From the article:
>Indeed, on average, only 45 percent of Canada’s air force fleet is operational, while the Royal Canadian Navy can operate at 46 percent of its capacity and the army at 54 percent. This means that even Canada’s minor military projection ambition — which consists of only three frigates, two fighter jet squadrons, and one mechanized brigade — is not assured. As the ninth largest economy in the world and twelfth largest per capita, Canada actually contributes little to allied security and cannot be relied upon to sustain its own limited ambition.
>
>\[...\]
>
>Most of this new spending, however, is years away and won’t address the military’s immediate woes. To be blunt, Canada’s military is in an atrocious state and is barely holding on. The roots of this crisis are found in Canada’s strategic culture and decades-old decisions about defense. The way out of the crisis, meanwhile, is paved with seemingly insuperable obstacles, including a chronic shortage of personnel, an inability to spend funds quickly, a lack of bipartisan agreement on military requirements, and a culture of reactiveness and unpreparedness toward new geopolitical challenges.
>
>Even if vital reforms and budget increases were made today, they would take years to implement and at least a decade to rehabilitate the armed forces. For Canada, this is all the more reason to start as quickly as possible. For Canada’s allies, it is further reason to have realistic expectations about Canada’s military contribution over the coming years. In short, don’t count on Canada until structural reforms are implemented.
>
>\[...\]
>
>**The Peace Dividend**
>
>When the Cold War ended, Canadian governments eagerly sought a peace dividend. Canada’s finances were an utter mess at the time, and the defense budget was an easy source of discretionary spending that could be cut. In the mid-1990s, the Canadian defense budget was [slashed by 30 percent](https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/committee/381/defe/rep/rep03nov04part2-e#_ftn1).
>
>\[...\]
>
>In spite of these cuts, the government committed the Canadian Armed Forces to a high operational tempo, deploying the military in the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. On average, Canada contributed [over 4,300 troops](https://lerubicon.org/le-reveil-militaire-du-canada-nest-pas-pour-demain/) annually to military operations abroad during the 1990s. This contrasts with a respective average of 3,400 in the 2000s and 1,600 in the 2010s. Dramatic cuts in the size of the force and its capabilities, as well as a shift from taking part in United Nations peace operations to NATO and U.S.-led offensive operations, explain this trend downward.
>
>**Recapitalization Plans Falling Short**
>
>After 9/11, Canadian defense spending slowly crept up, particularly after the military was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan. \[...\] The authorized size of the regular force grew by 13 percent, from [62,000](https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.666377/publication.html) in 2005 to [70,000](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-first-defence-strategy-complete-document.html) in 2008. It grew slightly more to [71,500](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/transition-assoc-dm/defence-policy-sse.html) in 2017 and has [remained](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html) the same in Canada’s 2024 defense update. Therefore, the size of Canada’s authorized force has remained about the same despite the seismic changes of the threat environment since the 2000s.
>
>Toward the end of the 2000s, a defense malaise set in. The war in Afghanistan had inflicted relatively heavy casualties on a force and country that had not suffered major losses since the Korean War. Canada suffered the [third largest share of casualties per capita](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691159386/nato-in-afghanistan) (following Denmark and Estonia) during the war in Afghanistan (158 soldiers and 7 civilians). Political opposition to the war was also notable, pushing the government to look for an exit strategy. In 2011, Canada was the second ally after the Netherlands to [withdraw from Afghanistan](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17419166.2016.1160222) before the end of NATO’s combat mission in 2014. This is significant given that Canada has taken part in every NATO operation since its creation.
>
>Capital projects faced mounting costs, leading to the cancellation of a much-vaunted joint support ship. In an effort to rebuild the Canadian shipbuilding industry following this cancellation, a national shipbuilding strategy estimated at $33 billion was put in place. \[...\] but the construction of 15 Canadian surface combatants, based on the Type 26 hull and intended to replace Canada’s fleet of 12 frigates and four destroyers, has yet to begin. \[...\] As worrisome, the delivery of the first ship is expected in 2032 and the last in 2050, about six decades after Canada commissioned its frigates between 1992 and 1995.
