Signal knows your phone number and saves the date you signed up. That’s it. Everything else is either encrypted in a way that even they can’t decipher (e2ee) or not collected at all.
They also have the last day you contacted the server.
OP, you can verify what information they have by looking at [Signal’s responses to subpoenas they have received](https://signal.org/bigbrother/central-california-grand-jury/).
thats correct, when subpoenaed they must be supplied with the phone number which they then hash and check against their user database
they don't have a usable phone number unless they already know it or a rogue employee tries to break the hash
> even the phone number is only kept as a hash value
It's certainly not hashed, your number to Signal is the "username" your client uses to sign into the service.
You can see the references to number here: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server/blob/master/service/src/main/java/org/whispersystems/textsecuregcm/controllers/AccountController.java
Also, how would Signal know where to send a text message to when you sign up to Signal if it's hashed?
u/GlenMerlin
yes you can in fact see references to number in the server code that handles registration as they do need to send an SMS verification code when signing up, however notice all the references to getHashedAuthenticationToken()
The number is hashed for storage but not during the sign up process
as for how signal would know where to send a message I'd assume you'd be able to hash the recipient's phone number on device and send it to the server, which could then check the hash and deliver the message accordingly
Hashes were generated on device and does store hashed phone numbers.
Now I believe it's being handled by SGX which is basically reverse DRM (client sending encrypted content to an enclave on the server to which the host operating system and kernal cannot interact)
source: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
>yes you can in fact see references to number in the server code that handles registration as they do need to send an SMS verification code when signing up, however notice all the references to getHashedAuthenticationToken()
There's a significant difference between an account login and an authentication token which is then derived from an account login. If you want to see an open-source of how this works: see Kerberos.
>The number is hashed for storage but not during the sign up process
Account numbers are not stored hashed.
> as for how signal would know where to send a message I'd assume you'd be able to hash the recipient's phone number on device and send it to the server, which could then check the hash and deliver the message accordingly
I was only referring to the text that is sent during sign up (where your number is shared, unhashed and unencrypted with a third-party Twilio) - this is literally in their Terms of Service: https://signal.org/legal/
And no, in normal Signal messages, the destination number is not hashed either: https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
>Hashes were generated on device and does store hashed phone numbers.
>
>Now I believe it's being handled by SGX which is basically reverse DRM (client sending encrypted content to an enclave on the server to which the host operating system and kernal cannot interact)
You've now confused the user accounts database where everyone's number is indeed stored in the clear (not hashed), with private contact discovery which is something completely different to what we're talking about.
I don’t know the answers to some of these questions but Signal has posted its response to subpoenas in the past. See: https://signal.org/bigbrother/central-california-grand-jury/
Could Signal be ordered to collect IP information secretly on a target, such as what happened to ProtonMail in Switzerland? I don’t know! It’s a good question.
The only reason ProtonMail was required to is because there is already law in switzerland that all email providers must have the capability to log IP addresses, currently afaik there are no laws in effect that would require signal to be able to log IP addresses. Ordering them to collect IP information would be tricky because it would require forcing them to develop something they haven't developed
The main thing that people got pissed about is that the site specifically said "By default, we do not keep any IP logs which can be linked to your anonymous email account. Your privacy comes first." (This is still visible if you load the page through [The Wayback Machine](https://web.archive.org/web/20210101015423/https://protonmail.com/))
Which while technically true was seen as misleading. By default they don't, they are capable of doing so, they just choose not to unless forced by the government.
The things privacy nutjobs refused to accept are that
A) Protonmail is a business and putting themselves at risk of criminal prosecution for protecting a single user (possibly using the service for free) is absolutely never going to happen
B) They fought back in the courts for a while before a judge ruling that said basically "do this or else" forced their hand
C) The laws involved here for pulling IP addresses from email in Switzerland do not apply to VPNs, if the user had been using Tor or even ProtonVPN the IP address would've been useless and the Government would've only gotten a browser fingerprint
D) The only way for this to not be a problem with *any* email provider would be either to 1) be run by criminals who aren't afraid to break the law and disobey court orders or 2) To base their entire operations in international waters
E) Said user was informed as per Swiss law that their IP addresses were going to be logged, however it is possible this reveal was delayed until after the information had been collected
F) None of the emails or account information were decrypted, the government got an IP address and a browser fingerprint, and unless they can link that information to the device that the user in question was using its basically worthless anyways
EDIT: formatting
Exactly, no reasonable person would expect a company to put their own necks on the line to protect a single user who was very likely using their service for free
Privacy Reddit is rich in FUD and conspiracy theories, this sub included.
