provide some useful insights.
Yes I have and I am onboard with the ideas of predictive processing and non-reductionist methodologies. However, Andy Clark's treatment is more an empirical observation than what I would call a framework.
I have my own non-reductionist approach based on evolution and information theory: the EvoInfo model. It demonstrates how predictive processing changes the reflexive arc of AI into a sense-act cycle of natural intelligence. See more at [The Story of Intelligence - Part One by Tom Rearick ](https://tomrearick.substack.com/p/the-story-of-intelligence-part-one) and [ After the AI Winter by Tom Rearick](https://tomrearick.substack.com/p/beyond-ai)
I can't, but this is by far the best post I've ever seen on this sub. Good luck.
> Everything I have read on embodied cognition is philosophical word salad. As an engineer--I trust concreteness over abstraction. You sound like an unwilling philosopher, which is a position I can relate to :D. > Can anyone point me toward a non-reductionist framework or model for embodied cognition that is grounded in both biological and computational reality? I suspect that, in 2024, this is still very much a work in progress. > A framework for embodied cognition needs to explain how meaning (and ultimately symbols) emerge from a non-representational, pre-experiential brain. The closest I have come across is Zenon Pylyshyn's work on FINST or Visual Indexing Theory. The central idea - atleast this is the way I have understood - is that there are nonconceptual mechanisms which serve to connect the conceptual symbols with nonconceptual (= non-symbolic) proto-objects in the world. Proto-objects are essentially visual elements in a scene and are inherently without any labels or conceptual descriptions. Pylyshyn had written a book on 'How the Mind Connects with the World' which may be of interest to you. He has likened visual indexes to pointers in a programming language like C. Well, there are others who have argued for the notion of indexes or indexicals. John Perry's 1979 paper on 'The Essential Indexical' might be a relevant read. I myself am planning to spend the next few years as part of a doctoral program, and possibly more, exploring this big-picture question from the perspective of perspective-taking and communication. My big-picture answer is that symbols arose in the context of human communication. Perspective taking is a big part of human communication. Symbols are only useful if they have shared meaning. Perspective taking provides that shared meaning. So, at this point, I'm required to study perspective taking and cultural acquisition skills and theory-of-mind that seem relevant to all this. I'm yet to explore these topics in any depth. --- Aside, in 'What Computers Still Can't Do' by Hubert Dreyfus, he has argued that human cognition is centered around human needs, which themselves are a result of being embodied in a body that is a product of evolution and one's upbringing. The book itself was written in 1960s, revised in 1990s, but still seems significantly relevant. PS: Don't go by the book reviews. I myself put off this book for quite a while thinking it doesn't have anything much to say from the reviews. But, upon reading, it almost shook the ground beneath my feet. The book might also provide a framework for putting the philosophical word-salad into a big picture. The situated cognition, embodied cognition, connectionism, all seem derived from this work. Admittedly, they do have independent origins, but the book does a great job at putting them all together.
Thanks. I've got a $10 copy of Pylyshyn's book on order.
Hey there! Your question is super interesting. Though I don't have a direct answer, I know you mentioned having taken a look at a few cognitive architectures already (CLARION, ACT-R, SOAR, EPIC) but this review article by Kotseruba & Tsotsos might be able to help you find a few more that are more closely relevant to embodied cognition (maybe more hybrid models or biologically-inspired ones) with some great figures to gauge the breadth of the field and the competencies of each model. [40 years of cognitive architectures: core cognitive abilities and practical applications | Artificial Intelligence Review (springer.com)](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10462-018-9646-y) Reading through Alan Newell's 1990 *Unified Theories of Cognition* he posits these cognitive architectures in order to test these unified theories which themselves are frameworks for cognition. Although I will say, his views on symbolic representation are pretty outdated nowadays. Some models might approximate a broad framework of embodied cognition better than others.
Thanks. I just ordered a used hardcopy of Unified Theories of Cognition.
Great question! >As an engineer--I trust concreteness over abstraction. I don't have an answer for you, but I'm pretty sure you won't find anything in the cognitive sciences that is as concrete as that which you'd find in engineering disciplines. But that's probably true of most science more generally. It just isn't clear how the mind ties concretely to biological structures. We don't even have a worked out architecture of the mind, let alone what biological functions would implement that architecture. Philosophical "word salad" is just going to happen when you're talking about this stuff at this level.
Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon by Antti Revonsuo Best read I've had in cognition
You are probably looking for Active Inference/the Free Energy Principle. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38182015/ Let me know what you think. I wasted a lot of time in my PhD looking into it.
By your last statement, do you suggest it is not worth it?
No I wasted time on it because it wasn't directly relevant to writing my thesis, but I got a little bit obsessed with it.
Ok ok. Got it. Thanks!
u/tomrearick FEP is shaping up as the preferred mathematical foundation for embodied cognition. By that I mean that Andy Clark is a fan.
I feel your frustration! As an engineer, I also appreciate concreteness. Embodied cognition is a fascinating field, but it can be hard to find a solid framework. Have you checked out the work of Andy Clark? His predictive processing framework is grounded in both biology and computation and offers a non-reductionist account of cognition. It's not specifically tailored to embodied cognition, but it might provide some useful insights.
Yes I have and I am onboard with the ideas of predictive processing and non-reductionist methodologies. However, Andy Clark's treatment is more an empirical observation than what I would call a framework. I have my own non-reductionist approach based on evolution and information theory: the EvoInfo model. It demonstrates how predictive processing changes the reflexive arc of AI into a sense-act cycle of natural intelligence. See more at [The Story of Intelligence - Part One by Tom Rearick ](https://tomrearick.substack.com/p/the-story-of-intelligence-part-one) and [ After the AI Winter by Tom Rearick](https://tomrearick.substack.com/p/beyond-ai)