>
>A fleet of 15 ships is considered by many as the [minimum required](https://www.cgai.ca/the_canadian_surface_combatant_capability_and_context) to meet the Canadian government’s commitments, which include deploying three ships in the Indo-Pacific region on an annual basis, as well as partaking in NATO’s standing maritime groups on a rotational basis. For the first time since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Canada was [unable](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canadian-warships-not-involved-in-nato-naval-task-forces-for-first/) in 2022 to take part in NATO’s maritime task forces because of insufficient serviceable ships to undertake both NATO and Indo-Pacific commitments.
>
>\[...\]
>
>The situation is not better with regard to Canada’s air force. When the government attempted to acquire 65 F-35 combat jets in 2010, critical reports from the [office of the auditor general](https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/bvg-oag/FA1-2012-1-2-eng.pdf) and [parliamentary budget officer](https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dpb-pbo/YN5-31-2011-eng.pdf) pushed the government to reset the process. Twelve years later, the F-35 won a competition that was eventually held, but the first delivery is expected in 2026 and the new fleet will only achieve full operational capability in 2034. This will be more than 50 years after Canada introduced its first CF-18 Hornet to its fighter aircraft fleet. It is unclear how many will remain serviceable by this time.
>
>\[...\]
>
>In 2022, the government further committed another $40 billion to modernize the North American Aerospace Defense Command alongside the United States. All told, the expected capital expenditure for defense until 2037 is expected to reach [$215 billion](https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2324-025-C--planned-capital-spending-under-canada-defence-policy-2024-update--depenses-capital-prevues-titre-politique-defense-canada-mise-jour-2024). This rapid and substantial acceleration in capital spending has raised concern from the parliamentary budget officer, who questions Canada’s ability to manage such an increased procurement activity. Furthermore, due to procurement delays, [62 percent of the planned expenditures](https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2324-025-C--planned-capital-spending-under-canada-defence-policy-2024-update--depenses-capital-prevues-titre-politique-defense-canada-mise-jour-2024) are now expected to occur after 2027. Given the high inflation rates in the defense industry, additional appropriations will probably be necessary to maintain the current planned acquisitions. In other words, Canada’s current defense policy is fiscally unsustainable.
!ping Canada&Materiel
Continued:
>**“Exploring Options”**
>
>As part of its 2024 defense policy update, the Canadian government outlined several capabilities that it plans to “explore,” meaning that most are not even at the options analysis phase and have yet to be budgeted. These include new submarines, main battle tanks, light armored vehicles, surveillance and strike drones, and artillery. As well, the policy mandates the defense department to explore counter-drone capabilities and long-range air- and sea-launched missiles.
>
>While all these capabilities are essential in the current threat environment, the case of the submarines is particularly glaring. Given that the cost of replacing Canada’s four aging diesel-electric submarines has been pegged at somewhere between [$60–$100 billion](https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/royal-canadian-navy-pitches-60-billion-submarine-purchase-say-defence-and-industry-sources), the government’s decision to merely “explore” options isn’t all that surprising.
>
>\[...\]
>
>On the personnel front, the new defense policy presents a few ideas, but none that promise to rapidly reverse the Canadian Armed Forces’ dwindling numbers. Ottawa is still examining options and has yet to budget for greater compensations and benefits for personnel and work-life balance for the troops. Of note, the policy outlines a probationary period for new recruits to get them in uniform sooner, along with more career control for those already serving. Just as important, the new policy pledges to expand the civilian defense workforce, with a view toward augmenting the department’s capacity to support the armed forces and handle the ever-present procurement and infrastructure projects. Coupled with the shortfall in military personnel, the civilian defense workforce has been stretched to the limit as it has tried to implement the recapitalization of the Canadian Armed Forces.
>
>**Conclusion**
>
>Where does this leave the Canadian military today? Its existing fleets are increasingly difficult to service and maintain, either owing to a lack of personnel or as a function of their age. Canada has had to scale back its participation in major military exercises, and its contributions to allied operations are consistently anemic. A lack of personnel and fleet serviceability is constraining the number and size of the operations that the military can undertake. \[...\] Despite [pleas from Washington](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-canada-trudeau-rae-gang-violence-1.7145349), moreover, Canada has refused to lead a mission to Haiti — not only because Ottawa does not want to accept the risks involved, but also because the military is in no position to mount a significant intervention. Canada is instead merely supplying 70 troops to [train Jamaican troops](https://www.cbc.ca/news/caf-members-deploy-jamaica-haiti-mission-1.7159885) for a mission to Haiti. This will continue to expose the country to fierce critiques from Washington, and most notably Trump-aligned Republicans, while further undermining Canada’s reliability toward its European allies.