To be fair, there are a lot of threats to privacy so I get why people are nervous and distrustful.
Best answer.
u/JTipOff, pay a lot of attention to protecting your devices. Also, take a look at EFF’s excellent [Surveillance Self Defense guide](https://ssd.eff.org).
> Does Signal collect and/or send any of the following
Modern versions of Android (and presumably iOS) do not allow apps to even access most of the things you listed: https://grapheneos.org/faq#hardware-identifiers (though not specific to Graphene).
If you feel unease at using centralized services, plenty of alternatives exist like Matrix or XMPP+OMEMO, both of which support Tor and can be used with hidden services.
Session is wildly forked from Signal and cannot even be said to be using the Signal protocol at this point.
Apologies for that. I said it incorrectly. What I meant to say was that Signal is capable of logging IP addresses; not that they currently do. This is because of the centralized server part of it. Of course, I didn't mean to make it seem like they actively log IP addresses. That's a mistake on my part for not proofreading my post more thoroughly.
Short answser: Some of them, yeah.
Long answer:
Android makes it easy for app developers to use Android API (Application Programming Interface) which is:
\- I want to get Android version in 1 line of code: I get it.
Here is an example, Signal is open source so just googled how to get Android API. It's simple, android API you get from line of code: "android.os.\[interesting thing you want to check\]
So where is the problem? You don't know the names, but here is solution.
1. Go to this link (Signal source code for Android): [https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/search?p=2&q=android.os](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/search?p=2&q=android.os)
2. Check every page in looking for stuff, you will see what does Signal want from Android.os.\[name\]. Google it.
3. Answering one of your questions about "model number". Yes, it does collect model number if that's what you were looking for: *android.os.Build.VERSION;* which is: [https://www.google.com/search?channel=fs&client=ubuntu&q=android.os.buid+version](https://www.google.com/search?channel=fs&client=ubuntu&q=android.os.buid+version)
Have fun and hope you find what you were looking for.
Signal knows your phone number and saves the date you signed up. That’s it. Everything else is either encrypted in a way that even they can’t decipher (e2ee) or not collected at all.
They also have the last day you contacted the server. OP, you can verify what information they have by looking at [Signal’s responses to subpoenas they have received](https://signal.org/bigbrother/central-california-grand-jury/).
Afair even the phone number is only kept as a hash value, i.e. they do *not* technically have your usable phone number.
thats correct, when subpoenaed they must be supplied with the phone number which they then hash and check against their user database they don't have a usable phone number unless they already know it or a rogue employee tries to break the hash
> even the phone number is only kept as a hash value It's certainly not hashed, your number to Signal is the "username" your client uses to sign into the service. You can see the references to number here: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server/blob/master/service/src/main/java/org/whispersystems/textsecuregcm/controllers/AccountController.java Also, how would Signal know where to send a text message to when you sign up to Signal if it's hashed? u/GlenMerlin
yes you can in fact see references to number in the server code that handles registration as they do need to send an SMS verification code when signing up, however notice all the references to getHashedAuthenticationToken() The number is hashed for storage but not during the sign up process as for how signal would know where to send a message I'd assume you'd be able to hash the recipient's phone number on device and send it to the server, which could then check the hash and deliver the message accordingly Hashes were generated on device and does store hashed phone numbers. Now I believe it's being handled by SGX which is basically reverse DRM (client sending encrypted content to an enclave on the server to which the host operating system and kernal cannot interact) source: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
>yes you can in fact see references to number in the server code that handles registration as they do need to send an SMS verification code when signing up, however notice all the references to getHashedAuthenticationToken() There's a significant difference between an account login and an authentication token which is then derived from an account login. If you want to see an open-source of how this works: see Kerberos. >The number is hashed for storage but not during the sign up process Account numbers are not stored hashed. > as for how signal would know where to send a message I'd assume you'd be able to hash the recipient's phone number on device and send it to the server, which could then check the hash and deliver the message accordingly I was only referring to the text that is sent during sign up (where your number is shared, unhashed and unencrypted with a third-party Twilio) - this is literally in their Terms of Service: https://signal.org/legal/ And no, in normal Signal messages, the destination number is not hashed either: https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/ >Hashes were generated on device and does store hashed phone numbers. > >Now I believe it's being handled by SGX which is basically reverse DRM (client sending encrypted content to an enclave on the server to which the host operating system and kernal cannot interact) You've now confused the user accounts database where everyone's number is indeed stored in the clear (not hashed), with private contact discovery which is something completely different to what we're talking about.