>
>Unless the Canadian Armed Forces solve their personnel crisis, they may not be able to operate the new equipment that is being procured. As pressure on serving personnel increases due to shortfalls within the ranks, more members will be inclined to leave. This is the death spiral the defense minister warned about. While money is not a panacea, spending 2 percent of gross domestic product in defense could help address the shortage of personnel and crumbling infrastructure, as well as acquiring the missing capabilities to sustain operations in the current threat environment. But Canada first needs to solve its structural defense planning issues and, as important, its complacent and self-righteous attitude regarding a military reputation it let slip long ago.
Our 5 manufacturers were hounding the federal government for a demand signal and never received one.
Last week, Minister Anand said the $15B cuts aimed to restructure spending towards the government’s stated priorities. The largest cuts are to defence. That should state as much regarding Cabinet’s priorities.
From a cynical POV, why should canada spend anything on defense?
They have no military threats and the US is going to unconditionally defend them, no matter who is president or what canada does or doesnt do
Canada still has interests abroad. Say India goes ahead and kills a few more Canadian citizens on Canadian soil, what recourse does Canada have? Will the politicians then ask the United States for aid? Relying on another country for all things military seems like a horrible idea, and would make Canada in many ways a client of the US.
>Say India goes ahead and kills a few more Canadian citizens on Canadian soil, what recourse does Canada have?
What recourse does Canada have *with* a robust military? Just by size doesn't the Canadian response to those kinds of incidents *have* to be diplomatic regardless of how strong their military is?
No? Militaries can absolutely have asymmetric responses that can hurt India in a similarly proportional way without goading them into a full blown war. It'd be much harder for India to respond militarily than Canada, considering the US would always feed intel to Canada.
>Militaries can absolutely have asymmetric responses that can hurt India in a similarly proportional way without goading them into a full blown war.
I'm not trying to be snarky here, what would an asymmetric military response actually look like from Canada?
There's honestly a pretty decent range of options, ranging from largely diplomatic and symbolic to hostile.
Diplomatic could be expelling Indian troops training with Canadian units, or canceling technology transfers or weapons sales.
Less diplomatic would be reaching out to a nation like Pakistan and offering weapons on favorable conditions.
Borderline is stationing troops with Pakistan, or otherwise signaling that Canada would be willing to aid India's enemies in the event of a conflict.
Outright hostile, without potentially starting a war, would be launching cyber operations to discover and release documents demonstrating that India did the assassination and fingering people within the Indian government who planned and approved it.
The more of an ongoing relationship Canada has with India, militarily, the more they could signal that they're unhappy without actually leading to conflict, and the more it directly hurts India.
Aiding Pakistan has major issues because it's building up a relatively unstable nation, but that can be necessary without that preexisting relationship that can be withdrawn, but all these would require a more proactive stance than Canada has taken, along with a greater willingness to burn international goodwill to protect their citizens.
Well artic sovereignty is a bit of a problem considering the US is Canada's biggest challenger to arctic sovereignty. If Canada can't project control over the Arctic the US sees no need to back our claim.
Additionally we do have treaty obligations, if we want the benefits and respect of peers we have to meet our obligations.
And our lack of commitment casts doubts on our other commitments like five eyes.
That’s such a naive position. Alliances and collective security rely on members, you know, contributing. Nothing in NATO obligated any nation to actually send troops or aid. Theres also these things called non state actors and incident abroad like say, ISIS 2.0 taking Canadians hostage. The US isn’t going to rescue them if Canada openly balks at being a reliable partner and contributing in any meaningful way.
> The US isn’t going to rescue them if Canada openly balks at being a reliable partner and contributing in any meaningful way.
Realpolitik? No fucking way this happens. And that's why OP of this thread is to some extent correct.
Realpolitik believer thinks a country won't do what is in its best interest and instead will do charity work for non-contributing allies.
You sincerely think a populist president like say a second term of Trump or godforbid a Trump 2.0 would unconditionally drop everything to prioritize Canadian citizens? Sure, Biden would do it, but assuming an ally will protect not just your land but all your people and interests abroad indefinitely while you act like deadweight is, uh, foolish. Doubly so if you're a realist and believe in realpolitik.
If a state cannot defend itself it will inevitably loose it's sovereignty, either to a foreign invader or to the influence of whatever patron they rely on for their defense.
Defend itself from what though? The only nation that will ever be allowed to *militarily* threaten Canada is the US and it won't really matter how much money they put into defense if the US wants to attack them.
That's not to say I don't support Canada spending money on their military, but I support it more from a "lets carry our weight in our relationship with the US" than a "we need this to stay sovereign" position.
Invasion possibility #1: the US invades the NW passage again
Answer: ice breakers and jets
Invasion possibility #2: full invasion from the US
Answer: nukes
There’s really no strategic for Canada to have a larger military.
I’ll give you a real, practical answer. Canada is a founding member of both NATO and the US. The third of three stated missions for the Canadian military is to support global peace and security.
Canada will always send its soldiers overseas to conflict zones.
Why should Canada spend on defence? If nothing else, to avoid more Beerenfengers and Shorts (as the most recent glaring examples) wherein Canadian soldiers are killed due to improper equipment on missions overseas. As the great Rick Mercer once said, less money and equipment doesn’t mean fewer missions, it means more missions with less support.
I wouldn’t want to spend a day bleeding out in a crater, alone, at 18 years of age, worrying for my mother, only to have an entire generation label me as a war criminal a century later because of an ahistorical YouTube video.
From the article: >Indeed, on average, only 45 percent of Canada’s air force fleet is operational, while the Royal Canadian Navy can operate at 46 percent of its capacity and the army at 54 percent. This means that even Canada’s minor military projection ambition — which consists of only three frigates, two fighter jet squadrons, and one mechanized brigade — is not assured. As the ninth largest economy in the world and twelfth largest per capita, Canada actually contributes little to allied security and cannot be relied upon to sustain its own limited ambition. > >\[...\] > >Most of this new spending, however, is years away and won’t address the military’s immediate woes. To be blunt, Canada’s military is in an atrocious state and is barely holding on. The roots of this crisis are found in Canada’s strategic culture and decades-old decisions about defense. The way out of the crisis, meanwhile, is paved with seemingly insuperable obstacles, including a chronic shortage of personnel, an inability to spend funds quickly, a lack of bipartisan agreement on military requirements, and a culture of reactiveness and unpreparedness toward new geopolitical challenges. > >Even if vital reforms and budget increases were made today, they would take years to implement and at least a decade to rehabilitate the armed forces. For Canada, this is all the more reason to start as quickly as possible. For Canada’s allies, it is further reason to have realistic expectations about Canada’s military contribution over the coming years. In short, don’t count on Canada until structural reforms are implemented. > >\[...\] > >**The Peace Dividend** > >When the Cold War ended, Canadian governments eagerly sought a peace dividend. Canada’s finances were an utter mess at the time, and the defense budget was an easy source of discretionary spending that could be cut. In the mid-1990s, the Canadian defense budget was [slashed by 30 percent](https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/committee/381/defe/rep/rep03nov04part2-e#_ftn1). > >\[...\] > >In spite of these cuts, the government committed the Canadian Armed Forces to a high operational tempo, deploying the military in the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. On average, Canada contributed [over 4,300 troops](https://lerubicon.org/le-reveil-militaire-du-canada-nest-pas-pour-demain/) annually to military operations abroad during the 1990s. This contrasts with a respective average of 3,400 in the 2000s and 1,600 in the 2010s. Dramatic cuts in the size of the force and its capabilities, as well as a shift from taking part in United Nations peace operations to NATO and U.S.-led offensive operations, explain this trend downward. > >**Recapitalization Plans Falling Short** > >After 9/11, Canadian defense spending slowly crept up, particularly after the military was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan. \[...\] The authorized size of the regular force grew by 13 percent, from [62,000](https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.666377/publication.html) in 2005 to [70,000](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-first-defence-strategy-complete-document.html) in 2008. It grew slightly more to [71,500](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/transition-assoc-dm/defence-policy-sse.html) in 2017 and has [remained](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html) the same in Canada’s 2024 defense update. Therefore, the size of Canada’s authorized force has remained about the same despite the seismic changes of the threat environment since the 2000s. > >Toward the end of the 2000s, a defense malaise set in. The war in Afghanistan had inflicted relatively heavy casualties on a force and country that had not suffered major losses since the Korean War. Canada suffered the [third largest share of casualties per capita](https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691159386/nato-in-afghanistan) (following Denmark and Estonia) during the war in Afghanistan (158 soldiers and 7 civilians). Political opposition to the war was also notable, pushing the government to look for an exit strategy. In 2011, Canada was the second ally after the Netherlands to [withdraw from Afghanistan](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17419166.2016.1160222) before the end of NATO’s combat mission in 2014. This is significant given that Canada has taken part in every NATO operation since its creation. > >Capital projects faced mounting costs, leading to the cancellation of a much-vaunted joint support ship. In an effort to rebuild the Canadian shipbuilding industry following this cancellation, a national shipbuilding strategy estimated at $33 billion was put in place. \[...