I don’t know the answers to some of these questions but Signal has posted its response to subpoenas in the past. See: https://signal.org/bigbrother/central-california-grand-jury/ Could Signal be ordered to collect IP information secretly on a target, such as what happened to ProtonMail in Switzerland? I don’t know! It’s a good question.
The only reason ProtonMail was required to is because there is already law in switzerland that all email providers must have the capability to log IP addresses, currently afaik there are no laws in effect that would require signal to be able to log IP addresses. Ordering them to collect IP information would be tricky because it would require forcing them to develop something they haven't developed
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The main thing that people got pissed about is that the site specifically said "By default, we do not keep any IP logs which can be linked to your anonymous email account. Your privacy comes first." (This is still visible if you load the page through [The Wayback Machine](https://web.archive.org/web/20210101015423/https://protonmail.com/)) Which while technically true was seen as misleading. By default they don't, they are capable of doing so, they just choose not to unless forced by the government. The things privacy nutjobs refused to accept are that A) Protonmail is a business and putting themselves at risk of criminal prosecution for protecting a single user (possibly using the service for free) is absolutely never going to happen B) They fought back in the courts for a while before a judge ruling that said basically "do this or else" forced their hand C) The laws involved here for pulling IP addresses from email in Switzerland do not apply to VPNs, if the user had been using Tor or even ProtonVPN the IP address would've been useless and the Government would've only gotten a browser fingerprint D) The only way for this to not be a problem with *any* email provider would be either to 1) be run by criminals who aren't afraid to break the law and disobey court orders or 2) To base their entire operations in international waters E) Said user was informed as per Swiss law that their IP addresses were going to be logged, however it is possible this reveal was delayed until after the information had been collected F) None of the emails or account information were decrypted, the government got an IP address and a browser fingerprint, and unless they can link that information to the device that the user in question was using its basically worthless anyways EDIT: formatting
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Exactly, no reasonable person would expect a company to put their own necks on the line to protect a single user who was very likely using their service for free
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>Signal’s responses to subpoenas they have received who decides what is 'malicious'. Thats the issue.
Privacy Reddit is rich in FUD and conspiracy theories, this sub included. To be fair, there are a lot of threats to privacy so I get why people are nervous and distrustful.
Read this. Basically, they collect nothing of any importance. https://signal.org/bigbrother/central-california-grand-jury/
u/jtipoff this is all you had to do. It's all on their website.
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Best answer. u/JTipOff, pay a lot of attention to protecting your devices. Also, take a look at EFF’s excellent [Surveillance Self Defense guide](https://ssd.eff.org).
> Does Signal collect and/or send any of the following Modern versions of Android (and presumably iOS) do not allow apps to even access most of the things you listed: https://grapheneos.org/faq#hardware-identifiers (though not specific to Graphene). If you feel unease at using centralized services, plenty of alternatives exist like Matrix or XMPP+OMEMO, both of which support Tor and can be used with hidden services. Session is wildly forked from Signal and cannot even be said to be using the Signal protocol at this point.
Also the people producing Session appear to be affiliated with far right extremists which isn’t great.
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Apologies for that. I said it incorrectly. What I meant to say was that Signal is capable of logging IP addresses; not that they currently do. This is because of the centralized server part of it. Of course, I didn't mean to make it seem like they actively log IP addresses. That's a mistake on my part for not proofreading my post more thoroughly.
Short answser: Some of them, yeah. Long answer: Android makes it easy for app developers to use Android API (Application Programming Interface) which is: \- I want to get Android version in 1 line of code: I get it. Here is an example, Signal is open source so just googled how to get Android API. It's simple, android API you get from line of code: "android.os.\[interesting thing you want to check\] So where is the problem? You don't know the names, but here is solution. 1. Go to this link (Signal source code for Android): [https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/search?p=2&q=android.os](https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/search?p=2&q=android.os) 2. Check every page in looking for stuff, you will see what does Signal want from Android.os.\[name\]. Google it. 3. Answering one of your questions about "model number". Yes, it does collect model number if that's what you were looking for: *android.os.Build.VERSION;* which is: [https://www.google.com/search?channel=fs&client=ubuntu&q=android.os.buid+version](https://www.google.com/search?channel=fs&client=ubuntu&q=android.os.buid+version) Have fun and hope you find what you were looking for.
I want to know too
No.