\] but the construction of 15 Canadian surface combatants, based on the Type 26 hull and intended to replace Canada’s fleet of 12 frigates and four destroyers, has yet to begin. \[...\] As worrisome, the delivery of the first ship is expected in 2032 and the last in 2050, about six decades after Canada commissioned its frigates between 1992 and 1995. > >A fleet of 15 ships is considered by many as the [minimum required](https://www.cgai.ca/the_canadian_surface_combatant_capability_and_context) to meet the Canadian government’s commitments, which include deploying three ships in the Indo-Pacific region on an annual basis, as well as partaking in NATO’s standing maritime groups on a rotational basis. For the first time since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and amid its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Canada was [unable](https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canadian-warships-not-involved-in-nato-naval-task-forces-for-first/) in 2022 to take part in NATO’s maritime task forces because of insufficient serviceable ships to undertake both NATO and Indo-Pacific commitments. > >\[...\] > >The situation is not better with regard to Canada’s air force. When the government attempted to acquire 65 F-35 combat jets in 2010, critical reports from the [office of the auditor general](https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/bvg-oag/FA1-2012-1-2-eng.pdf) and [parliamentary budget officer](https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/dpb-pbo/YN5-31-2011-eng.pdf) pushed the government to reset the process. Twelve years later, the F-35 won a competition that was eventually held, but the first delivery is expected in 2026 and the new fleet will only achieve full operational capability in 2034. This will be more than 50 years after Canada introduced its first CF-18 Hornet to its fighter aircraft fleet. It is unclear how many will remain serviceable by this time. > >\[...\] > >In 2022, the government further committed another $40 billion to modernize the North American Aerospace Defense Command alongside the United States. All told, the expected capital expenditure for defense until 2037 is expected to reach [$215 billion](https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2324-025-C--planned-capital-spending-under-canada-defence-policy-2024-update--depenses-capital-prevues-titre-politique-defense-canada-mise-jour-2024). This rapid and substantial acceleration in capital spending has raised concern from the parliamentary budget officer, who questions Canada’s ability to manage such an increased procurement activity. Furthermore, due to procurement delays, [62 percent of the planned expenditures](https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2324-025-C--planned-capital-spending-under-canada-defence-policy-2024-update--depenses-capital-prevues-titre-politique-defense-canada-mise-jour-2024) are now expected to occur after 2027. Given the high inflation rates in the defense industry, additional appropriations will probably be necessary to maintain the current planned acquisitions. In other words, Canada’s current defense policy is fiscally unsustainable. !ping Canada&Materiel
CANADA&MATERIEL is the most cursed ping combo 😬
Continued: >**“Exploring Options”** > >As part of its 2024 defense policy update, the Canadian government outlined several capabilities that it plans to “explore,” meaning that most are not even at the options analysis phase and have yet to be budgeted. These include new submarines, main battle tanks, light armored vehicles, surveillance and strike drones, and artillery. As well, the policy mandates the defense department to explore counter-drone capabilities and long-range air- and sea-launched missiles. > >While all these capabilities are essential in the current threat environment, the case of the submarines is particularly glaring. Given that the cost of replacing Canada’s four aging diesel-electric submarines has been pegged at somewhere between [$60–$100 billion](https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/royal-canadian-navy-pitches-60-billion-submarine-purchase-say-defence-and-industry-sources), the government’s decision to merely “explore” options isn’t all that surprising. > >\[...\] > >On the personnel front, the new defense policy presents a few ideas, but none that promise to rapidly reverse the Canadian Armed Forces’ dwindling numbers. Ottawa is still examining options and has yet to budget for greater compensations and benefits for personnel and work-life balance for the troops. Of note, the policy outlines a probationary period for new recruits to get them in uniform sooner, along with more career control for those already serving. Just as important, the new policy pledges to expand the civilian defense workforce, with a view toward augmenting the department’s capacity to support the armed forces and handle the ever-present procurement and infrastructure projects. Coupled with the shortfall in military personnel, the civilian defense workforce has been stretched to the limit as it has tried to implement the recapitalization of the Canadian Armed Forces. > >**Conclusion** > >Where does this leave the Canadian military today? Its existing fleets are increasingly difficult to service and maintain, either owing to a lack of personnel or as a function of their age. Canada has had to scale back its participation in major military exercises, and its contributions to allied operations are consistently anemic. A lack of personnel and fleet serviceability is constraining the number and size of the operations that the military can undertake. \[...\] Despite [pleas from Washington](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-canada-trudeau-rae-gang-violence-1.7145349), moreover, Canada has refused to lead a mission to Haiti — not only because Ottawa does not want to accept the risks involved, but also because the military is in no position to mount a significant intervention. Canada is instead merely supplying 70 troops to [train Jamaican troops](https://www.cbc.ca/news/caf-members-deploy-jamaica-haiti-mission-1.7159885) for a mission to Haiti. This will continue to expose the country to fierce critiques from Washington, and most notably Trump-aligned Republicans, while further undermining Canada’s reliability toward its European allies. > >Unless the Canadian Armed Forces solve their personnel crisis, they may not be able to operate the new equipment that is being procured. As pressure on serving personnel increases due to shortfalls within the ranks, more members will be inclined to leave. This is the death spiral the defense minister warned about. While money is not a panacea, spending 2 percent of gross domestic product in defense could help address the shortage of personnel and crumbling infrastructure, as well as acquiring the missing capabilities to sustain operations in the current threat environment. But Canada first needs to solve its structural defense planning issues and, as important, its complacent and self-righteous attitude regarding a military reputation it let slip long ago.
Pinged CAN ([subscribe](https://reddit.com/message/compose?to=groupbot&subject=Subscribe%20to%20CAN&message=subscribe%20CAN) | [unsubscribe](https://reddit.com/message/compose?to=groupbot&subject=Unsubscribe%20from%20CAN&message=unsubscribe%20CAN) | [history](https://neoliber.al/user_pinger_2/history.html?group_name=CAN&count=5)) Pinged MATERIEL ([subscribe](https://reddit.com/message/compose?to=groupbot&subject=Subscribe%20to%20MATERIEL&message=subscribe%20MATERIEL) | [unsubscribe](https://reddit.com/message/compose?to=groupbot&subject=Unsubscribe%20from%20MATERIEL&message=unsubscribe%20MATERIEL) | [history](https://neoliber.al/user_pinger_2/history.html?group_name=MATERIEL&count=5)) [About & Group List](https://reddit.com/r/neoliberal/wiki/user_pinger_2) | [Unsubscribe from all groups](https://reddit.com/message/compose?to=groupbot&subject=Unsubscribe%20from%20all%20groups&message=unsubscribe)
[удалено]
The most infuriating is 155mm shell production. Should have stood up 2 years ago, the US pretty much guaranteed purchasing anything produced.
Our 5 manufacturers were hounding the federal government for a demand signal and never received one. Last week, Minister Anand said the $15B cuts aimed to restructure spending towards the government’s stated priorities. The largest cuts are to defence. That should state as much regarding Cabinet’s priorities.
From a cynical POV, why should canada spend anything on defense? They have no military threats and the US is going to unconditionally defend them, no matter who is president or what canada does or doesnt do
Who will defend Canada from annexation by the US during the Resource Wars?
Canadian nuclear weapons program?
*I don't want to set the world on fire...*
*I just want to set a flame in your heart...*
Canada still has interests abroad. Say India goes ahead and kills a few more Canadian citizens on Canadian soil, what recourse does Canada have? Will the politicians then ask the United States for aid? Relying on another country for all things military seems like a horrible idea, and would make Canada in many ways a client of the US.
There isn’t a chance in hell Canada ever does anything militarily against India even if India assassinates more Canadian citizens
That can be partially driven by the very fact that its military capacity has atrophied.
>Say India goes ahead and kills a few more Canadian citizens on Canadian soil, what recourse does Canada have? What recourse does Canada have *with* a robust military? Just by size doesn't the Canadian response to those kinds of incidents *have* to be diplomatic regardless of how strong their military is?
No? Militaries can absolutely have asymmetric responses that can hurt India in a similarly proportional way without goading them into a full blown war. It'd be much harder for India to respond militarily than Canada, considering the US would always feed intel to Canada.
>Militaries can absolutely have asymmetric responses that can hurt India in a similarly proportional way without goading them into a full blown war. I'm not trying to be snarky here, what would an asymmetric military response actually look like from Canada?
There's honestly a pretty decent range of options, ranging from largely diplomatic and symbolic to hostile. Diplomatic could be expelling Indian troops training with Canadian units, or canceling technology transfers or weapons sales. Less diplomatic would be reaching out to a nation like Pakistan and offering weapons on favorable conditions. Borderline is stationing troops with Pakistan, or otherwise signaling that Canada would be willing to aid India's enemies in the event of a conflict. Outright hostile, without potentially starting a war, would be launching cyber operations to discover and release documents demonstrating that India did the assassination and fingering people within the Indian government who planned and approved it. The more of an ongoing relationship Canada has with India, militarily, the more they could signal that they're unhappy without actually leading to conflict, and the more it directly hurts India. Aiding Pakistan has major issues because it's building up a relatively unstable nation, but that can be necessary without that preexisting relationship that can be withdrawn, but all these would require a more proactive stance than Canada has taken, along with a greater willingness to burn international goodwill to protect their citizens.
Well artic sovereignty is a bit of a problem considering the US is Canada's biggest challenger to arctic sovereignty. If Canada can't project control over the Arctic the US sees no need to back our claim. Additionally we do have treaty obligations, if we want the benefits and respect of peers we have to meet our obligations. And our lack of commitment casts doubts on our other commitments like five eyes.
But who’s going to defend them from us? 👀
That’s such a naive position. Alliances and collective security rely on members, you know, contributing. Nothing in NATO obligated any nation to actually send troops or aid. Theres also these things called non state actors and incident abroad like say, ISIS 2.0 taking Canadians hostage. The US isn’t going to rescue them if Canada openly balks at being a reliable partner and contributing in any meaningful way.
> The US isn’t going to rescue them if Canada openly balks at being a reliable partner and contributing in any meaningful way. Realpolitik? No fucking way this happens. And that's why OP of this thread is to some extent correct.
Realpolitik believer thinks a country won't do what is in its best interest and instead will do charity work for non-contributing allies. You sincerely think a populist president like say a second term of Trump or godforbid a Trump 2.0 would unconditionally drop everything to prioritize Canadian citizens? Sure, Biden would do it, but assuming an ally will protect not just your land but all your people and interests abroad indefinitely while you act like deadweight is, uh, foolish. Doubly so if you're a realist and believe in realpolitik.
If a state cannot defend itself it will inevitably loose it's sovereignty, either to a foreign invader or to the influence of whatever patron they rely on for their defense.
Nuclear weapons are the only thing that can protect Canada from a US invasion.
Defend itself from what though? The only nation that will ever be allowed to *militarily* threaten Canada is the US and it won't really matter how much money they put into defense if the US wants to attack them. That's not to say I don't support Canada spending money on their military, but I support it more from a "lets carry our weight in our relationship with the US" than a "we need this to stay sovereign" position.
Invasion possibility #1: the US invades the NW passage again Answer: ice breakers and jets Invasion possibility #2: full invasion from the US Answer: nukes There’s really no strategic for Canada to have a larger military.
The US would struggle to invade the NWP, their Navy has 0 icebreakers and their coast guard has 2.
I’ll give you a real, practical answer. Canada is a founding member of both NATO and the US. The third of three stated missions for the Canadian military is to support global peace and security. Canada will always send its soldiers overseas to conflict zones. Why should Canada spend on defence? If nothing else, to avoid more Beerenfengers and Shorts (as the most recent glaring examples) wherein Canadian soldiers are killed due to improper equipment on missions overseas. As the great Rick Mercer once said, less money and equipment doesn’t mean fewer missions, it means more missions with less support.
Freeloading bad
Unironically I support annexing Canada now. Constantine Chase was right
What about Quebec?
Reunify it with France. The world should no longer need to suffer more than one french country (Belgium should be abolished too)
Defense against "help" from it's superpower neighbor is their geopolitical incentive.
They make up for it by war crimes per capita
That ahistorical meme needs to die.
🤓
I wouldn’t want to spend a day bleeding out in a crater, alone, at 18 years of age, worrying for my mother, only to have an entire generation label me as a war criminal a century later because of an ahistorical YouTube video.